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In 2020, the way we define “insecurity” has drastically 
changed. Indeed, insecurity can now also be invisible and 
all around us, in the shape of a virus that disrupts people’s 
lives, upends the economy, subverts the core functions of 
national governments and jeopardises the foundations of 
international cooperation. Still, the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic 
has not made traditional security challenges disappear, 
especially in and around Asia.
This Report presents short- and long-term scenarios for 
each of the hotspots that challenge peace and stability in 
Asia, a region that, after the pandemic, has become ever 
more crucial to global recovery.
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Introduction
In 2020, the way we define “insecurity” has drastically changed. 
No longer does it automatically bring to mind images of 
armed groups, or a fleet of missiles: insecurity can now also be 
invisible and all around us, in the shape of a virus that disrupts 
people’s lives, upends the economy, subverts the core functions 
of national governments, and jeopardises the foundations of 
international cooperation.
Still, the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic has not made traditional 
security challenges disappear. As it did with other aspects of our 
lives, with the “help” of national lockdowns and restrictions to 
international mobility, the virus merely pushed those challenges 
to the background. After the first wave of the pandemic 
subsided and restrictions eased, the terrorist attacks in France 
last November have served as a painful reminder to Europeans 
of potential short-term rebounds of violence.
In Asia, one of the world’s most insecure continents, the pause 
button had not even been fully pressed. In fact, in the spring of 
2020, while the world was struggling to contain the death toll of 
Sars-CoV-2, China declared new administrative divisions in the 
South China Sea, stirring the waters of regional contestation. 
Put differently: Beijing has exploited the crisis caused by the 
global pandemic to unilaterally declare that disputed territories 
in the South China Sea are integral parts of Chinese national 
sovereign territory. Around the same time, despite the raging 
health and food crises, North Korea launched short-range cruise 
missiles off its eastern coast, redoubling concerns in Japan and 
Post-Pandemic Asia: A New Normal for Regional Security?8
South Korea. During the summer, terrorist attacks broke the 
truce negotiated by the pandemic in the Philippines, while 
China and the United States (U.S.) moved their respective naval 
vessels around the Taiwan Straits. In addition, the China-India 
border was tainted by the first serious violent clashes since the 
“Line of Actual Control” had been established in the 1910s. 
Lastly, in the fall, anti-government protests erupted in Thailand 
and Indonesia.
Therefore, despite the (one can only hope) uniqueness of 
2020, traditional security challenges have remained pressing 
in the Asia Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions, adding a layer of 
complexity to states’ policy responses to the Sars-CoV-2 health 
and economic crises. As many have argued, the pandemic is 
acting as the “great accelerator” of our time. While the crisis has 
had some positive effects – for instance, by accelerating green 
energy transitions – it is also bound to continue amplifying 
longstanding and new security challenges, which will remain 
with us as the world continues to look for its “new normal”.
The above-mentioned events and developments span all 
major Asian hotspots, which are currently at risk of experiencing 
a post-crisis escalation first-hand. This is one of the reasons why 
this Report presents short- and long-term scenarios for each 
one of the hotspots that challenge peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific regions. Both areas remain crucial 
for the global post-pandemic economic recovery, partly due 
to China’s global role, and partly due to the recently signed 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement, 
which in the longer term is set to spur regional trade. Therefore, 
Asia’s security remains paramount to the international system, as 
the world cannot afford security crises that jeopardise economic 
recovery at this current fragile juncture.
The first chapter analyses the search for new security 
paradigms in the region. Niklas Swanström identifies China-
U.S. competition as the crucial factor affecting Asia’s current 
security landscape. According to Swanström, the growing 
polarisation between authoritarian regimes and democracies 
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during the pandemic has brought the China-U.S. rivalry even 
more to the fore. Coupled with a gradual linking of traditional 
and non-traditional security challenges, the competition is the 
element that is more likely to determine either a cooperating or 
conflicting period for Asia over the next few years.
The topic is further developed by Valérie Niquet in the 
second chapter. The author holds China’s global engagement 
strategy accountable for aggravating Asia’s “Thucydides trap”, 
but also warns that the establishment of an alliance similar to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a security 
provider is unfeasible, especially as Asia is still coming to terms 
with a U.S.-created power vacuum that no regional power has 
been able to fill. Although Japan is the best-suited candidate, 
it lacks the military capabilities and reach to become a credible 
power. Indeed, what at a first glance appears to be a textbook 
example of “great power competition”, Niquet argues, actually is 
a collection of regional “survival strategies” that were developed 
in an effort to react to China’s hubris.
Moving on, Shino Watanabe presents an in-depth analysis 
of China and the U.S.’s penetration within the continent. The 
author identifies a crucial strategic tool for Beijing in the massive 
presence of Chinese officials in the United Nations (UN), which 
has proved to be an asset for the country’s efforts to become 
a central protagonist in multilateral frameworks around the 
world and in the region. As Watanabe contends, there is still no 
real competition for China in Asia: the “Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue” (Quad) bringing together the U.S., Japan, India, and 
Australia is in fact lacking full institutionalisation and cannot 
yet rival China’s sophisticated cooperative frameworks like the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What would make a difference 
for Asia would be a U.S. re-engagement. However, even under 
the new Biden presidency, not only could the U.S. show that the 
country for now has other priorities (e.g., the national health 
and economic crises), but it might also be nearly impossible for 
Biden to match China’s pace of regional expansion.
Post-Pandemic Asia: A New Normal for Regional Security?10
The remaining chapters maintain the China-U.S. 
confrontation in Asia as a premise, while looking at three 
security challenges in particular. Cristina Varriale begins by 
offerings insights into Asia’s nuclear threat, by examining the 
crucial case of North Korea. At the core of Varriale’s argument 
is the connection between the issue of proliferation and the 
military innovation of the country’s arsenal. To this day, China 
and the U.S. maintain contrasting approaches to North Korea: 
the former actually benefits from the country’s instability, 
while the latter prefers a diplomatic approach to Pyongyang’s 
demilitarisation. As the author argues, Sars-CoV-2 has made 
access to North Korea even more difficult, thus further 
endangering the country’s “diplomatic denuclearisation” and, 
as sanctions cannot be lifted, anything resembling economic 
growth and recovery.
Abhijit Singh’s chapter makes a case for the dual role – 
military and economic – of Asia’s sea lanes. The author stresses 
the fact that regional powers will be forced towards cooperation 
in the post-pandemic world to ensure that maritime routes are 
secured. However, Singh adds that an escalation of the China-
U.S. competition, or the simple continuation of the trade war, 
risks bringing about a profound restructuring of both Asia’s sea 
lanes and regional value chains, to the detriment of regional 
security.
Lastly, the impact of Sars-CoV-2 as a trend accelerator is at 
the core of Giulia Sciorati’s chapter on terrorism in Asia. The 
author unpacks terrorist trends in the continent after the 2014 
global peak, showing a partial realignment to global tendencies. 
The pandemic, Sciorati contends, has heightened the risk of 
radicalisation by forcing the quick, unregulated digitalisation 
of everyday life and by inspiring the resurgence of narratives 
(especially in Islamic countries) that link national epidemic 
outbreaks to un-Islamic behaviour. The author concludes by 
pinpointing Indonesia and Muslim regions in the Philippines 
as the areas in Asia where de-radicalisation strategies should be 
implemented as part and in support of a post-pandemic recovery.
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In the last chapter, Axel Berkofsky analyses the current and 
future EU and European role in, and impact on, security in 
the Indo-Pacific Region. Between 2018 and 2020, France, 
Germany and the Netherlands have all adopted their own 
national Indo-Pacific policy strategies, and the EU has also 
announced it will adopt its strategy some time this year. While 
all of this looks ambitious, pointing to new European courage 
and determination to make tangible contributions to peace 
and stability in the Indo-Pacific, business will continue to rule 
supreme for Europe (and its multinational, above all German, 
companies). In other words, and as the very recent adoption 
of the EU-China trade and investment agreement shows, the 
author concludes that European preparedness to confront and 
deter the “Chinese elephant” in the room will continue to 
remain fairly limited.  
In conclusion, although we will undoubtedly witness 
the further reintegration of non-traditional into traditional 
security challenges over the next few years, the complexity 
of Asia’s security landscape should not to be underestimated, 
as Sars-CoV-2 has taken the continent to a critical juncture. 
Traditional and non-traditional insecurities, in fact, are bound 
to morph into new conglomerates that the region will need to 
counterbalance by devising new, multifaceted tools. Still, even 
after a pandemic, the fragile equilibrium between China and 
the U.S. will remain at the core of Asia’s insecurities, mimicking 
the regime struggle between non-democratic and democratic 
powers that is now posing challenges to security worldwide.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President
1.  Linking Economic and Security Factors 
     and Policies After the Pandemic
Niklas Swanström
The Sars-CoV-2 pandemic (also called Corona pandemic in 
this chapter) is a challenge that most states are still struggling 
to handle. Originating in Wuhan, China, the pandemic is 
spreading and affecting the entire world. Arguably, to date it has 
hit Brazil and the U.S. the hardest. From the outset it appears 
as though East Asia has been much more successful than many 
other parts of the world in managing this pandemic, but the 
threat to states and their respective citizens still looms large, and 
globalisation and state interaction have fundamentally changed. 
Usually, such an extreme situation would trigger cooperation. 
However, so far, only modest levels of cooperation have been 
seen and instead we have witnessed a rise of nationalistic 
sentiment, heightening already existing trends of conflict and 
triggering new blame game tactics at both a regional and global 
level. The lack of collaboration between states has even affected 
the EU, where cooperation fell apart, and national interest took 
priority, arguably allowing Sars-CoV-2 to spread more easily in 
Europe.1 Moreover, new and dormant conflict lines have been 
allowed to come to the surface, to such an extent that there 
have been accusations that individual states have been using 
the crisis to further their political agendas in their respective 
regions.  
1 G. Friedman, “The Coronavirus Crisis and the Geopolitical Impact”, Horizons, 
Journal of  International Relations and Sustainable Development, no. 6, 2020, pp. 24-29.
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It has been argued that the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic has 
changed the terms of economic interaction and that there has 
been a change of global leadership that would fundamentally 
change international security. Some have even argued more 
than one significant power has used Sars-CoV-2 to strengthen 
their political positions by politicising or possibly weaponising 
the situation.2 This chapter looks at the economic and political 
impact at regional and international level to outline what has 
changed as a consequence of Sars-CoV-2 and if there has been 
the watershed change that is often presented in media. The 
conclusion of the chapter is that we have seen changes in the 
regional and international levels, but that the pandemic has 
reinforced already existing trends, rather than creating new 
ones. The world, and Asia, is heading towards a future of more 
nationalism, anti-democratic tendencies and Europe risks being 
a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution unless 
political leadership is demonstrated in Brussels and the capitals 
of the European members.
Construction of Alternative Realities?
It would be naïve to assume a potentially powerful political 
tool such as a pandemic would not be used in domestic and 
international agendas. China, especially, has been able to assert 
its influence in several global organisations, promoted Chinese 
values, and an illiberal agenda which undermines democratic 
states and democratic values.3 Even if the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic 
is not turning China into a world leader overnight,4 it has 
2 T. Dearing, Weaponizing the Ties that Bind: China’s Clear Message to Australia Amid 
the SARS-CoV-2 Inquiry Cause Celebre, Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 23 
June 2020.
3 S. Zhao, “Rhetoric and Reality of  China’s Global Leadership in the Context 
of  SARS-COV-2: Implications for the US-led World Order and Liberal 
Globalization”, Journal of  Contemporary China, 7 July 2020.
4 M. Green and E. Medeiros, “The Pandemic Won’t Make China the World’s 
Leader”, Foreign Affairs, 15 April, 2020.
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effectively attacked its competitors’ political foundations, 
particularly as the U.S., at least in terms of perception, retreats 
from international institutions and alliances.
If a Cold War 2.0 or a geopolitical shift emerges from 
the rubble of the pandemic, it will challenge much-needed 
economic recovery and future efforts to combat global 
challenges in general. The direction we have seen so far during 
the Corona pandemic has not evoked a vision of a promising 
democratic future. China, which has contested U.S. global 
leadership for some years, saw an opportunity in the pandemic 
and presented an action-oriented aid and assistance strategy 
for states in peril. The success has been debatable, but Beijing’s 
intention to promote China as a responsible leader has been 
clear. Sino-U.S. tensions are not new, but with the Corona 
pandemic, the negative decline has accelerated. Of course 
these tensions grow not just out of international posturing, but 
from domestic factors in both China and the U.S., such as the 
U.S. presidential campaign and the question of Xi’s political 
coalition support in China.5 
Confrontations between the U.S. and China have developed 
into more than just a rhetorical war. Each side has discredited 
the other and implemented strategically damaging economic 
policies, such as closed doors for Huawei, sanctions for 
human rights breaches in Xinjiang, etc. China has responded 
with countermeasures on imports and sanctions against U.S. 
legislators, such as Senators Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio for 
their criticism of the crackdown in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. 
In and among the hard policies have come rhetorical attacks. 
President Trump and the U.S. have focused on China’s failure 
to act quickly to stop the spread of the virus, to openly share 
information, and take responsibility. While Beijing has mostly 
concentrated on discrediting democratic institutions for a 
5 G. Shih, “A lion of  a porcupine? Insecurity drives China’s Xi to take on the 
world”, The Washington Post, 7 August 2020; M. Pei, “China’s Coming Upheaval: 
Competition, the Coronavirus, and the Weakness of  Xi Jinping”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 100, no. May/June, 2020. 
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perceived failure to perform, it has also been attempting to 
change the narrative to suggest that the pandemic originated 
in the U.S., which they have pursued through mass media 
campaigns, inserting false information, and threatening states 
and institutions etc.6
The various names that have been attached to this strand 
of the virus and its origins indicate a willingness to politicise 
the pandemic, a politicisation that has directly impacted Asia’s 
security dimension. China’s refusal to take onus for being 
the source of the virus coupled with the attempt to deny 
any responsibility for the subsequent spread indicates both a 
domestic drive and an international ambition to benefit from 
the pandemic. In parallel, President Trump has attempted to 
reinforce the connection of the pandemic to China by naming 
it the “Kung Flu”, “the Wuhan Flu”, the “China Flu” etc.
President Xi initially attempted to centre China’s actions in 
the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic around his concept of a “community 
of common destiny for mankind”, with his premier vision to 
transform China into a global leader.7 It seems as though China 
has used the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic as a test case to expand 
China’s global leadership role, something that could explain 
the harsh reactions to even modest criticism of China’s actions 
in the pandemic. China has consistently attempted to change 
the narrative surrounding the pandemic to fit its political 
objectives, to the point the initial support for Wuhan from 
the U.S. and the EU has been suppressed in this narrative. For 
example, the U.S. sent 18 tonnes of medical supplies to Wuhan 
to support China in combating the early stages of the outbreak, 
which was seemingly silenced in the Chinese storyline.8 By 
6 K. Campbell and R. Doshi, “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order: 
China is Maneuvering for International Leadership as the United States 
Falters”, Foreign Affairs, 18 March 2020; P. Rough, “How China is Exploiting the 
Coronavirus to Weaken Democracies”, Foreign Policy, 25 March 2020.
7 D. Dorman, “China’s Global SARS-COV-2 Assistance is Humanitarian and 
Geopolitical”, Security Nexus, April 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24866 
8 M. Crowley, E. Wong, and L. Jakes, “Corona virus Drives the U.S. and China 
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contrast, Chinese aid to the outside world and its expertise 
in combating the coronavirus have been heavily promoted by 
China, ignoring the delivery of often-faulty medical equipment 
coupled with the political and economic pressure and threats 
that have accompanied China’s international engagement. 
Moreover, the achievements of Taiwan and South Korea in 
tackling the virus, two close neighbours with similarly densely 
populated urban centres, have purposefully been ignored as this 
success does fit with the narrative Beijing wants to push. This 
tactic was somewhat successful in the early days of the pandemic, 
as a U.S. or EU policy that could provide an alternative was 
largely absent and President Trump’s unpredictable and rather 
confused statements played into the hands of Beijing.
Equally crucial to the tensions that have arisen during the 
pandemic is the strong recognition globalisation has created 
unwanted and sometimes even dangerous dependencies. At the 
beginning of the pandemic most general medical supplies were 
produced in China. In June 2020, China was producing 150 
tonnes per day of mask fabric, 15 times the quantity the U.S. was 
able to manufacture.9 Pharmaceutical dependency will decrease 
due to the challenges many states face in the light of the Sars-
CoV-2 pandemic. Japan has already adopted severe measures to 
limit any potential future impact by reducing foreign investment 
in the pharmaceutical sector.10 Countries throughout Asia have 
attempted to decrease their dependency on China by changing 
their supply chains.11 Moreover, agricultural production and 
consumer goods will increasingly need a domestic base in the 
future to avoid a complete absence of stock. 
Deeper into Global Power Struggle”, New York Times, 22 March 2020. 
9 K. Bradsher, “China Dominates Medical Supplies, in This Outbreak and the 
Next”, The New York Times, 26 October 2020.
10 Nikkei Staff  Writers, “Japan to Block Foreign Investments in Medicine amid 
Coronavirus”, Nikkei Asia, 22 April 2020. 
11 C. Campe, “Supply chain cooperation to reduce dependency on China”, Asia 
Fund Managers, 8 September 2020.
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External dependency and national interests in Europe made 
joint action problematic, as states focused primarily on their 
own security and disregarded the regional context. This was an 
unfortunate reality for the European Union and their ambitions 
for better integration as there should be no reason why Europe 
needs to rely on external parties to supply strategic goods, such 
as medical supplies, but rather use its shared common market 
to meet the needs of individual states. Europe should use this 
period as an incentive to minimise any external dependency on 
goods and trade and maintain its independence by strengthening 
internal production and independence while still building new 
free trade agreements with the rest of the world.
Is There a New Security Landscape 
After Sars-CoV-2?
In early 2020, Berkofsky and Sciorati asked if China was 
playing ball or rocking the boat.12 Over the course of this year 
at least it is clear that China has certainly been rocking the 
boat, both unintentionally and intentionally. China’s “Wolf 
Warrior diplomacy” strategy in combination with its pandemic 
aid, violation of the democratic institutions in Hong Kong, 
“re-education” camps in Xinjiang,13 mounting pressures in 
the South China Sea, heightening tensions in Cross-Strait 
relations, as well as skirmishes in the Himalayas, have been 
sending a clear message to regional states: we are on your side 
as long as our interests and preferences are guaranteed. The 
pressure and demands China has put on many of its “allies” 
have reached unprecedented levels.14 The harsh response China 
12 A. Berkofsky and G. Sciorati, Mapping China’s Global Future: Playing Ball or 
Rocking the Boat?, Milan, ISPI-Ledizioni Ledi Publishing, 2020. 
13 E. Graham-Harrison, “China Has Built 380 Internment Camps in Xinjiang, 
Study Finds”, The Guardian, 26 October 2020.
14 C. Grundy-Warr and S. Lin, “SARS-COV-2 geopolitics: Silence and erasure in 
Cambodia and Myanmar in times of  pandemic”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 
vol. 61, no. 4-5, 2020.
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has taken to any international criticism of what it considers 
to be its “internal affairs” has been exceedingly sharp. During 
the Corona pandemic, the same pattern was seen when China 
attempted to rewrite and change the narrative to fit its political 
purposes and long-term plan in Asia as well as internationally. 
China tried to project itself as the saviour of Asia (especially 
in the absence of the U.S.) and as a reliable power under its 
umbrella of a “common destiny of mankind”. 
It was a great surprise to many Chinese policymakers 
that the response to the country’s Sars-CoV-2 assistance was 
not received entirely positively and that so many parties saw 
through Beijing’s attempts to reformulate the narrative and 
use this in its political agenda. The pandemic also manifested 
China’s attempts to control regional and international bodies 
to expand its influence and implement a significant degree 
of self-censorship in these organisations. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) has come out of the pandemic very 
much tainted by Chinese pressure and its kowtow to Beijing 
and flagrant denial of the health needs of Taiwan (also known 
as the Republic of China and considered a renegade province 
by Beijing).15 It has also become evident China has significant 
influence over health issues internationally, to the extent they 
prevented Taiwan from sitting on  WHO roundtables, despite 
the significant success Taiwan has had in countering the Sars-
CoV-2 epidemic. 
The support and aid that came during the early stages of the 
pandemic to China has not been noted at all in its domestic 
media. Instead, once Beijing was able to get the epidemic under 
control locally, China’s support for the outside world has been 
used in what could be termed as Sars-CoV-2 diplomacy.16 This 
Sars-CoV-2 diplomacy tactic was, of course, put in place after 
China delayed critical information about the novel coronavirus 
15 H. Davidson, “Senior WHO Adviser Appears to Dodge Question on Taiwan’s 
SARS-CoV-2 Response”, The Guardian, 26 October 2020.
16 K. Campbell and M. Rapp-Hooper, “China Is Done Biding Its Time: The End 
of  Beijing’s Foreign Policy Restraint?”, Foreign Affairs, 15 July 2020. 
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and purchased a great deal of the global supply of health 
equipment, something that has put China at odds with several 
governments, particularly the U.S.17 The criticism that has, 
rightfully, come out of Washington regarding China’s behaviour 
has infuriated Beijing and increased tensions between them.18 
China has been attempting to push the narrative that its 
own political system and leadership capability have been 
instrumental in managing the pandemic, a storyline that is not 
entirely reflected by the facts. Arguably democracies such as 
South Korea and China’s own “renegade province” Taiwan have 
been much more successful and transparent in their policies 
to manage Sars-CoV-2. However, putting reality aside, this is 
not how China has presented it and there is little chance of 
that changing. Beijing has been actively using the construct 
that democracies, particularly the U.S., cannot respond 
appropriately to crises either regionally or internationally. 
China has been very blunt in its ties to the outside world; 
the states that have criticised China’s behaviour during the 
pandemic or referred to the epidemic as the Wuhan virus have 
been sharply rebuked by Beijing. One example of this is the 
case of Australia, when Canberra called for an independent 
evaluation of the source of the virus. Shortly after the Chinese 
ambassador to Australia explained that tourism, education, and 
trade would be affected if Australia continued to press for such 
an investigation.19 There have been several similar incidents 
that have occurred all around Asia and in other regions. As a 
countering paradigm, China has claimed that the U.S. Army 
brought the virus to Wuhan and that it is not a virus originating 
in China.20 More than simply being a claim that disregards all 
17 M. Crowley M. Wong and L. Jakes (2020).
18 Ibid.
19 T. Dearing (2020); A. Tillet, “China consumer backlash looms over Morrison’s 
coronavirus probe”, Australian Financial Review, 26 April 2020; P. Karp, “China’s 
trade bans are retaliation to SARS-COV-2 inquiry, more than half  of  Australians 
say”, The Guardian, 25 May 2020.
20 Reuters Staff, “China Government Spokesman Says U.S. Army Might Have 
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evidence, it also shows the lack of sincerity from the Chinese 
government; however, it has been somewhat effective in certain 
circles and states (often without free media), serving as an 
alternative paradigm.21 The use of disinformation to discredit 
democratic countries is not a new phenomenon, but the massive 
use of it in China’s Sars-CoV-2 diplomacy is relatively new and 
it is likely that China will continue using this toolbox.
What Impact Has Sars-CoV-2 Had on 
Pre-Existing Trends, and Is It Irreversible? 
It would be a flawed argument to contest Sars-CoV-2 has 
completely changed the international or regional order or even 
its engagement terms. In reality, it has accelerated trends and 
exposed flaws in the global system as well as the failures of 
many democratic states to properly coordinate themselves and 
formulate a crisis response. There is now a strong perception 
the U.S. is withdrawing from international commitments, and 
China is promptly trying to fill the void, promoting the opinion 
that China is the only reliable power to act. In terms of the 
U.S., China has sought to focus on a narrative that points to 
the unpredictability of President Trump and his inability to act. 
When it comes to the EU, the overarching perception is that it 
is a union divided, which has been exploited and highlighted by 
China. Certain polls in Italy have shown China is more popular 
than the U.S. or EU.22 This, even if we could argue China is not 
helping Italy but instead waging information warfare against 
it, is a clear example of the success of Chinese disinformation 
campaigns.23 Other polls such as the Pew Institute show similar 
Brought Virus to China”, Reuters, 26 October 2020.
21 P. Rough (2020).
22 F. Bechis, “Polls Show Concerning Effects of  Chinese Coronavirus Charm 
offensive in Italy”, New Atlanticist, 17 April 2020.
23 M. Ferraresi, “China Isn’t Heling Italy: It’s Waging Information Warfare”, 
Foreign Policy, 31 March 2020.
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tendencies,24  but on the other side we have a lack of moral 
compass among many politicians that will make a compromise 
with China likely. In Asia, there is a similar trend where states 
dependent on China have accepted China’s narrative and are 
reluctant to allow alternative views in media. In Asia, there is a 
similar trend where states dependent on China have accepted 
China’s narrative and are reluctant to allow alternative views in 
media.
Simultaneously, China, and to a certain degree Russia, have 
been actively promoting their political system and their respective 
abilities to take decisive action – this of course is nothing new but 
their focus on building this narrative has accelerated during the 
pandemic.25 The polarisation of interpretations is increasingly 
problematic in Asia, and globally, this has strengthened already 
existing divisions between states and political systems. This 
might not be a Suez moment26 but the significance is there are 
direct impacts on the global security environment. Notably, 
there is increased cooperation between Japan, the U.S., India, 
and Australia in the form of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 
(Quad), and bilateral agreements with the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. The upgrade of 
the Quad to the Foreign Minister meeting in Tokyo in October 
2020 was a direct reaction to China’s misuse of information 
about the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic, its economic fallout, and 
China’s attempts to manipulate the repercussions to fit its 
political agenda, in addition to the maritime challenges China 
increasingly projects.27 It has been argued the Quad could 
be the initial structure of an “Arc of Democracy”,28 but that 
24 L. Silver, K. Devlin and C. Huang, Unfavorable Views of  China Reach Historic 
Highs in Many Countries, Pew Research Center, 6 October, 2020.
25 C. Grundy-Warr and S. Lin (2020). 
26 K. Campbell and R. Doshi (2020).
27 A. Singh, “India, US, Japan and Australia’s Quad: A comprehensive regional 
construct”, Financial Express, 6 October, 2020. 
28 R. Heydarian, “Quad alliance forms ‘arc of  democracy’ around China”, Asia 
Times, 27 July 2020.
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might be too far-reaching unless China increases its pressure 
on democratic states or engages in military confrontation with 
Taiwan. The Quad was initiated in 2007, but the timing was 
premature as there were minimal common security challenges. 
The deepened geopolitical tensions in 2020 and the trigger 
effect of the Chinese use of Sars-CoV-2 has led to increased and 
deepened cooperation in the Quad. 
In addition to the Quad, and a variety of bilateral defence 
cooperation agreements among Quad-members, there is also a 
“Supply Chain Resilience Initiative” (SCRI) between the Quad-
members “to take a lead in delivering a free, fair, inclusive, non-
discriminatory, transparent, predictable and stable trade and 
investment environment and in keeping the markets open”.29 
In addition to the founding members, ASEAN has been invited 
to participate. In the tracks of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic it 
has been a short move to a more localised approach all across 
Asia when it comes to company supply chains, and decreased 
dependency on China.30 Nowhere has this been more apparent 
than in the demand for surgical masks and the N95 respirators 
that were in no small degree produced in China and held back 
from sale until the country managed to contain the pandemic 
domestically. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
tweeted that if foreigners were not pleased with Chinese aid, 
they should stop wearing Chinese face masks,31 something that 
will be a reality as states increase their own production.
Due to increased polarisation and the failure of states in the 
era of economic and political globalisation to show solidarity 
the subsequent international crisis has revealed frays in the 
legitimacy of a democratic and Western-led order. The first 
step for national governments will be to improve national 
sustainability and build smaller coalitions of like-minded states. 
It is not unlikely that these will be formed along the lines of 
29 C. Campe (2020). 
30 K. Campbell and R. Doshi (2020); Bank of  America, Tectonic shifts in global supply 
chains, 4 February 2020.
31 K. Campbell and M. Rapp-Hooper (2020).
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democratic and non-democratic countries. Friedman argues 
that national decision-making, regionalism, and globalisation 
will take a step back in favour of the nation-state.32 It is not 
unlikely even more well established initiatives such as the EU 
will have to re-evaluate some of their policies unless European 
politicians can rise to the occasion. The potential of increased 
fragmentation would further weaken small and medium-sized 
states, such as Germany, Malaysia, Mexico, Sweden, Singapore 
in favour of great powers such as China and the U.S. If the 
U.S. continues on its path towards isolationism, cooperation 
between small and medium-sized states will have to increase, as 
well as democratic coalitions if increased pressure from China is 
to be managed. This is something the EU should support, not 
only to strengthen its own position, but also to support other 
democracies. 
Another unfortunate trend is that certain individual 
states have used the Corona pandemic to maintain control, 
make political change more complicated, and even decrease 
democratic norms. This a trend that has not only been seen in 
weak political systems, but also India, Israel, Slovakia, Spain, 
etc. have all imposed significant restrictions on their citizens 
to combat the pandemic, and in many cases rightfully so.33 
However, it is increasingly evident a substantial consequence of 
the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic is that some states have reduced their 
openness and democratic credentials, in some cases, to combat 
the epidemic, but in others to maintain and even expand 
political powers for leaders. This trend is aligned with the anti-
globalisation movement, left and right-wing extremism, and 
the weakening of international organisations. 
32 G. Friedman (2020). 
33 A. Ilyas, Impact on Geopolitics: Emergence of  a new geopolitical perspective, Sustainable 
Development Policy Institute, 2020.
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Empty Pockets and Restrictions in the Economy
Initially, economic recovery will be a priority for all states 
post-Sars-CoV-2, and the question is if the democratic world 
and China can do this without each other. It will be difficult 
and undesirable to decouple too much from China and vice 
versa. Still, on the other hand, this could be an ideal time to 
break free from the trade deficit and the political and economic 
dependencies. Production was already moving out of China, 
and restrictions on Chinese investments were on the rise pre-
pandemic. Sars-CoV-2 has accelerated this trend in national 
interest areas, such as medical equipment but also through 
rising anti-Chinese sentiment. 
China is strongly dependent on exports to the EU, the 
U.S., and Japan and would not be able to restart its economy 
without a simultaneous rebound from some of the hardest-hit 
economies. 40% of China’s export ties are with the 12 hardest-
hit economies, and without recovery in these states, the Chinese 
economy as a whole will not recover.34 China might be forced 
to wait for a global recovery or stimulate the global economy 
for its benefit, even if such a strategy would be portrayed as 
an international rescue operation were it to materialise. The 
aforementioned cooperation between all major economies will 
be crucial in the post-pandemic recovery. Decoupling with 
China, or China with the EU, or the U.S., is a delusory route as 
the international global economy is so intertwined. Still, more 
realistic, transparent, and fair engagement is a necessity. This will 
affect China, and its trading partners, negatively, but hopefully, 
with time, even China will open up politically, socially, and 
geopolitically so that engagement could also benefit China. 
The economic recovery will be challenging and will impact 
the security situation in Asia. As one example, the impact on 
military budgets will be significant. As the key player, the U.S. 
will have difficulties maintaining the current budget in light of 
34 M. Green and E. Medeiros (2020).
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rising unemployment and economic restructuring. Similarly, 
China has been hit hard by the pandemic even if arguably not 
as hard as the U.S. and many of its allies. It is unlikely U.S. 
allies in NATO will step up and cover the security deficit, 
particularly as many of these states have learned to rely on U.S. 
security guarantees at a low cost. However, if this were to come 
to fruition, it could lead to a more diverse security situation 
where the U.S. no longer compensates financially for the rest 
of its allies and a case where individual states have to take 
greater responsibility for their own security. This could result 
in individual states leaning towards China if the U.S. fails to 
re-engage with Asia. The EU should do well in expanding its 
own security interest to the region, and possibly engage with 
the Quad and other influential democracies to counter trends 
that would be against Europe’s long-term interests. 
To What Extent Should Asia’s Security Concept 
Be Revisited? 
It is not so much that Sars-CoV-2 has changed the security 
dimension in the region, but rather it has accelerated ongoing 
policy trends and revealed cracks in the sincerity of many states’ 
foreign policy objectives. If anything, the division between 
democratic and authoritarian states has been made more 
prominent, and there is more of a willingness to use trade, 
economic needs, and health issues as political tools. Hong Kong 
became the first manifestation of this new reality when China’s 
actions were endorsed by non-democratic states, and criticism 
was mainly from democratic countries.35 The new security lines 
in Asia (and even internationally) are increasingly cut along 
political lines, i.e. democracies versus autocracies. 
35 E. Lederer, “Nearly 40 nations criticize China’s human rights policies”, A.P. 
News, 7 October 2020.
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Is then China a potential global leader? Before President 
Trump, the U.S. regularly took the lead when dealing with 
an international crisis, with both political and economic 
responsibilities. Even if U.S. leadership has been severely tainted 
in the last few years, it is easy to imagine the U.S. bouncing back 
on the international stage again. However, it is also a question 
over whether China is able and willing to lead regionally or 
internationally. Many states are seemingly willing to condone 
China’s autocratic state policies and their approach to internal 
security (which relegates human and civil rights to the side-
lines), but taking the global lead is another matter. If China 
were able to lead, it would have to compromise on some of its 
interests to show a benign policy and increase trust among its 
followers, something that China has been unable to do to date. 
However, since the beginning of this crisis it has been quite 
clearly laid out that China is not ready to take the lead. This was 
apparent when it failed to inform and set a strategy to assist other 
states simultaneously as it combated its internal Sars-CoV-2 
challenges. The pandemic was quickly deprioritised below its 
national strategy, party ideology, and Xi Jinping’s prestige. It 
is hard to see the development of a new security concept in 
Asia led by China, as long as this remains, especially if the 
next U.S. government reinitiates international responsibility. 
China can most certainly provide an ideological alternative and 
criticise U.S. attempts to take action, but to lead proactively is 
another matter entirely. Even China has realised criticism of 
the country was on the rise due to its Sars-CoV-2 diplomacy 
tactics. A report from the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR) warned the leadership in 
Beijing that anti-Chinese sentiments were at their highest levels 
since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989.36 
36 “Exclusive: Internal Chinese report warns Beijing faces Tiananmen-like global 
backlash over virus”, Reuters, 4 May 2020. 
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Bilateral relations between China and the U.S. will continue 
to be difficult for many years to come; even with possible 
short-term improvements in ties. The systemic differences, the 
perception of freedoms and trade, etc. are too essential to their 
respective ideological outlooks and even seemingly minor 
issues quickly become impassable obstacles to overcome. 
The reverberations of these fluctuations of ties will impact all 
relations in the Asia-Pacific region, but also the world at large. 
The Quad cooperation and the Sino-Russian cooperation are 
two aspects of this. It will be increasingly difficult for states 
to sit on the fence and play the two emerging blocks against 
one another. Europe would need to clarify its stance and more 
clearly take a transatlantic and democratic position against 
a non-democratic block. The pandemic has pointed to the 
consequences of a potential geopolitical shift, especially as 
U.S. commitment to international cooperation is weak. The 
EU would need to take greater responsibility (and financial 
obligations), and other democracies need to cooperate. 
Regardless, the pandemic will not immediately make China 
the leader of the world.
Current international debates focus strongly on non-
traditional security threats, such as pandemics and 
environmental degradation. Still, as we move forward in time, 
these will be intertwined with traditional security challenges. 
It is notable China has increased pressure on Taiwan and used 
the opportunity to strengthen its coalition-building in Asia 
and beyond. China will challenge Taiwanese control of its 
offshore islands and U.S. free movement in the South China 
Sea. The pandemic has not been instrumental in creating 
this geopolitical situation, but the crisis has accelerated the 
timeframe and created opportunities to speed up the coming 
changes. This trend could be slowed down if the U.S., as the 
strongest state internationally, once again took up the leadership 
that it has lost and restructured and strengthened cooperation 
among democracies or democratic leaning states. This should 
not simply be for altruistic reasons but its long-term interests. 
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The potential strengthening of free and democratic societies is 
a beneficial consequence, but this is no longer possible without 
serious support from other like-minded states, such as the 
Quad and the EU. 
Unfortunately, in the coming years, authoritarianism will 
not be as disregarded as previously. Much like in the 1920s 
and 1930s in Europe and Asia, there will be a growth of 
authoritarian states, this time led by China. This will not only 
be because China has taken a more assertive stance, but arguably 
more because democracies have not actively defended their 
liberal values to the point where they have taken cooperative 
and decisive action. The U.S., and to a certain degree, the EU, 
would be the preferred choice for leadership in many states, 
even if the cost-sharing has to be more equal. However, the 
EU is still divided, and the U.S. has become more isolationist 
once more, and therefore, China will, by default, increase its 
influence over Asia. 
The Corona pandemic has created an increase in anti-China, 
and anti-Chinese sentiment, both regionally and internationally,37 
which will make it difficult for China to take a leadership role 
and reformulate the geopolitics of Asia. However, the trend 
has been set in motion, and China will learn from its mistakes 
in this crisis. China has acted very aggressively, responding to 
opposition to its Sars-CoV-2 strategy by highlighting trade 
discrimination. This strategy may have been one of the biggest 
reasons that prevented China from taking the role as a new 
leader, and effectively rewriting the regional order.
Europe is in a position, if the EU can unite, to play a 
positive role in the strengthening of democracies and offer 
alternatives to small and medium-sized states in the more 
polarised international community. To do this Europe needs to 
strengthen its own production lines, build new supply lines, and 
not shy away from setting its own agendas. The EU will have 
37 R. Verma, “China’s diplomacy and changing the SARS-COV-2 narrative”, 
International Journal, 2020, vol. 75, no. 2, pp. 248-258. 
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to start defining its own core interests, and not only normative 
interests, and act accordingly with broader geopolitical interest, 
something that could be difficult when Europe is divided about 
the future. The reality is, however, the EU has the ability to 
build its own future together or stand divided and be ruled by 
the agendas of other states, but does it have the moral compass 
and political strength to enforce this? 
2.  Great Power Rivalry in Asia: 
     Thucydides Trap or 
     Leninist Power Game? 
Valérie Niquet
The emergence of a new Cold War in Asia between two 
profoundly different ideological systems, more than 30 years 
after the first ended, seems to have established itself as the latest 
unquestionable narrative. The United States and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), the world’s first and second economic 
powers respectively, are on a collision course: competition 
between them, exacerbated by the consequences of the Sars-
CoV-2 pandemic, has become the main driver of international 
relations and balance of power in the region. This narrative, 
however, raises many questions concerning the equilibrium 
between China and the United States, and the veracity of a 
“Cold War” narrative that tends to assign sole responsibility 
for antagonising foreign policy choices regarding China and 
multilateralism in general to the Trump administration. 
This narrative fits well with the PRC who, for years, have 
been denouncing the United States’ unipolar hegemony and 
anticipating the emergence of a multipolar world where an 
emerging China will be accepted as the major power in its own 
natural and historical sphere of influence in Asia.1
1 Wen Tiejun, 温铁军 “新冷战的究竟新在哪里为何让人如此指手不及” 
(“In what is the new cold war so dominant”) 观察者网 (The Observer), 19 August 
2020.
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Sino-U.S. rivalry is driving the region’s re-bipolarisation along 
different dividing lines from those prevalent during the post-
1950s Cold War. Russia is now marginalised and to speak of a 
China-Russia ideological alliance would be a mistake, whatever 
common interests they may have at the tactical level. Moreover, 
the PRC today makes a point of differentiating itself from the 
former Soviet Union. While the Chinese regime is very much 
governed by Leninist principles, one of the keys to its success 
and its emergence as a great economic power has been its denial 
of ideological specificities and its stress on a pro-globalisation 
market economy that distinguishes it from the failed Soviet 
Union. China now rejects the idea of an open, full-blown 
confrontation with the western world and more specifically 
with the United States. It proclaims itself not interested in 
“spreading Marxism” but in making use of capital to access 
market shares and resources to compete within the framework 
of the liberal world order.2 At the same time, however, China is 
also increasing its capacity to influence, which obviously serves 
its quest for power and the regime’s survival strategy. 
In the context of this new rivalry (one that will not disappear 
after the United States presidential elections in 2020), one 
major issue remains the positioning of regional powers and U.S. 
allies, who might well be torn between the need to maintain a 
lucrative working relationship with China and preserving the 
assurance of U.S. security. 
The Sars-CoV-2 pandemic that erupted in Wuhan and 
spread around the world in January 2020 has also played a 
role, raising tensions and focusing debate on China’s aggressive 
strategic choices. Such tensions, however, did not originate 
with the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic. More importantly, they will 
not disappear after the end of the pandemic in Asia. This 
chapter will focus first on the role of the Trump presidency 
in increasing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. It will then 
2 Chen Zhao, “Donald Trump Anti-China Policy is Doomed to Fail as his 
Coronavirus Strategy Did”, South China Morning Post, 14 August 2020.
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introduce the China factor, as the main driver of these tensions 
to demonstrate that, far from traditional great power rivalries, 
these tensions are essentially the specificities and priorities of 
the Chinese regime.
The Trump Presidency and the Emergence of the 
Concept of “Great Powers Rivalries” 
to Characterise Sino-U.S. Relations
Under the Trump presidency, tensions with China have indeed 
increased and a new “Great Power rivalry” has taken centre 
stage, intensifying over the last year of the administration as 
the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic has run its course. Tensions have 
assumed many forms, from economic to military, including 
technological and cyber-security dimensions. Naturally, they 
have had immediate consequences for strategic stability in East 
Asia, the U.S. becoming increasingly involved in the region at 
many levels to counter China’s advance and assertive posture. 
After initial hopes of a “deal”, the choice of a “strategy of 
maximum pressure” by President Trump and his entourage 
has translated into a multi-targeted offensive focusing on all 
relevant aspects of Chinese power. 
Inaugurating a “trade war” with the PRC in 2018, new tariffs 
were adopted by a Trump administration expecting concrete 
results more than dialogue. The objective was to impose on the 
PRC a reduction in trade deficit and a reform of trade practices, 
from forced technology transfers to failure to respect intellectual 
property rights. On these issues, the Trump administration’s 
posture on Chinese trade practices was shared by partners from 
Japan to the European Union. In spite of tensions, however, a 
first phase economic agreement was reached between Beijing 
and Washington, though with limited impact on China’s 
imports from the United States. 
As part of this trade war, the United States also took decisions 
directly affecting Chinese high-tech companies, particularly 
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in the telecom sector. The U.S. decided to ban chip sales first 
to ZTE, then to the telecom giant Huawei, challenging their 
capacity to survive. Washington’s decision evidenced the PRC’s 
dependency on the outside world and its weakness in key 
industrial sectors, inflicting a direct blow to China’s ambitions 
to be perceived as an innovation power, an important tool in its 
exercise of regional and global influence. 
This decision, though, also had implications for U.S. allies 
in the region, particularly for Japan and South Korea, whose 
economies rely heavily on high-tech exports to China.3 In this 
sense, the U.S.-China trade war has introduced a new element 
of internal debate, particularly in Japan, between preserving 
economic cooperation with China and avoiding tensions with 
the U.S. as the only credible security guarantor in the region. 
At the same time, Japan has aligned itself with the United 
States in paying increased attention to the PRC’s strategy 
for influence in the country through research programs, 
investments and scientific cooperation, potentially at the service 
of the PRC’s objective of civil-military integration.4  
More specifically, the United States has also focused its 
offensive on cybersecurity, traditionally conceptualised by 
Chinese strategists as a point of strength as well as weakness in 
developed societies. One development in this area (apart from 
a ban on technology transfer to some companies) has been the 
“Clean Network Initiative” (CNI) launched by the U.S. State 
Department in 2020. The CNI openly targets the People’s 
Republic of China. Its declared objective is to “safeguard 
national assets, citizens’ privacy and companies’ most sensitive 
information from aggressive intrusion by malign actors such 
3 Rebuilding trust and close relationships with U.S. allies in the region, 
including with Japan, is one of  the most pressing challenge that the new Biden 
administration will be facing in 2021.
4 Civil-Military integration is at the heart of  China’s technological development 
and priorities. President Xi Jinping, Secretary general of  the CCP is President of  
the Central military commission of  the Party-State is also the head of  the civil 
military integration commission.
Post-Pandemic Asia: A New Normal for Regional Security?34
as the CCP”. This naming of the target has made it difficult 
for Japan to endorse the initiative despite Washington’s high 
expectations. 
At the military level, the United States has continued to 
pursue the Obama “Pivot to Asia” strategy while simultaneously 
denying continuity: after some initial confusion, the Trump 
administration soon realised the necessity and urgency of 
reassuring its allies. Japan and South Korea in particular were 
worried by President Trump’s “America first” rhetoric and 
by growing pressure to considerably increase their financial 
contribution to the U.S. presence in their respective countries. 
In spite of “America first” rhetoric, U.S. presence in a region 
threatened by an assertive PRC has actually increased and has 
been firmly reasserted to avoid any miscalculation by China. 
While Chinese strategists and the PLA (People’s Liberation 
Army) might be prudent enough not to risk a full-fledged war 
with a potential intervention by the U.S., the political leadership 
under Xi Jinping might too readily interpret signs of weakness 
or hesitation as a signal to take dangerous risks either in the 
South China Sea, the East China Sea or regarding Taiwan. 
Thanks to President Trump’s unpredictability, China has not 
risked seizing additional territories in the South China Sea, 
though it has applied pressure on Vietnam, the Philippines and 
Indonesia within their own exclusive economic zones (EEZs). 
At the same time, the U.S. military has organised numerous 
exercises and Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in the 
region, including in zones specifically claimed by the PRC as 
“territorial waters” or air space. In a demonstration of force, and 
to persuade the PRC that the U.S. navy has not been weakened 
by Sars-CoV-2, the United States conducted air defence 
exercises in the South China Sea in 2020 with two ACGs “in 
support of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. 
Taiwan is another example of the new U.S. posture regarding 
China’s claims and offensives under the Trump Administration. 
In a break with the previous administration, the United States 
has multiplied initiatives to support Taiwanese democracy, 
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crossing a number of red lines. Trump accepted a call from 
President Tsai Ing-wen after being elected, to the fury of the 
Chinese leadership, establishing a new, less ambiguous position 
regarding the United States’ ideological support for democratic 
Taiwan. In August 2020, the U.S. Secretary of Health Alex Azar 
visited Taiwan to discuss Sars-CoV-2 in the context of China’s 
embargo on Taiwan’s participation as an observer to the World 
Health Organization (WHO). He was followed in September 
by the Under-Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy 
and the Environment, who participated in the memorial service 
for former president Lee Teng-Hui, a major bête noire for 
Beijing since his election in 1996.5
This evolution in relations between Taiwan and the United 
States follows its own logic, based on ideological convergence 
since the election of President Tsai Ing-Wen. It is also a mark 
of the growing rivalry between the United States and China as 
two diverging ideological models. In Taiwan, Alex Azar insisted 
that “we consider Taiwan to be a vital partner, a democratic 
success story and a force for good in the world”. More precisely 
on health issues, he declared the priority of recognising Taiwan 
as an open and democratic society executing a highly successful 
and transparent Sars-CoV-2 response, and insisted that Taiwan 
deserves to be recognised as a global health leader. Change in the 
presidency of the United States is unlikely to alter this position 
given the large consensus on Taiwan and its democratic values. 
Under the Trump administration, more stress has also 
been placed on the need to avoid the U.S. being replaced as 
world leader on an economic and technical level rather than in 
ideological terms and human rights. At the same time, China’s 
ambition to displace the United States as the preponderant 
power in East Asia is a preoccupation shared by many actors 
in Asia.6
5 “Under Secretary of  State Keth Krach Visits Taiwan”, State Department, 16 
September 2020.
6 A. Friedberg, “An answer to aggression: How to push back against 
Beijing”, Foreign Affairs, vol. 99, no. 5, September/October 2020.
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Particularly in the year leading up to the 2020 elections 
in the United States, the ideological dimension has assumed 
greater importance, following the Chinese leadership’s call to 
resist “western values” and regime change or evolution theories.7 
In July 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo delivered a 
talk titled “Communist China and the Free World’s Future”, 
stressing major differences with the Obama administration’s 
Pivot to Asia. If there are differences in methods, however, 
the fundamental principles of antagonism to a Chinese power 
that favours the use of force and nationalism is not limited to 
the Trump administration and will probably survive into the 
next presidency, particularly if the PRC does not renounce its 
aggressive power play. 
Highlighting the fundamental ideological divide between 
an obsolete ideological regime and the nation that remains the 
prime power and security guarantor in Asia, the United States 
under Tump has increased its military visibility in the region, 
particularly in the South China Sea and regarding Taiwan. 
Arms sales to Taiwan have taken place on a regular basis since 
Donald Trump’s election and this policy will be a test for the 
new Joe Biden administration in its approach to Asia.8 Military 
exercises have also taken place in the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean, involving Japan, Australia and India, as well as 
FON operations in the vicinity of features claimed by the PRC. 
In July 2020, a dual aircraft carrier exercise took place in the 
South China Sea to deter China from seizing the opportunity 
presented by the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic to attempt aggressive 
action in the region. In October 2020, Pompeo also declared 
7 N. Gan, “China President Xi Jinping Warns Communist Party School Against 
Western Capitalist Values”, South China Morning Post, 1 May 2016.
8 In 2013, along with National Security Adviser Susan Rice, Joe Biden was 
apparently taken by the “Great Powers relationship” concept pushed by Xi 
Jinping to redefine China’s relation with the United States. To be recognised by 
Washington as the other Great Power, partner or adversary also plays a role in 
the legitimation process for a regime influenced by the bilateral system of  the 
cold war. 
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that “to push back against stepped up military activities near 
Taiwan and in the South China Sea was a means of deterring 
conflict with Beijing”. 
While exacerbating Great Power rivalry in the Pacific and 
challenging the PRC’s constant denunciation of a “cold war 
type system of alliances”, the Unites States under Trump has 
also tried to reassure its allies on security matters. Japan was 
and still is the main target of this reassurance, as defence 
arrangements between Tokyo and Washington, dating back to 
the 1950s, are still central to U.S. security policy in Asia.9 This 
was reiterated by President Elect Joe Biden and Prime Minister 
Suga during their first phone call in November 2020. The same 
goes for South Korea, even though this defence relationship 
is focused on the security of the Korean peninsula and is also 
more complex, depending on the political majority in Seoul. 
Consolidation of the U.S. presence and arrangements in 
the Indo-Pacific has placed new emphasis on the Quadrilateral 
Security Dialogue (Quad) format (United States, Japan, 
Australia, India) at a time when India seems less reticent as 
a result of border incidents with China in 2020, and with 
Australia and Japan signing their own defence agreement in 
November 2020. 
The second Quad meeting took place in Tokyo in the 
presence of Secretary of State Pompeo a few days before the 
presidential elections in the United States, and despite the 
ongoing Sars-CoV-2 pandemic and the fact that the president 
of the United States was himself infected at the time. Together 
with increasing visibility, countering the threat of China was 
very much at the forefront of the agenda. 
For Mike Pompeo, Quad could be transformed into a more 
effective instrument to support the FOIP (Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific) concept. However, conscious of Japan’s serious 
limitations in military terms, Pompeo also added that the 
9 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty on https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/
us/q&a/ref/1.html 
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concept of security was to be understood in the broader sense, 
beyond the military, including common democratic values and 
the economy.10 The proposal to work more effectively with 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has, however, 
been countered by the signature, after years of negotiations, of 
the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) 
between ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, China, Australia and 
New Zealand, but without the U.S. and India, a classical 
balancing act by countries in the region. 
Despite the emphasis placed on the American offensive in 
the great new game being played in the Indo-Pacific, China 
remains the dominant cause of growing tensions between great 
powers in the region and of re-bipolarisation along lines of 
division set by the Chinese regime.
Conclusions: China as the Trigger of Great Power 
Rivalry and Source of Tensions in the Region
The awareness of an emerging threat from China is not 
specific to the region, and not related exclusively to the Trump 
administration. Since 2016, the European Union’s perception 
of China has also evolved, from a source of opportunities to 
a “systemic rival” whose destabilising role in Asia could have 
immediate consequences for the security of Europe. In the 
United States, the Pivot strategy originated under Obama as a 
result of disappointment in relations with the PRC. Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton was instrumental in developing the 
concept in Vietnam when she participated in the ASEAN 
Regional Forum meeting there in 2010. On all these issues the 
PRC has driven the refocusing of priorities, from the integration 
of a “responsible stakeholder” to the need to counter a source of 
tensions and conflicts. 
10 “Q and A With Mike Pompeo: We Won’t not Bend our Knee to China”, Nikkei 
Asia, 6 October 2020.
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Tensions in the region, and Great Power rivalries are thus 
not, or not only, the result of a Thucydides trap where a failing 
power, the United States, and western values in general, are 
confronted by an inevitably rising power, the People’s Republic 
of China. 
Even before Donald Trump’s election and his conversion 
to a strident China containment policy, the priorities of the 
Chinese regime, and their quest for new factors of legitimation 
were leading to heightened tensions in East-Asia and a growing 
need for U.S. engagement in the region, as the sole acceptable 
instrument of strategic stability. Japan, the world’s third 
economic power, would have the technological and economic 
capacity to play that role. For historical reasons however, 
Tokyo would be hamstrung as much by external reticence as 
by internal opposition. Unfortunately, the development of an 
effective security organisation in East Asia, openly geared to 
containing an aggressive Chinese regime, similar to NATO’s 
balancing of the Soviet threat in Western Europe during the 
first Cold War, is not possible. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese have increased pressure on the 
region’s margins and interior, particularly since Xi Jinping came 
to power in 2012 with the clear aim of saving the regime with 
lofty ambitions of a “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” 
and building of a “war ready” People’s Liberation army. Xi’s 
mission is to save the Party/State even at the price of provocative 
foreign policy, as well as to revive Maoist-type mass mobilisation 
campaigns and control.11 According to Xi Jinping’s world vision, 
the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic has presented the Chinese regime 
with new opportunities to demonstrate its superiority and to 
make overtures at the economic and technological levels. In 
short, it has given China a chance to reassert itself. This hubris, 
11 Ren Lixuan 任里轩, « 在危机中育新机于变局中开新局深入学习习近平
思想 » (“Nurturing new opportunities in a crisis, opening new opportunities in 
the changing situation, an in-depth study of  Xi Jinping’s thought”), 人民日报 
(People’s Daily), 12 October 2020. 
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which began after the 2008 economic crisis, has been reinforced 
by the heavy impact of Sars-CoV-2 on the western world. It has 
also provided an answer to the long-term structural difficulties 
and impasse the Chinese regime is facing, between opening up 
to the outside world, vital for its economic growth and stability, 
and regaining ideological control.
Alongside offers of beneficial regionalism and increased 
investment under the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi Jinping has 
not hesitated to use military and quasi-military coercive actions 
or “grey zone” threats to assert China’s claims and power, despite 
the fact that these run counter to the international rule of law. 
In the South China Sea, the threat of possible retaliation by an 
unpredictable Donald Trump has deterred China from seizing 
new features in the maritime domain. China has, however, 
prevented Vietnam from pursuing oil exploration in its own 
EEZ, which it claims. The PRC also rejected as irrelevant the 
decision of the Hague International Court of Arbitration 
in favour of the Philippines in 2016.12 As a result, despite 
regime differences, Hanoi has been increasingly in favour of 
rapprochement, including in security matters, not only with 
Washington but with regional allies like Japan too. The first 
trip abroad by Prime Minister Suga after his appointment in 
September 2019 was to Indonesia, which is facing incursions 
by Chinese fishing flotillas, and to Vietnam where he reasserted 
the importance of the concept of “free and open Indo-Pacific”.
As for relations with Japan, constant Chinese pressure on 
the Senkaku islands has not decreased despite the Sars-CoV-2 
pandemic. This has had a counter-productive effect on those in 
Japan who would otherwise favour better relations with China. 
In 2020, there have been seven incursions into Japan’s territorial 
waters by Chinese vessels. 
The PRC has also triggered multiple incidents at the border 
with India, at the risk of alienating another regional power 
12 J. Perlez, “Tribunal Rejects Beijing Claims in South China Sea”, New York Times, 
12 July 2016.
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which, as a result, has increased its strategic cooperation 
with the United States and its allies within and outside the 
framework of Quad. New Delhi was also the first major actor 
to refuse to sign up to the new RCEP agreement that China 
presents as a diplomatic and strategic triumph in the face of 
U.S. “isolationism”. 
Inside China’s borders, tensions have also been on the rise, in 
Xinjiang province and Hong Kong. Critics have been repressed 
and the regime has paid no attention to global reactions to such 
ideological and “security” offensives. The same goes for Taiwan, 
with a multiplication of PLA exercises in the Taiwan Strait over 
the period of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic. 
As a consequence, rising tensions and Chinese hubris cannot 
be understood through the lens of “Great Power rivalry”: rather, 
they must be seen as “survival strategies” essential to a Chinese 
communist regime that needs to support its legitimacy at all 
costs.13 This security priority has been clearly defined by the 
leadership on numerous occasions. Regime change, and the 
fall of the Soviet Union, are the two main threats to China’s 
way of thinking. The latter in particular made the Chinese 
realise that, contrary to Marxist belief in the linear progress 
of history towards socialism and communism, the regime was 
mortal. Nationalist references to China’s “natural” hegemony in 
the region, and the assertion of Chinese power, are thus a way 
for the leadership to reassert the legitimacy and vitality of the 
Communist Party. 
At the same time, China is also facing far more complex 
long-term difficulties. Economic slowdown, dating back to 
mid-2015, is a major problem now that the regime is also facing 
social challenges like aging, unemployment and the lack of 
social security. The Sars-CoV-2 pandemic has had consequences 
despite the apparently good performance of the Chinese 
economy in 2020. Social tensions and inequalities have not been 
13 A. Su, “Dreams of  a Red Emperor: The Relentless Rise of  Xi Jinping”, Los 
Angeles Times, 22 October 2020.
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tackled and will lead to further uncertainties in the longer term. 
Last but not the least, the trade and technological wars launched 
by the United States under Donald Trump have demonstrated 
the PRC’s vulnerabilities in terms of access to external markets 
and technology. Xi Jinping’s references to dual-track growth 
and decoupling, focusing on China’s domestic market, growing 
middle class and indigenous innovative capacity, are not new 
and have previously proved insufficient to support the ongoing 
economic growth and development essential to the country’s 
stability.14 They also clearly echo the Maoist slogan “Count on 
one’s own force to rejuvenate” (自力更生), and serve as a mass 
mobilisation tool for ideological purposes.15 
Beyond territorial claims and trade rivalries, Chinese hubris 
and the need for the regime to assert itself are actually at the 
heart of tensions in the region. Surrounding countries risk 
being trapped, not in the middle of  growing and polarising 
rivalries between the United States and China, but in their 
own contradictions, between trying to take advantage of the 
Chinese economy’s remaining opportunities, particularly if 
there is a long-term rebound after the end of the pandemic, and 
opposing Chinese military encroachments and coercive policy 
in the maritime domain with the support of the United States. 
With the election of Joe Biden, the temptation for some might 
be to hope for a return to a situation where the United States 
maintains engagement in the region as guarantor of strategic 
stability without asking regional powers to “take sides” and 
jeopardise their economic partnerships with China. 
In this context, while Sars-CoV-2 has not been a game 
changer in the Asia-Pacific, it has played the role of a revealer 
and accelerator of tensions related to the nature of the Chinese 
regime. Any return to a strategy of unconditional engagement 
or appeasement with China could only lead to increased 
assertiveness and red line testing, augmenting the risk of 
14 Wen Qing, “A Dual Track Approach”, Beijing Review, 6 August 2020.
15 B.R. Young, “From China to the US: the Self  Reliance Slogan is Back”, The 
Diplomat, 2 October 2020.
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miscalculation and conflict in the region.16 The consequences 
of this would have an incommensurable global fallout given 
that the Indo-Pacific remains at the heart of global economic 
growth and trade.
16 A. Xie, “How a Joe Biden Presidency Would Offer US-China relations a Brief  
Window of  Hope”, South China Morning Post, 22 October 2020.
3. Multilateral Competition: The Quad 
    vis-à-vis China in the UN System
Shino Watanabe
The 2020 Sars-CoV-2 pandemic has had a profound impact on 
international relations and the current international order. It 
has intensified the United States-China rivalry and revealed the 
limits of multilateral cooperation when the entire world must 
work together to fight against coronavirus.
Japan, the U.S., Australia and India have enhanced 
coordination amid Sars-CoV-2. In October 2020 Japan hosted 
the second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. foreign ministers meeting 
in Tokyo. The four ministers – Japanese Foreign Minister 
Toshimitsu Motegi, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, 
Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and 
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo – agreed to continue their 
cooperation in health and hygiene, rule-making in the digital 
economy and in enhancing practical cooperation in other areas, 
including quality infrastructure, maritime security, counter-
terrorism, cybersecurity, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
and education and human resource development. They also 
agreed to work with more countries to promote a “Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific”.1
It was the second round of the Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue, also known as the “Quad”, which was first held in 
New York in September 2019. It was created as a forum for 
1 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan, “The Second Japan-Australis-India-U.S. 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, 6 October 2020.
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the four countries to discuss regional cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific. The fact that the Quad meeting was the first ministerial-
level international conference hosted by Japan since the Sars-
CoV-2 outbreak indicates its significance for Japan.
Responding to the Quad meeting, China did not hesitate 
to express its concern. On 6 October, a spokesperson of 
the Chinese embassy in Tokyo stated that any multilateral 
cooperation should not form “exclusive cliques”, going against 
the interests of third countries.2
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China’s concern 
about the Quad. After meeting with Malaysia’s Foreign Minister 
Hishammuddin Hussein in Kuala Lumpur on 13 October, 
he called the Quad “a so-called Indo-Pacific NATO”. Wang 
also commented, “What it pursues is to trumpet the Cold 
War mentality and to stir up confrontation among different 
groups and blocs and to stoke geopolitical competition. What 
it maintains is the dominance and hegemonic system of the 
United States.” He further warned, “this strategy is itself a big 
underlying security risk. If it is forced forward, it will wind back 
the clock of history”.3
Meanwhile, China seeks to enhance multilateral cooperation 
based on international organisations. A series of pro-China 
remarks by the Director-General of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), Dr Tedros Adhanom Hebreyesus, 
a former Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ethiopia, amid the 
coronavirus pandemic became a wake-up call to the entire 
world. Taiwan’s exclusion from the World Health Assembly 
(WHA), the highest decision-making body/mechanism of the 
WHO, in May 2020, despite Taiwan’s successful containment 
of Sars-CoV-2, is another example of China’s growing influence 
2 Chinese Embassy in Japan, “A Spokesperson of  the Chinese Embassy in Japan 
Answered Questions on the Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and US Secretary 
of  State Mike Pompeo’s Interview with Japanese Media”, 7 October 2020.
3 B. Jaipragas and T. Sukumaran, “‘Indo-Pacific Nato’: China’s Wang Yi Slams 
US-led ‘Quad’ as Underlying Security Risk at Malaysia Meeting”, South China 
Morning Post, 13 October 2020.
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within the WHO. In protest, the Trump administration 
submitted its notice of withdrawal from the WHO to the UN 
Secretary-General in July 2020.
China’s proactiveness within international organisations 
is not a response to the Trump administration’s reluctance to 
support international organisations that go against U.S. policies 
and interests. This chapter argues that it is a product of China’s 
long-term preparation for increasing its influence within 
international organisations. At the same time, China’s proactive 
attitude toward international organisations, particularly the 
United Nations and its relevant institutions, as a means for 
promoting multilateral cooperation, has become a part of Xi 
Jinping’s strategy toward the current international order.
This chapter first explains the Xi Jinping administration’s 
approach to the international order. Second, it describes how 
China’s strategy for international organisations has evolved since 
China was founded in 1949. Contrary to its initial rejection of 
international organisations, China now obtains top leadership 
positions in many international organisations. The chapter then 
concludes by suggesting that competition over multilateral 
cooperation strategies between the Quad countries and China 
will likely be intensified in the post Sars-CoV-2 world. 
The Xi Jinping Administration’s Strategy 
for International Order
The Xi Jinping administration’s stance on reforming the 
current international order has been evident since October 
2017. Xi Jinping made it clear that China would proactively 
engage in global governance and lead the transformation of the 
international order in his report at the 19th National Congress 
of the Chinese Communist Party (Party Congress):
China follows the principle of achieving shared growth through 
discussion and collaboration in engaging in global governance. 
China stands for democracy in international relations and the 
Multilateral Competition: The Quad vis-à-vis China in the UN System 47
equality of all countries, big or small, strong or weak, rich 
or poor. China supports the United Nations in playing an 
active role in international affairs, and supports the efforts of 
other developing countries to increase their representation 
and strengthen their voice in international affairs. China will 
continue to play its part as a major and responsible country, 
take an active part in reforming and developing the global 
governance system, and keep contributing Chinese wisdom and 
strength to global governance.4
China’s concrete approach to engaging in reforming global 
governance was announced at the 3rd Central Foreign Affairs 
Work Conference in June 2018. It was the first conference on 
foreign affairs after the 19th Party Congress, and the forum 
where Xi Jinping announced his diplomatic thoughts.5
After the conference, Yang Jiechi, a member of the 
Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
Central Committee and Director of the Central Foreign 
Affairs Commission Office, explained the background to 
Xi’s diplomatic thoughts. In his account, China perceives the 
global governance system as being in a key phase of qualitative 
change, and thus should seize this opportunity in reforming 
it. China takes the lead in advocating the “democratisation of 
international relations” that reflects the will and interests of 
the majority of nations by increasing their representation and 
the voice of developing countries. Yang also emphasises the 
proactive role of the UN in the reform of global governance.6
Chinese leaders and major academics have repeatedly 
mentioned China’s priority to the UN as the major platform 
4 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous 
Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of  Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Delivered at the 19th National Congress 
of  the Communist Party of  China”, 18 October 2017, p. 54.
5 The second Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference was convened in 
November 2014.
6 Yang Jiechi, “Yi Xijinpig Waijiao Sixiang Wei Zhidao Shenru Tuijin Xin Shidai 
Duiwai Gongzuo” (“Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, Deeply 
Promote Foreign Work in the New Era”), Qiushi, vol. 15, 1 August 2018.
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for reforming global governance. Xi Jinping reiterated the need 
for the global governance reform with the UN at its core in his 
video message delivered at the annual General Debate of the 
75th of the UN General Assembly in September 2020:
Covid-19 reminds us that the global governance system calls for 
reform and improvement… We should stay true to multilateralism 
and safeguard the international system with the UN at its core.7 
Qin Yaqing, one of the leading Chinese academics and President 
of China’s Foreign Affairs University which trains future 
Chinese diplomats, proposes the “G20+1” model for rebuilding 
cooperation amid the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic. He argues that 
political leadership and advisory and implementation functions 
are necessary for multilateral cooperation today. He proposes 
a multilateral mechanism consisting of G20 countries and 
the UN, in which the former exercise leadership and the UN 
specialised agencies offer advice and implement policies in their 
relevant fields.8
The idea of the G20 assuming the leadership of multilateral 
cooperation would be an ideal situation for China. The G20, 
namely the Group of Twenty, is a forum of 19 countries and the 
European Union. In addition to the G7 countries, i.e., Britain, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.S., the other 
members are BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa), Australia, Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Korea and Turkey. China can feel comfortable with 
BRICS countries and major emerging markets and developing 
countries (EMDC) within the framework of G20. 
7 “Full Text: Xi Jinping’s Speech at the General Debate of  the 75th Session 
of  the United Nations General Assembly”, China Global Television Network 
(CGTN), 23 September 2020.
8 Qin Yaqing, “Cooperation: An Iron Law for a Community with a Shared 
Future”, China International Studies, vol. 82, 2020, p. 40.
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China’s Engagement with 
International Organisations
China’s attitude to international organisations has gone through 
dramatic changes over the past seven decades. China initially 
refused to be involved in international organisations, but over 
time it has become an active participant and now seeks to play 
a leading role in them.
China’s relations with international organisations from 1949 
to 1971 were extremely limited. After it fought against the UN 
force while assisting North Korea during the Korean War from 
1950 to 1953, China perceived international organisations 
mostly as tools controlled by U.S.-led capitalist states.9 China 
opposed joining them and positioned itself as a “dissenter” or 
“rebel” within international society. The only exception were 
Beijing’s efforts to join the United Nations by replacing Taiwan 
and taking over its seat.
Meanwhile, China sought to develop and strengthen its ties 
with non-aligned countries at multilateral conferences. The 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence agreed by Chinese Premier 
Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was 
an outcome of Beijing’s participation in the Geneva Conference 
in 1954.10 Zhou’s leading role at the Asian-African Conference 
in Bandung in 1955 extended China’s presence in the Third 
World and beyond.
President Richard Nixon’s surprising visit to China in 
February 1971 led to the U.S.-China rapprochement. Beijing’s 
posture toward international organisations shifted from refusal 
to participate to cautious and ad hoc participation after 
9 Li Hua, Guoji Zuzhi Gonggong Waijiao Yanjiu (Study on the Public Diplomacy of  
International Organization), Shishi Chubanshe (China Affairs Press), 2014, pp. 
266-67.
10 The five principles are mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual benefit and peaceful 
coexistence.
Post-Pandemic Asia: A New Normal for Regional Security?50
China joined the UN in October 1971, replacing Taiwan as 
representative of “China”. 
China’s passive attitude at that time came mainly from its 
turbulent domestic politics. From 1966 to 1976 China was in 
the midst of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese leaders such as 
Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, who were labelled as “capitalist 
roaders”, suffered from the political struggle against the Gang 
of Four, the group led by Mao Zedong’s wife, Jiang Qing. 
China was not yet a full-fledged participant in international 
organisations.
Interestingly, China did use the UN for its political purposes, 
however. As Chairman of the Chinese delegation to the UN, 
Deng delivered a speech at the Special Session of the UN 
General Assembly in April 1974. It was an opportunity for 
Deng to appeal for his reinstatement as a Chinese leader. Deng 
had been purged in 1968, during the Cultural Revolution, but 
in the early 1970s he was restoring his power. He was appointed 
Vice Premier in March 1973 and was once again a member of 
the Political Bureau of the CCP in December that year. 
In his speech entitled “Three Worlds”, Deng stated that “the 
United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World,” 
and “the developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, 
and other regions make up the Third World”. Moreover, he 
said, “the developed countries between the two make up the 
Second World”.11
In general, China had been a passive member of international 
organisations during the 1970s. Chinese leaders believed 
that Western developed countries controlled international 
organisations, and thus developing countries had limited 
influence. Mao Zedong intended to use international 
organisations to break its state of isolation and obtain 
diplomatic recognition from as many countries as possible with 
the assistance of the Soviet Union.12 In light of this, China had 
11 “Deng Xiaoping’s “Three Worlds” Speech, April 1974.
12 Li Hua (2014), p. 210. 
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been active in building good relations with developing countries 
within the Group of 77 (G-77) and Non-Aligned Movement.13
After launching the Open and Reform Policy in 1978, China 
began to join international organisations in some fields, such 
as economics, trade, finance, culture, science and technology, 
and actively participated in their activities.14 China’s entry into 
international economic organisations was mainly driven by its 
new focus on economic development, reflecting the Third Plenary 
Session of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978. 
China joined one international organisation after another 
and expanded the scope and depth of its engagement with 
international organisations. For example, it became a member 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank in 1980 and of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 
1986, and received loans from them for building infrastructure 
in China. 
Beijing regarded its membership as an unavoidable 
condition for China’s development at that time.15 China’s 
strategy for international organisations during the rule of 
Deng Xiaoping was to create a favourable environment for 
developing its economy based on its acceptance of the existing 
international order.16 Nevertheless, China still felt antipathy 
against multilateral institutions due to concerns that Western 
countries might use international organisations to punish and 
constrain China. At the same time, China’s priority was to solve 
domestic problems, such as feeding China’s large population 
and developing its economy. 17
13 Zhihai Xie, “The Rise of  China and Its Growing Role in International 
Organizations”, ICCS Journal of  Modern Chinese Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 2011, p. 86. 
The Group of  77 was a group of  developing countries that signed the “Joint 
Declaration of  the Seventy-Seven Developing Countries” at the first UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva in 1964. For 
more information on G-77, refer to the site of  G-77 at http://www.g77.org/
14 Ibid., p. 87.
15 Li Hua (2014), p. 212.
16 Ibid., p. 213.
17 Ibid., p. 267.
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China began to take the lead in some international 
organisations after the end of the Cold War in 1991.18 China’s 
engagement in international organisations became even more 
active and diverse and sought to proactively use them as a 
means for promoting its national interests.19
China’s active stance toward international organisations 
during this phase was due to its isolation in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen Incident in June 1989 and the rise of the “China 
Threat” thesis since the mid-1990s.20 China finally joined the 
WTO in December 2001, a manifestation of China’s full-
fledged participation in the U.S.-led international economic 
system.
China’s Growing Representation in the UN System
Strong dissatisfaction with the existing international order 
has been widely shared among Chinese policymakers and 
academics since the late 2000s. They tend to believe that China 
has not been granted an appropriate position commensurate 
with its growing strengths and is in an inferior position in the 
international order’s rule-making processes. This is because the 
current order was formed by the U.S. after World War II and 
thus does not reflect the reality of power distribution in the 
international system.21 
Pang Zhongying points out that there is a considerable 
difference between China’s status as a major power today 
and its role within existing international organisations. 
Therefore, China seeks to strengthen its level of involvement 
within international organisations in order to gain a degree of 
influence commensurate with its growing economic power. 
18 Zhihai Xie (2011), p. 85.
19 Li Hua (2014), p. 213.
20 Zhihai Xie (2011), p. 88.
21 Zhimin Chen and Xueying Zhang, “Chinese Conception of  the World Order 
in a Turbulent Trump Era”, The Pacific Review, vol. 33, no. 3-4, 2020, p. 445.
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China’s efforts towards “reforms from the inside” include its 
promotion of governance reform within the IMF (by increasing 
its voting rights) and inclusion of the Chinese yuan (RMB) 
in the basket of special drawing right (SDR) currencies. In 
Pang’s view, since such reforms within the current international 
system have limits, China simultaneously implements “reforms 
from the outside”, as was seen in its initiative to establish the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).22
China’s engagement with international organisations has 
evolved dramatically since the mid-2000s, with Beijing striving 
to gain power and influence within them. The first Chinese 
national to head a UN specialised agency was Dr Margaret 
Chan Fung Fu-chun as Director-General of the WHO in 2007.
China’s attitude toward international organisations made 
qualitative changes in the late 2010s. Since then, China has 
increased the number of Chinese nationals serving as heads of 
key international organisations. As of October 2020, China has 
been successful in obtaining 4 top posts among the 15 UN 
specialised agencies: Mr. Houlin Zhao of the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), Dr Fang Liu of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Mr. Yong 
Li of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) and Dr Dongyu Qu of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO).
22 Pang Zhongying, “Quanqiu Zhili de Zhongguo Juese: Fuza dan Qingxi (“The 
China Role in Global Governance: Complex yet Clear”) Frontiers, August 2015, 
pp. 87-90.
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Tab. 3.1 - Heads of the UN Specialised Agencies
Sources: Homepages of UN Specialised Agencies
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We should note that these four Chinese top leaders share some 
things in their career paths. First, they are all former Chinese 
technocrats who have worked in China’s central government 
and have expertise in their international institutions’ particular 
fields. As it is rare for non-Communist Party members to 
assume high positions in the Chinese central government, it 
is natural to think that they are CCP members or have strong 
connections. Second, before assuming the current top posts, 
they gained long-term experience in top leadership positions, 
such as the board of directors or senior management team level, 
in their international organisations. Judging from their long-
term career with expertise in their fields, they are qualified to 
lead these international organisations.
China is actually the only country with 4 of its nationals 
holding the UN specialised agencies’ highest position. As Table 
3.1 shows, the other 11 heads of the UN specialised agencies 
come from different countries: Togo, the United Kingdom, 
Bulgaria, South Korea, France, Georgia, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Singapore, Germany and the U.S. In contrast, all of the 8 
heads of the UN related organisations in Table 3.2 come from 
different countries: Burkina Faso, Argentina, Nigeria, Portugal, 
the United Kingdom, South Africa, Spain and Brazil.
In total, the United Kingdom has 2 heads, the Director-
General of ILO and the Secretary-General of ISA, and Portugal 
also has two top leaders, UN Secretary-General Mr. Antonio 
Guterres and the Director General of IOM. However, both 
countries are still far behind China.
Having Chinese nationals serving as heads of the UN 
specialised agencies does not automatically mean that their 
agencies are under China’s influence. But China’s political use 
of international organisations through its growing influence 
on the top-level decision-making process in these agencies 
might affect international organisations’ existing practices and 
undermine the current international order.
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Tab. 3.2 - Heads of the UN Related Organisations
*Mr. Azavedo stepped down a year before the expiry of his mandate
Sources: Homepages of UN Related Organisations
China has prevented Taiwan from attending the World Health 
Assembly (WHA), the WHO’s highest decision-making body 
since Dr Tsai Ing-wen became the President of Taiwan in 
2016. The decision was made under the leadership of former 
Director-General Dr Margaret Chan, who held the post for ten 
years from July 2007 to June 2017.
China’s efforts to increase its influence within international 
organisations are also seen in its efforts to send high-ranking 
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officials to these institutions. According to a report issued in 
April 2020 by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, almost 30 Chinese nationals are in the top 
leadership positions in UN principal organs, UN funds and 
programs, UN specialised agencies, UN entities and bodies 
and international financial institutions, among others.23 As 
Table 3.3 indicates, most high-ranking officials have experience 
of working in the Chinese central government or equivalent 
institutions in China. They are likely to be potential candidates 
for the top position in the international organisations in which 
they currently work. 
Finally, China makes extra-special efforts to increase the number 
of Chinese nationals working in international organisations. 
Beijing has a unique human resource deployment system 
for sending Chinese government officials to international 
organisations. China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security (MHRSS) selects a group of Chinese bureaucrats 
through a competitive examination and maintains a list of 
“reserved talents” for international civil servants. Upon request 
for a Chinese civil servant from international organisations, 
MHRSS sends a candidate from the list pool.24 The traditional 
mechanism continues to serve China as an effective channel 
to send Chinese nationals who are “ideologically correct” to 
international organisations.
Besides this, in the past few years China has introduced a 
new procedure to send Chinese nationals to international 
organisations. Chinese universities such as the School of Public 
Policy and Management at Tsinghua University and the School 
of International Studies at Peking University have established 
Master’s degree programmes for those seeking to work as 
international civil servants. This new route is reportedly more 
transparent and fairer because it offers open competition to 
qualified students all over China.
23 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, pp. 4-18.
24 Wei Liu, “China Wants More Chinese to Work in International Organizations”, 
The Diplomat, 24 August 2018.
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In essence, China has been spending significant resources to 
send qualified Chinese nationals to international organisations 
over the past decade. Having four Chinese nationals 
currently serving as the head of UN specialised agencies is the 
crystallisation of such efforts. More Chinese nationals are likely 
to be in the top leadership position in the foreseeable future. 
Qin Yaqing’s “G20+1” model can be a feasible option for China 
to further cooperation.
Conclusions
During the last ten years China has achieved a strong position 
in the UN system by sending former Chinese officials and 
placing them in high-ranking posts. Approximately 30 Chinese 
nationals are already in the top leadership positions of major 
international organisations, and some of them might serve as 
head of their institutions in the future. As of October 2020, 
China has already signed a memorandum of understanding 
to support Belt and Road infrastructure projects with 30 
international organisations and 138 countries.25 China will 
continue to promote multilateral cooperation based on the UN 
system in the post-pandemic world.
Meanwhile, Quad countries seek to enhance cooperation 
in many fields, such as quality infrastructure, anti-terrorism 
and cybersecurity. The Quad dates back to the idea proposed 
by the first Abe administration in 2007, but the quadrilateral 
mechanism is still centred on ministerial meetings and has 
not yet achieved full-fledge institutionalisation. U.S. Secretary 
of State Pompeo launched the Blue Dot Network for quality 
infrastructure financing in November 2019 and the Clean 
25 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guojia Fazhan he Gaige Weiyuanhui (National 
Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of  China), “Gongjian 
‘Yidai Yilu’ 2020 Nian Zhongdian Gongzuo Tuijinhui Zan Fujian Quanzhou 
Zhaokai” (”The Key Work Promoting Meeting for the Joint Construction of  the 
‘Belt and Road’ in 2020 Was Held in Quanzhou, Fujian”), 14 September 2020.
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Network program for safeguarding national assets in October 
2020, but it is still too early to see any tangible results from 
these initiatives.
Competition over multilateral cooperation strategies 
between China and the Quad countries will intensify in the 
post-pandemic world. Given that China has been prepared to 
utilise the existing framework of the UN system as the platform 
of multilateral cooperation, Quad countries must act as swiftly 
as possible to deal with the challenge as to how they can ensure 
that their cooperation materialises and what kind of outcomes 
they can deliver beyond the talk shop.
4.  North Korea’s Reliance on Nuclear 
     Weapons: Actors and Implications
Cristina Varriale
Since the 1990s, when North Korea first began to pose a 
nuclear proliferation problem to its region and the international 
community, nuclear weapons have become a key component 
of the North Korean state. Although diplomatic agreements 
have at times stalled North Korea’s activities, responses have 
not prevented the country becoming a nuclear power. Under 
the leadership of Kim Jong Un, the focus on nuclear weapons 
has sharpened, providing many signals that he not only sees 
nuclear weapons as an important tool in safeguarding the 
regime, much like his father and grandfather, but has turned 
that vision into a much stronger reality. The growth of interest 
in nuclear weapons that began possibly as early as the 1960s1 
has, in the past eight years, become cemented as a capability at 
the core of the regime.
Yet, the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea does 
not exist in a vacuum and creates implications for the region 
and indeed globally. North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme 
both influences and is influenced by the geographical context 
and the security and political relationships within it. Not only 
has the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons resulted in 
others within the region, primarily South Korea and Japan, 
investing in new conventional weapons systems and adapting 
1 J.D. Pollack, No Exit, North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, 
Oxford, Routledge, 2011, p. 51.
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militarily to counter North Korea’s nuclear threat, it has also 
influenced the regional presence of the U.S. and its alliances. 
These developments in turn impact other aspects of regional 
security, most notably in relation to China. The entanglement 
of North Korea’s nuclear programme with broader regional 
security concerns is not just conceptual, but impacts policy 
responses such as efforts at diplomatic engagement and the 
implementation of sanctions in response to North Korea’s 
proliferation activities. 
This chapter first explains North Korea’s reliance on nuclear 
weapons and why this is likely to persist. It then considers how 
the entanglement of regional security issues influences two of 
the most common policy tools used to respond to North Korea’s 
proliferation activities – diplomacy and sanctions – and whether 
the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic might impact their effectiveness.
North Korea’s Reliance on Nuclear Weapons 
North Korea’s nuclear proliferation must be considered in the 
context of its broader goals and the priorities of state sovereignty 
and regime survival. For the regime, nuclear weapons have 
been understood as one tool through which these goals can 
be achieved.2 In support of this, the North Korean state has 
bought into the logic of nuclear deterrence and developed 
nuclear weapons as a means to counter external threats to the 
regime. This has been driven by Pyongyang’s perception of the 
need to redress the military imbalance between North Korea’s 
aging conventional capabilities and the much more advanced 
South Korean and U.S. military capabilities that could be used 
to target and overthrow the regime. Furthermore, the lessons 
of Saddam Hussein’s and Muammar al-Gaddafi’s fall from 
power after relinquishing their weapon of mass destruction 
(WMD) capabilities are not lost on the Kim dynasty, and 
2 V.D. Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of  Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields or 
Swords”, Political Science Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 2002, pp. 209-230.
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can be understood as underpinning why the regime requires 
nuclear weapons for its own survival. Thus, the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons has been justified by the regime as a necessity 
to ensure the sovereignty and security of North Korea from 
external military threats. 
Nuclear weapons have also become central to the North 
Korean regime’s security through the implementation of its 
Juche, or self-reliance, ideology.3 Although both Kim Il Sung 
and Kim Jong Il perceived nuclear weapons as a capability that 
North Korea should acquire, and initiated activities in this 
regard, Kim Jong Un has been the leader who has established 
nuclear weapons as a core feature of the North Korean state. 
Nuclear weapons are a tool for demonstrating Juche in the 
political security context and for protecting national sovereignty; 
by developing nuclear weapons, North Korea has demonstrated 
to its own people and the international community that it is 
not a Chinese protégé reliant on Beijing for its security. Instead, 
nuclear weapons support Pyongyang’s narrative that North 
Korea is a strong and powerful country able to protect its own 
people. Although at least partly driven by a paranoia rooted in 
Kim Il Sung’s world view and in his determination to ensure 
that North Korea is not reliant on others for its security,4 the 
need for self-reliance from a security perspective has continued 
to manifest itself today. 
Since assuming leadership after his father’s death at the end 
2011, Kim Jong Un has cemented the role of nuclear weapons 
and demonstrated the importance of such a capability in 
several ways. Early on in his tenure, Kim Jong Un made clear 
the importance of nuclear weapons to the regime through the 
enactment of the Byungjin policy line. This promoted the parallel 
development of the economy and nuclear weapons as two key 
state priorities. In practice, this meant a significant ramping 
up of capability testing that peaked in 2016 and 2017, and 
3 E. Howell, ”The Juche H-bomb? North Korea, nuclear weapons and regime-
state survival”, International Affairs, vol. 96, no. 4, 2020, pp. 1051-1068.
4 J.D. Pollack (2011). 
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allowed the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
to quickly progress the research and development stages of 
several new missile systems. These efforts sought to improve 
the survivability, and thus credibility, of the North Korean 
regime rather than provide Pyongyang with a bargaining chip 
with which to leverage economic concessions from the global 
community.5 
In addition to improving technical capabilities, Kim Jong Un 
has also undertaken political changes to reflect the importance 
of nuclear weapons. In 2012, the North Korean constitution 
was reportedly changed to include reference to the country’s 
status as a nuclear power. This was followed by the 2013 Law 
on Consolidating the Position of Nuclear Weapons State. Both 
changes recognise and legitimise North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
status domestically.6 This not only demonstrates to the outside 
world that North Korea is committed to maintaining nuclear 
weapons, but firmly establishes that capability as a national 
achievement while showcasing the power, strength, and success 
of the regime to domestic audiences.  
As a result of these technical and political developments, in 
2018 North Korea announced an end to the Byungjin policy, 
stating that the primary focus would now be on the other branch 
of that two-track policy: the economy and domestic growth. 
Pyongyang also declared a unilateral suspension of long-range 
missile testing and used explosives to collapse the tunnel entrances 
at its nuclear test site, supposedly demonstrating its closure. 
These actions were not about taking unilateral steps towards 
denuclearisation, or intended to signal a reduction in reliance on 
or in the value of nuclear weapons. Instead, they were a result 
of the established centrality of nuclear weapons and the regime’s 
efforts to communicate confidence in its nuclear capability.7
5 T. Plant, The Hanoi Summit: It is Not About the Economy, Stupid, RUSI Newsbrief, 
13 March 2019, pp. 1-4.
6 L. Allard, M. Duchâtel, and F. Gode, Pre-empting Defeat: In Search of  North Korea’s 
Nuclear Doctrine, Policy Brief, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2017.
7 C. Varriale, A Long Road to Denuclearisation, Challenges to Security-Based Diplomacy 
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Despite this shift in focus and a move away from intense 
testing since 2018, North Korea’s narrative around nuclear 
weapons has remained one of ideological importance. Various 
state media articles, speeches, and reports have continued to 
highlight the strategic value this capability has. For example, in 
Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Years’ address8 and report from the 
Fifth Plenary Meeting of the Seventh Central Committee of the 
Workers’ Party of Korea at the start of 2020,9 nuclear weapons 
were referred to as essential for national security and self-
defence. This conviction has also been continuously reiterated 
outside of high-level events and speeches; for example in 2019 
a Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) article covering a 
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test referenced 
“indispensable” nuclear capability and the “pre-requisite of 
strategic weapons for national security”,10 reiterating the 
enduring political value of nuclear weapons.
Notwithstanding efforts to alter North Korea’s cost-
benefit calculations around the acquisition and maintenance 
of a nuclear programme through a series of carrot and stick 
approaches,11 it is clear that nuclear weapons will likely remain 
a central feature of the North Korean state. Despite Sars-CoV-2 
concerns,12 North Korea showcased several new nuclear-capable 
systems during a large military parade on 10 October 2020, 
with North Korea, RUSI Occasional Paper, 2018.
8 National Committee on North Korea, 2018. Kim Jong Un’s 2018 New Year’s 
Address, [online] available at: https://www.ncnk.org/node/1427 [Accessed 29 
October 2020].
9 Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of  7th 
C.C., WPK, 2020.
10 Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), DPRK Academy of  Defence Science 
Succeeds in Test-firing of  New-type SLBM, 2019.
11 E.B. Onyekachiand O.B. Hyginus, “North Korea’Tab.s Nuclearization Process 
and Threat to Global Security: Exploring the Carrot and Stick Approaches as 
Panacea”, Journal of  Current Issues in Arts and Humanities, vol. 6, no. 1, 2020, 
pp. 1-14.
12 J. Panda and J. Kim, “What Does North Korea’s Zero SARS-CoV-2 Claim 
Signify?”, 38NORTH, 28 April 2020.
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held to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the founding of the 
Workers’ Part of Korea. Not only did this demonstrate a certain 
level of confidence on the part of North Korea in its ability to 
control the pandemic within its borders,13 it also reiterated the 
continuation of nuclear and missile development as objects of 
importance. 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons are a symptom of the nature 
of the regime. Because of the ideological driving forces behind 
the nuclear weapons programme and determination to ensure 
the longevity of the regime, the perceived need for nuclear 
weapons will likely persist, leading to an enduring nuclear 
weapons capability.
North Korea’s Regional Context 
Ideology and strategic goals of regime survival and sovereignty 
underpin North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. Yet, North Korea 
– and indeed its nuclear programme – should not be considered 
as disconnected from the regional context. Instead, North Korea’s 
nuclear challenge is better thought of as a node in an increasingly 
complex web of security issues in the region, that both influences 
and is influenced by the neighbourhood it operates in. 
The most obvious regional relationship that demands 
consideration in this context is that between the two Koreas. 
It is across the demilitarised zone between North and South 
that the most serious risk of military conflict exists. Despite 
military conflict on the peninsula being in the interests neither 
13 Given the number of  military personnel involved in the parade and the 
gathering of  Kim Jong Un and his elites, it could be assumed that the regime had 
high confidence that the risk of  Sars-CoV-2 spreading amongst those attending 
the parade was low. This could be the result of  extreme restrictions to manage 
the Sars-CoV-2 situation in North Korea, ensuring that the parade was able to 
go ahead in such a grand manner. Alternatively, the parade might have been 
considered of  higher importance than managing the spread of  the virus. From 
the perspective of  regime preservation and security, the former seems more 
credible.
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of either Pyongyang nor Seoul, occasional skirmishes coupled 
with limited military to military engagements increase the risk 
of miscalculation or unintended escalation. 
As North Korea’s nuclear programme has developed, so too 
has South Korea’s advanced conventional military capability. 
Yet, military advances by South Korea are also driven by factors 
other than North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. Although the 
primary military target for these acquisitions is obviously 
North Korea, these acquisitions have, arguably, also been driven 
by South Korea’s national interest in achieving the transfer 
of wartime Operational Control (OpCon) from the U.S. 
back to its own forces. This has led to technical acquisitions 
and policies that respond directly to North Korea’s nuclear 
developments and demonstrate that South Korean forces 
have achieved the necessary capabilities to secure OpCon 
transfer.14 These advancements and policies are not solely for 
the benefit of deterring and defending against North Korea, 
but also support a liberal agenda for more independent security. 
However, advancing conventional military assets in South 
Korea inevitably aggravate North Korea’s threat perceptions 
and thus the high value placed on nuclear weapons.
The inter-Korean security relationship is further complicated 
by the regional role and presence of the U.S. Although not 
geographically part of the region, the U.S. has numerous 
military bases in East Asia and its Pacific territory of Guam and 
maintains nuclear alliances most notably with South Korea and 
Japan. The United States extended nuclear deterrence provisions 
not only seek to deter regional adversaries, but also form part of 
the U.S.’ non-proliferation toolbox; offering nuclear protection 
to both South Korea and Japan discourage their respective 
governments from seeking nuclear arsenals of their own.
These efforts to stem proliferation in South Korea and 
Japan, though, have undoubtedly contributed to North Korea’s 
14 J. Kim, Military Considerations for OPCON Transfer on the Korean Peninsula, Council 
on Foreign Relations (CFR), 20 March 2020; Seol, In-hyo and Lee, Jang-wook., 
US-ROK Deterrence Architecture, Asan Special Forum, 27 February 2018.
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justification for nuclear weapons development. In ongoing 
efforts to reassure its allies that the U.S. remains steadfast 
in its commitments despite a changing security context,15 
Washington has sent increasingly advanced conventional 
military equipment to the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. 
stopped basing nuclear weapons in South Korea as a sign of 
its commitment to the alliance in the 1990s, but has provided 
additional conventional military assets in the region to provide 
the necessary reassurance.16 This, however, helps drive the 
perceptions that underpin North Korea’s reliance on nuclear 
weapons as a tool to counter the military threat to which U.S. 
activities in the regime contribute.17 This has trapped North 
Korea, South Korea and the U.S. in a classic security dilemma.18 
In addition to the relevance North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
obviously have for security on the Korean peninsula and regional 
alliances with the U.S., Pyongyang’s nuclear proliferation has 
broader implications for East Asian security too. North Korea 
is not the only state in the region to possess nuclear weapons, 
and many countries also hold security concerns about China, 
its military growth and assertiveness. Two clear examples 
demonstrate how North Korea’s nuclear programme is 
entangled more broadly in regional security dynamics: China’s 
response to the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) battery in South Korea; and Japanese threat 
perceptions vis-à-vis China and the possibility of removing the 
U.S. military presence from the Korean peninsula.  
15 As North Korea’s nuclear and missile capability have advanced and missiles 
with intercontinental ranges have been showcased, questions over whether the 
U.S. would sacrifice Washington for Seoul or Tokyo have become less theoretical. 
16 C. Varriale (2018).
17 A. Berger, “A Downward Spiral”, The RUSI Journal, vol. 159, no. 1, 2014, pp. 
68-76.
18 C. Varriale, “Connecting the Dots: US Extended Nuclear Deterrence and 
Denuclearization of  the Korean Peninsula” in B. Unal, Y. Afina, and P. Lewis 
(Eds.), Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, London, Chatham 
House, 2020, pp. 19-22.
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In 2016, Washington and Seoul agreed to deploy a THAAD 
battery in Seongju, South Korea in response to North Korea’s 
ongoing missile tests. THAAD is designed to intercept short, 
medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles in their 
terminal phase of flight. The deployment was not just about 
ensuring the presence of a technical capability able to respond 
to North Korean missile launches; it also provided additional 
assurance to South Korea that the U.S. remained committed 
to its security in the face of North Korea’s advancing nuclear 
capabilities. This deployment, however, was perceived by 
Beijing as having negative implications for Chinese security and 
its nuclear balance vis-à-vis the U.S.19 China’s nuclear stockpile 
is significantly smaller than that of the U.S. (and Russia), and 
Beijing therefore perceives a need to maintain a certain level 
of opacity concerning its nuclear forces in order to minimise 
vulnerability. According to the Chinese argument, THAAD 
would increase its vulnerability as the radar capability on the 
THAAD battery would have the ability to detect Chinese 
military movements, thus putting the desired opacity at risk. 
Furthermore, such military deployments are perceived by 
China to be a gross over-assertion of the U.S. regional military 
presence, and therefore understood to have motives extending 
beyond North Korea.20 
The second example of how the North Korean nuclear issue 
impacts broader regional security followed the diplomatic 
engagements between the U.S. and DPRK in 2018. After his 
first summit with Kim Jong Un in Singapore, U.S. President 
Trump announced a suspension of military exercises between 
19 J. Sankaran and B.L. Fearey, Missile defense and strategic stability: Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea, Contemporary Security 
Policy, 38(3), 2017, pp. 321-344; B.-K. Jun, “China’s Sanctions on North Korea 
After Its Fourth Nuclear Test. Pacific Focus”, Inha Journal of  International Studies, 
vol. 32, no. 2, 2017, cit. p. 219.
20 M. Paul and M. Overhaus, “Security and Security Dilemmas in Sino-American 
Relations”, in B. Lippert and V. Perthes (Eds.), Strategic Rivalry between United 
States and China, SWP Research Paper, pp. 20-24, 2020, cit. p. 22.
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the U.S. and South Korea.21 Not only did this raise concerns 
about military readiness on the Korean peninsula and defence 
and deterrence capabilities in relation to North Korea, it was 
recognised has having implications for regional security too.22 
Given Japan’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis China,23 removing 
or reducing the U.S. military presence in South Korea was 
considered to negatively impact Japanese security, as the first 
line of defence vis-à-vis China would be diminished or lost. 
As with the THAAD deployment discussed above, this result 
of military developments and U.S. alliances is not exclusively 
related to the threats and risks posed by North Korea. From this 
perspective, efforts to reduce military tensions and nuclear risks 
in relation to North Korea were viewed as negatively impacting 
the balance of other regional security concerns, especially in 
relation to China.
Managing North Korea’s Nuclear Risk and 
the Implications of Sars-CoV-2 
North Korea has shown, especially over the last eight years, that 
nuclear weapons are considered a vital aspect of the state and its 
security. As a result of this, convincing North Korea to completely 
relinquish its nuclear programme and weapons stockpile is 
likely an impossible task, at least in the near term. North Korea’s 
nuclear programme has also become intrinsically woven into the 
region’s security architecture. This situation is complicated by 
the fact that some of the actions and activities that drive North 
Korea to consider nuclear weapons necessary are also believed 
to be important for maintaining security and stability vis-à-vis 
other regional security issues, such as balancing the growth of 
21 Press Conference by President Trump, Press Briefings, 12 June 2018.
22 C. Varriale (2018).
23 N. Katagiri, ”Between Structural Realism and Liberalism: Japan’s Threat 
Perception and Response”, International Studies Perspectives, vol. 19, no. 4, 2018, 
pp. 325-43.
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China and preventing nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the 
region. North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, rather than being 
an issue that needs to be solved, has become instead one of 
many factors to consider in balancing security concerns in East 
Asia. Because North Korea’s nuclear programme is so entangled 
in regional security considerations, the effectiveness of efforts 
to respond to the nuclear risks presented by the DPRK must be 
considered in an extended context. 
Diplomacy is considered by far the preferred approach to 
responding to North Korea’s nuclear proliferation, and will likely 
remain a high priority in relation to mitigating the challenges 
posed by North Korea’s nuclear programme, in theory if not in 
practice. Nevertheless, the pitfalls and challenges of diplomacy 
are well recorded.24 North Korea’s reliance on nuclear weapons 
and the unlikelihood of this changing creates a political 
problem for stakeholders committed to what is often defined 
as the Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible, Denuclearization 
(CVID) or the Final, Fully Verified, Denuclearization (FFVD) 
of North Korea – i.e. the verified reduction and elimination of 
North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. In the past, many diplomatic 
agreements have attempted to balance nuclear limitations with 
offers of energy, food aid, and sanctions relief to North Korea.25 
Although these overtures are acceptable to the regime, they are 
not considered of equal or greater value to nuclear weapons 
in ensuring North Korea’s security. Where efforts have been 
focused more explicitly on conventional military security issues, 
other security challenges have arisen, as in the case of Japanese 
threat perceptions vis-à-vis China, noted above. This creates a 
diplomatic dichotomy that, although not insurmountable,26 
24 C. Killough, Begun is Half  Done, Prospects for US-North Korea Nuclear Diplomacy, 
Ploughshares Fund, Ploughshares Fund Study Report no. 4, February 2019
25 C. Varriale (2018).
26 For example, see J. Kim, “Calculating Pyongyang’s Next Steps and Coordinating 
A Response: A South Korean View” in P. M. Cronin (Ed.), Pathways to Peace: 
Achieving the Stable Transformation of  the Korean Peninsula, Washington DC, Hudson 
Institute, 2020, pp. 25-33.
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is often a prominent factor in frustrating diplomatic solutions 
to the situation. Difficulties are compounded by the fact that 
working level engagements between North Korea, the U.S. and 
other regional governments and militaries are sporadic or non-
existent. This not only hampers the effectiveness of diplomacy 
but sustains the deficit of trust and confidence that underpins 
the negative security perceptions surrounding the North Korean 
nuclear question.
In addition to the well-known challenges that result from 
an imbalanced approach to diplomacy and lack of security 
considerations, the short-term impact of the Sars-CoV-2 
pandemic could further increase barriers to engagement. North 
Korea has insisted that the country does not have any Sars-
CoV-2 cases and state media has given significant attention to 
domestic preparedness efforts. North Korea already seemed to 
be focused on domestic issues, even earlier in the year,27 and the 
need for Sars-CoV-2 response measures has only aggravated this 
inward-looking agenda. This may result in reduced capacity and 
appetite for nuclear diplomacy in Pyongyang. Furthermore, 
one of the measures that the DPRK has put in place in response 
to Sars-CoV-2 has been to restrict the entry of foreign visitors. 
This has had implications for the operations of several embassies 
in Pyongyang, with missions including those of the UK and 
Sweden having to temporarily close. This removes a possible 
line of communication with North Korea in lieu of ongoing 
diplomatic efforts. The pandemic could therefore impact the 
nuclear issue in the short-term by forming an additional barrier 
to re-engagement and to broader opportunities for trust and 
confidence building.
It is worth recognising that even beyond the implications 
of Sars-CoV-2, North Korea’s appetite for diplomacy might 
well be small. Since its decision to significantly reduce the 
number of nuclear and missile tests, and the brief spell of 
27 C. Varriale, What North Korea Is Not Telling Us about Denuclearisation in 
2020, RUSI, Commentary, 2 March 2020.
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diplomatic engagement with the U.S. and South Korea in 
2018 (and to a lesser extent 2019), North Korea has been in 
the advantageous position of being able to continue developing 
its nuclear and missile programmes without significant military 
tensions and without rigorous sanctions enforcement from its 
main trading partner, China. Though the ability to continue 
military developments with little international attention is 
likely to be complicated by the pandemic taking up time in 
other governmental agendas, there seems to be little incentive 
for North Korea to seek change right now. Thus, although Sars-
CoV-2 will likely complicate diplomacy in the short term, it is 
only contributing to challenges that would already exist rather 
than causing a change of course. 
A similar observation might also be true for the role of 
sanctions as a tool for responding to North Korea’s proliferation 
activities. Since North Korea carried out its first nuclear test 
in 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has 
passed nine sanctions resolutions in response to Pyongyang’s 
provocations in advancing its nuclear capability.28 Yet, the lack 
of robust sanctions implementation is well recorded.29 Although 
weak implementation can stem from limited capacity or from 
lack of effective domestic enforcement regulations, it is also the 
result of strategic choices made by certain governments who 
have calculated it is not in their interests to strive for robust 
implementation. China’s position on sanctions against North 
Korea is a case in point. 
Given Beijing’s security interests in maintaining stability in 
North Korea,30 China avoids strict sanctions enforcement and 
consistently allows sanctioned goods to flow between it and 
28 UNSCR 1718 (2006); UNSCR 1874 (2009); UNSCR 2087 (2013); UNSCR 
2094 (2013); UNSCR 2270 (2016); UNSCR 2321 (2016); UNSCR 2371 (2017); 
UNSCR 2375 (2017); UNSCR 2379 (2017).
29 A. Berger, A House Without Foundations, The North Korea Sanctions Regime and its 
Implementation, RUSI Whitehall Report 3-17, June 2017.
30 C. Meyskens, “Chinese views of  the nuclear endgame in North Korea”, The 
Nonproliferation Review, vol. 26, no. 5, 2019, pp. 499-517.
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North Korea.31 Analysis has suggested that at the height of the 
2017 military tensions driven by DPRK nuclear and missile 
testing, Chinese support for sanctions against North Korea 
increased, evidenced by China’s (and to a lesser extent Russia’s) 
support for the passing of UNSCRs (UN Security Council 
Resolutions) applying increasingly stringent limitations on 
DPRK trade.32 This was most likely because North Korea’s 
nuclear and missile testing resulted in military tensions 
unfavourable to China tipping the balance of Beijing’s strategic 
interests in support of enhanced sanctions, at least on paper, 
as a way of signalling displeasure to the DPRK and avoiding 
a regional military confrontation that would directly involve 
the U.S. Yet support in theory did not translate into practice; 
as 2018 diplomatic efforts progressed and DPRK nuclear and 
missile provocations lessened, sanctions enforcement remained 
weak.33 Unless North Korea returns to a testing schedule that 
becomes destabilising to the region, increasing military tensions 
and risking military conflict (intentional or otherwise), the level 
of China’s sanctions enforcement is unlikely to improve. This is 
the direct result of competing political priorities and strategic 
concepts in the region. As noted above, China is reluctant 
to contribute to instability within North Korea that would 
result from the domestic economic impact of full sanctions 
enforcement, as the repercussions of this – such as an increased 
U.S. military presence in the region – would not be in Beijing’s 
interests.34  
The Sars-CoV-2 pandemic is likely to see support for 
sanctions enforcement remaining weak. The economic impact 
31 J. Byrne, G. Somerville and H. Macdonald, The Billion-Dollar Border Town, RUSI, 
Project Sandstone, no. 7, 2020; J. Byrne, G. Somerville and H. Macdonald, The 
Phantom Fleet, RUSI, Project Sandstone, no. 6, 2020.
32 B.-K. Jun, ”China’s Sanctions on North Korea After Its Fourth Nuclear 
Test”, Pacific Focus, Inha Journal of  International Studies, vol. 32, no. 2, 2017, 
pp. 208-231.
33 J. Byrne, G. Somerville and H. Macdonald, The Phantom Fleet..., cit.
34 S. Dingli, North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China, China Security, Volume 
Autumn, 2006, pp. 19-34; B.-K. Jun (2017), p. 223 .
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of the health crisis may have constrained the DPRK economy 
in an unprecedented way. Early in 2020, just as the virus was 
beginning to spread globally, satellite imagery caught North 
Korea’s fleet of vessels returning to its port in Nampo.35 North 
Korea relies heavily on this fleet being active for its illicit access 
to resources that are assumed to provide funds for the nuclear 
programme and for the country’s economy and regime more 
broadly. It could be argued that if the desire and need for 
sanctions relief was high pre-Covid, the economic restrictions 
resulting from Sars-CoV-2 response measures may well have 
exacerbated the situation. This in turn could make a diplomatic 
compromise on freezing part of the nuclear programme in 
exchange for sanctions relief more appealing to Pyongyang, 
even if only temporarily. However, it should also be recognised 
that the negative economic impact directly caused by Covid 
response measures may not be as harsh as initial evidence 
suggested. To avoid Sars-CoV-2 having a more substantial and 
enduring impact on the North Korean economy, and because of 
their desire to avoid domestic instability in the DPRK, Chinese 
authorities will be unlikely to reverse the trend of poor sanctions 
enforcement. The implementation of sanctions by China was 
already weak, but the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic will likely weaken 
it further. As a result of China’s strategic and security interests 
in the region, robust enforcement of sanctions against North 
Korea is not likely to happen. 
Despite the growth and advancements of North Korea’s 
nuclear capability, regional and international policy responses 
will continue to be marred by competing security perceptions 
and complex relationships. As with most of the world, North 
Korea, and indeed the nuclear issue, are not free from the effects 
of Sars-CoV-2. However, the impacts of the global pandemic in 
this context are not likely to alter regional security trends and may 
instead merely contribute to compounding existing challenges.
35 Project Sandstone, Rickety Anchor: North Korea Calls its Illicit Shipping Fleet Home 
amid Coronavirus Fears, RUSI, Commentary, 27 March 2020.
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Conclusions
North Korea’s nuclear weapons have evolved over the past 
three decades, and especially in the last decade, to become 
a key aspect of the North Korean state and thus of regional 
security too. Given the ideological driving forces underpinning 
the perceived need for nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that the 
presence and role of such a capability in North Korea is going 
to significantly change, especially in the near term. 
Efforts to manage North Korea’s proliferation and mitigate 
the risks associated with the possession of nuclear weapons, and 
even more so with their use are, however, subject to regional 
challenges that stem from varying threat perceptions. This 
makes it difficult for key regional governmental stakeholders 
and the U.S. to tackle the drivers of North Korea’s proliferation 
without impacting their response to and management of other 
regional security concerns.  
The evolution of North Korea’s nuclear programme, and 
indeed regional and global efforts to respond, have been 
impacted by and in turn impact other security considerations 
in East Asia. Where sanctions have been a tool of interest, their 
robust implementation is hindered by China’s broader concerns 
around ensuring stability in North Korea and by the U.S. 
presence in the region beyond the North Korean nuclear issue. 
Where diplomacy has been utilised, efforts to provide North 
Korea with concessions of energy and aid fail to acknowledge 
the security based drivers behind Pyongyang’s proliferation, 
and thereby fail to address one of the key factors North Korea 
perceives as justifying actions. Where diplomacy has sought 
to consider the conventional-nuclear security balance, efforts 
have negatively impacted the balance of other regional security 
concerns. 
The challenge of using sanctions and diplomacy in response 
to North Korea’s proliferation are not new. However, they may 
be compounded by the Sars-CoV-2 health crisis, especially 
in the short term. The pandemic is limiting opportunities to 
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engage with North Korea directly, to build trust and confidence 
and to promote discussions around denuclearisation; it may also 
be decreasing China’s interest in robust sanctions enforcement. 
Sars-CoV-2 is not likely to be a game changer in this context 
but may add additional complexities to the existing challenges 
associated with addressing North Korea’s nuclear proliferation.
5. Securing Asia’s Sea Lanes: Balancing 
     Military and Trade Applications
Abhijit Singh
Asia’s economic development over the past four decades has 
been closely related to seaborne trade, the cheapest and most 
effective mode of transporting large volumes of cargo over long 
distances.1 The dependence of Indian Ocean and Pacific nations 
on trade for national development has implied a growing 
reliance on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs), the key 
maritime passageways that facilitate heavy shipping traffic 
volumes. As peace-time commercial trading routes, the SLOCs 
are seen by many as strategic highways that give nations access 
to resources in distant locations. This is particularly true for oil 
and gas shipments, the vast majority of which are transported 
via the sea. Consequently, SLOCs security has come to be seen 
as an essential precondition for sustained economic growth.2
Yet, Asia’s sea-lanes today are fraught with risk. There is, to 
begin with, a prevalence of criminal activity in the littorals, 
1 As the backbone of  international trade and the global economy, around 80% 
of  global trade by volume and over 70% of  global trade by value are carried 
by sea and are handled by ports worldwide. See, United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of  Maritime Transport, United 
Nations Publications, New York, 2018.
2 The SLOCs is a dual-edged concept. In peacetime, it denotes the umbilical cord 
of  a state’s economy and the arteries of  a region’s economic health. In war, these 
routes are considered strategic pathways to keep the war machine fully oiled. See 
V. Sakhuja, “Indian Ocean and the Safety of  the Sea Lines of  Communication”, 
Strategic Analysis, vol. 25, no. 5, 2018, pp.689-702.
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especially in the Western Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia, 
where a recent rise in the incidents of piracy has caused worry 
among regional watchers. More conspicuous, and perhaps more 
consequential, are the rising geopolitical conflicts between 
world powers that threaten peace and stability in the littorals. 
The United States and China are at odds in the Western Pacific, 
with tense contests in the South China Sea. India has been 
suspicious of China’s presence in the Eastern Indian Ocean, 
especially in the Bay of Bengal, where Indian analysts discern 
a Chinese attempt to encircle India through regional alliances 
and naval bases evocatively dubbed as the “string of pearls”.3
China’s rising assertiveness in the South China Sea and 
expanding footprint in the Western Indian Ocean have also 
caused disquiet in Europe, where there is growing wariness 
over Chinese attempts to securitise the littorals.4 In a recent 
development, the United Kingdom, France and Germany 
submitted a Note Verbale to the United Nations challenging 
the legality of China’s expansive maritime claims in the South 
China Sea. The three European countries have underlined the 
importance of “unhampered exercise of the freedom of the high 
seas, in particular the freedom of navigation and overflight, 
and of the right of innocent passage enshrined in UNCLOS, 
including in the South China Sea”.5 France, an important 
Indian Ocean power, has sought to enhance cooperation with 
India and Australia and strengthen multilateralism to hedge 
against the possibility of Chinese aggression in the region.6
The strategic environment has been further complicated 
by the advent of Sars-CoV-2. Since the virus first appeared 
3 D. Brewster, “Silk Roads and Strings of  Pearls: The Strategic Geography of  
China’s New Pathways in the Indian Ocean”, Geopolitics, vol. 22, no. 2, 2016, pp. 
269-91.
4 J. Webber, “China’s expansion in the Indian Ocean calls for European 
engagement”, MERICS, 11 October 2019. 
5 “France-UK-Germany submit joint note in UN against China’s South China 
Sea claims”, Economic Times, 20 September 2020.
6 D.R. Chaudhury, “First trilateral meet between India, France and Australia to 
counter Chinese growing presence”, Economic Times, 9 September 2020.
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in late 2019, the pandemic has triggered a collapse in global 
trade flows, disrupting air and sea transport, causing a massive 
fall in the demand for consumer and investment goods.7 In 
the first 6 months of 2020, cruise ship companies have seen 
business come to a halt, with even bulk carrier and container 
shipping firms struggling to turn a profit. Amidst reports of a 
nascent recovery of trade in the 3rd quarter of 2020, analysts 
fear maritime commerce could yet be undermined by a new 
wave of infections.8
Meanwhile, an economic “cold” war between China and the 
United States is heightening geopolitical discord in littoral-Asia, 
with major implications for maritime trade. Since 2018, when 
U.S. President Donald Trump imposed tariffs and other trade 
barriers on China to counter the latter’s “unfair trade practices”, 
relations between Washington and Beijing have been highly 
fraught.9 A deal in January 2020 attempted to strike a partial 
truce, but it is unclear if China intends to honour the agreement.10
The most important issues concern the long-term security of 
the SLOCs. Against the backdrop of the pandemic, there are 
questions about the capacity and willingness of Asian states to 
underwrite security in the maritime commons. Analysts and 
policy planners wonder aloud if businesses and the shipping 
industry have the incentives and security assurances to expand 
activity in a post pandemic world. More pertinently, will Indo-
Pacific powers be able to overcome mistrust and strategic 
suspicion to strike a balance between commercial and military 
uses of the SLOCs, committing to a regime of free passage in 
the contested littorals? 
7 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “Global 
trade continues nosedive, UNCTAD forecasts 20% drop in 2020”, 11 June 2020.
8 “COVID second wave would slam ocean shipping”, Hellenic Shipping News, 12 
June 2020.
9 For a detailed examination of  the U.S.-China trade war see Tao Liu  and Wing 
Thye Woo, “Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War”, China Economic Journal, 
Special Issue on Forty Years’ Economic Reform in China, vol. 11, no. 3, 2018.
10 “US, China to Discuss ‘Phase-1’ Trade Deal amid SARS-CoV-2 Disruption”, 
News 18, 15 August 2020. 
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This chapter carries out a region-wide assessment of threats 
in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite fast changing political and 
economic circumstances, it argues, sea lane security remains 
critical for Asia’s big and small powers. Consequently, even as 
they compete for strategic advantage in the littorals, regional 
states are likely to be willing to cooperate in the interests of 
regional peace, stability and economic prosperity. The chapter 
surveys the security situation in the Indian Ocean and the 
Western Pacific, identifying critical hurdles that might impact 
the flow of maritime traffic in the Asian sea lanes.
The Indian Ocean
The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has some of the world’s most 
important trading routes, connecting the Middle East and Africa 
with South Asia, East Asia, Europe and the Americas. These 
are witness to some of the world’s heaviest trading traffic, with 
more than 80% of the world’s seaborne trade in oil (equivalent 
to about one-fifth of global energy supply) transiting through 
these sea lanes.11 From a SLOCs security perspective, 3 regions 
in the Indian Ocean are of particular interest: the Persian Gulf/
Strait of Hormuz, the Horn of Africa, and the Eastern Indian 
Ocean.12
The Strait of Hormuz
With a daily oil flow average of over 21 million barrels per day 
(b/d), or the equivalent of about 21% of global petroleum 
liquids consumption, the Strait of Hormuz is a vital artery 
for Asian trade (Figure 5.1).13 Close to one-fifth of the world’s 
11 J. Lee and C. Horner,  “China Faces Barriers in the Indian Ocean”, Hudson 
Institute, 11 January 2014.
12 C. Jeffery, “The Indian Ocean Region May Soon Play a Lead Role in World 
Affairs”, The Wire, 16 January 2019. 
13  “The world’s most important oil transit chokepoint”, U.S. Energy Information 
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crude oil supplied by Gulf countries traverses through the strait, 
which is only 21 miles wide at its narrowest point. In recent 
years, escalating tension between Iran and the United States 
has raised the prospect of a military clash in this vital waterway. 
Since May 2018, when the U.S. withdrew from a 2015 nuclear 
pact with Iran and 6 major powers, and re-imposed sanctions, 
Iran has threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz. Washington’s 
designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps – the 
Islamic Republic’s most powerful military institution – a foreign 
terrorist organisation in April 2019 led Tehran to declare the 
U.S. a “state sponsor of terrorism”. 14
Fig. 5.1 - Crude oil condensate and petroleum products 
passing through the Strait of Hormuz 
(2014-2018, barrels per day)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Administration (EIA), 20 June 2019.
14 “Iran responds in kind to Trump’s IRGC ‘terrorist’ designation”, Al Jazeera, 8 
April 2019.
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The security situation in the Persian Gulf further declined after 
the U.S. accused Iran of orchestrating attacks on oil tankers 
in the region, and also targeting a Saudi Arabian oil facility.15 
In May 2020, the Donald Trump Administration ordered an 
airstrike in Iraq to kill Iran’s top general, Qasem Soleimani – 
a move that led Iranian military commanders to renew their 
threat to close down the Persian Gulf, and target U.S. warships. 
Iran has sought to negate key U.S. advantages in the Persian 
Gulf. Tehran has been modernising its arsenal of Anti-Access/
Area Denial (A2/AD), and carried out regular military exercises 
near the Gulf of Hormuz. The Iranian Republican Guards navy 
has developed significant mine-laying capability, and deployed 
anti-ship missile weapons on Iran’s coast to deter U.S. naval 
forces in the Persian Gulf.16 In collaboration with China, Iran 
is also strengthening its joint intelligence collection capabilities 
in the region.17 Under a bilateral strategic agreement signed 
recently, China has undertaken to invest US$400 billion in 
Iran’s oil and gas and infrastructure sectors, including multiple 
projects along Iran’s Gulf coastline.18
Meanwhile, regional moves to safeguard shipping in the 
Gulf region have acquired urgency. In July 2019 Washington 
announced plans to mobilise an international maritime force 
to protect vital shipping routes in the Persian Gulf.19 Operation 
Sentinel is intended to increase surveillance of and security in 
key waterways in the Middle East and is supported by Australia, 
Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
The UK, supported by France, Italy, and Denmark, has also 
announced a European-led “maritime protection mission” to 
15 “U.S. blames Iran for Saudi oil plant attacks”, The Hindu, 15 September 2019.
16 S. Pasandideh, “Iran boosts A2/AD capabilities”, The Diplomat, 23 May 2014.
17 EyalPinko, Iran, China setting up joint base for collecting intelligence, Israel 
Defence, 17 September 2020.
18 F. Fassihi and S. Lee Myers, “Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and 
Military Partnership”, New York Times, 12 July 2020.
19 “U.S. Central Command Statement on Operation Sentinel”, United States Central 
Command, 19 July 2019.
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protect oil flows through the Strait and in other chokepoints 
and international shipping lanes.20 India and Japan have 
deployed their own warships to escort country-bound crude 
oil carriers in the Gulf region. Needless to say, any disruption 
of oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz would have severe 
implications for the global economy. Even without a crisis, the 
increasing militarisation of the Persian Gulf could grievously 
impact maritime security and pose a threat to regional security 
and stability.
Horn of Africa 
Located at the intersection of the Red Sea and the Western 
Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa is another critical hot-spot in 
the Indian Ocean Region. Long a region of great competition 
for power, the Horn today is witness to new rivalries playing 
out on its shores.21 The competition for influence centres on the 
Middle East’s primary political fault lines – between Iran and 
Arab states, and among Arab states. Since 2014, when a Saudi 
Arabian-led coalition of African and Middle Eastern countries 
intervened in Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
has sought to protect the Gulf States’ western security flank. 
Following the war in Yemen, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and Saudi Arabia have allied against Iran, Turkey and Qatar in 
a game of brinkmanship that has threatened security across the 
Red Sea corridor.22
To enable military operations in Yemen, the GCC established 
a military base in Assab in Eritrea. The UAE has been 
constructing a military facility at Berbera in Somaliland, even 
20 “UK to seek European maritime mission to counter Iran’s ‘ illegal acts of  
piracy”, The Guardian, 22 July 2019. 
21 For a detailed discussion on Arab politics in the Horn of  Africa see N.J. 
Melvin, “The new external security politics of  the Horn of  Africa region”, 
SIPRI insights on Peace and Security, April 2019.
22  Ibid. 
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as the Saudis have pushed for a military facility in Djibouti. 
Together Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deployed naval forces 
in support of operations in Yemen, sending military forces to 
the Yemeni island of Socotra. Turkey has opposed these moves, 
and in concert with Qatar expanded its own presence in the Red 
Sea and the Horn region.23 In January 2020, eight Arab and 
African states bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden signed 
a deal to form a council to resolve disputes in their region of 
interest.24 Unfortunately, the terms of engagement of this pact 
are unclear. Many regional states like Somaliland and Eritrea 
remain wary of the GCC’s enormous influence in the region, 
and the Houthi-aligned government in Yemen has expressed 
strong opposition to being used as a tool of aggression by the 
Saudi-led coalition. There is uncertainty, then, about whether 
and how the pact will usher in long-term peace.
The lack of stability in the Horn of Africa has implications 
for maritime security and regional trade flows. The inability of 
African and Gulf States to resolve contentious issues, together 
with the growing militarisation of the Red Sea coast increases 
maritime security risks. China’s establishment of a military base 
in Djibouti has added a knot to an already tangled security 
landscape.25 It does not help that piracy around the Horn 
continues to linger. Despite a general decline in attacks in recent 
years, the number of suspicious approaches towards merchant 
vessels in the region continues to be high, indicating that the 
progress made on combating piracy off the coast of Somalia 
remains fragile and reversible.26
23 Z. Vertin, The Gulf, the Horn, and the new geopolitics of  the Red Sea, Brookings Doha 
Center, August 2019.
24 “Crossing the Red Sea: Where the new littoral-state council goes next”, Africa 
Times, 21 January 2020.
25 J.-P. Cabestan, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of  China’s 
Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity”, Journal of  
Contemporary China, vol. 29, no. 125, 2012, p. 731.
26 “Report of  the Secretary-General on the situation with respect to piracy 
and armed robbery at sea off  the coast of  Somalia”, United Nations Security 
Council, 2 November 2020.
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There is also the threat of state-sponsored terrorism looming 
over the region. Recent reports of Iran’s covert ties with the 
Somalia-based al-Shabab terrorist group have caused anxiety 
among regional watchers.27 There is speculation that Tehran 
could use al Shabab to attack the U.S. military and other foreign 
forces in East Africa. Seemingly, it remains doubtful the region 
will ever be able to overcome its dependence on international 
taskforces for security in the littorals.28
The Eastern Indian Ocean
On the Eastern end of the Indian Ocean, there are other players 
but similar problems. The Andaman Sea has emerged as a 
potential flashpoint for conflict between India and China. In 
the aftermath of the India-China military clash in Northern 
Ladakh in June 2020, New Delhi has been looking at ways 
to firm its grip onthis sensitive space.29 A vast majority of 
international East-West trade, including Chinese oil shipments, 
container vessels, and bulk cargo traffic approaches the Malacca 
Strait through the 10 degree channel between Andaman 
and Nicobar. Indian analysts have therefore been advocating 
an aggressive strategy aimed at deterring Chinese maritime 
operations in this space.
Growing tensions on the India-China Himalayan border have 
prompted New Delhi to expedite plans to refurbish military 
bases inthe Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI). This includes 
a proposal to construct additional facilities for warships, aircraft, 
missile batteries and infantry soldiers on the strategically-
located islands.30 Runways at existing naval air stations are being 
27 M. Fraser-Rahim and M. Fatah, “In Somalia, Iran Is Replicating Russia’s 
Afghan Strategy”, Foreign Policy, 17 June 2020.
28 N.J. Melvin (2019).
29 S. Sinha, “Time to reset India’s China policy”, Sunday Guardian, 18 July 2020. 
30 R. Pandit, “LAC face-off: Ladakh triggers Andamans build-up plan”, The Times 
of  India, 4 July 2020.
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extended to support operations by large aircraft, and additional 
infrastructure for surveillance is being set up. 
The focus of Indian naval operations is the tracking of Chinese 
ships and submarines.31 The Indian navy (IN) recognises 
China’s “Malacca dilemma” and has concentrated forces along 
chokepoints on the Eastern edge of the Indian Ocean. P-8 is 
based in India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands regularly survey 
the near-seas, and the Indian navy has also carried out bilateral 
and trilateral exercises with the maritime forces of “Quad” 
nations, Japan, Australia and the U.S., as also the French navy.
In response, China has expanded its outreach to Bay of 
Bengal countries. Beijing has made significant inroads in 
South Asia via the Belt and Road Initiative, setting up what 
many see as dual-use civilian military bases.32 China has also 
expanded its non-military activity in the Eastern Indian Ocean. 
In September last year an Indian warship expelled the Shiyan 
1, a Chinese research vessel found intruding into the exclusive 
economic zone off the coast of India’s Andaman and Nicobar 
Islands.33 China’s deep-sea mining vessels34 and intelligence 
ships regularly visit the Indian Ocean – the latter often found 
operating in the waters of the Eastern Indian Ocean.35 At a 
time when there’s talk of a China-backed plan to construct a 
canal across the Thai isthmus36 and a secret agreement for a 
Chinese naval base on the Cambodian coast, the rise in China’s 
non-military activities in the Eastern Indian Ocean has caused 
worry in India’s security establishment.37
31 “More Muscle for India’s Andaman and Nicobar Defence Posts to Counter 
Hawkish China”, The Hindustan Times, 26 August 2016.
32 J. White, “China’s Indian Ocean ambitions”, Brookings Report, June 2020.
33 “Navy expels suspected Chinese spy vessel from Indian waters”, India Today, 
3 December 2019.
34 “India on alert as ‘China deploys dozen underwater drones in Southern Indian 
Ocean”, Times of  India, 24 May 2020.
35 “Spy planes spot China warship in south IOR”, DNA, 19 September 2019.
36 “Thailand’s Kra Canal: China’s Way Around the Malacca Strait”, The Diplomat, 
6 April 2018.
37 “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military 
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Amid apprehension over an India-China standoff in the 
Indian Ocean, there are growing fears that a wider conflict 
in the littorals could impact the flow of trade in the regional 
SLOCs. If India escalated from the land border to the maritime 
domain, where the Indian navy enjoys substantial advantages, 
the implications would not be limited to China’s vital Indian 
Ocean trade, but also affect international traffic flows. Regional 
analysts worry over the prospect that China’s “Malacca dilemma” 
could compel it to react in unpredictable ways.38
The Western Pacific
The seas of the Western Pacific region are the most contested 
in the Indo-Pacific realm. The region faces a host of maritime 
security challenges, including piracy, terrorism, territorial 
claims, jurisdictional disputes, criminal trafficking and illegal 
fishing. The differences between coastal and maritime user 
nations in terms of their interpretation of the provisions of the 
Law of the Sea Convention vis-à-vis navigation and military 
operations represent some of the most pressing challenges to 
SLOCs security in the Asian littorals.
South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca
No region is more representative of the challenges to sea-
lane security in the Western Pacific than the South China Sea 
(SCS).The Strait of Malacca, which connects the SCS to the 
Indian Ocean, is the busiest, and arguably the most important 
sea lane in the world.39 Over 25% of oil shipped between the 
Network”, The Wall Street Journal, 22 July 2019.
38 You Ji, “Dealing with the Malacca Dilemma: China’s Effort to Protect its 
Energy Supply”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 31, no. 3, 2017, pp. 467-89.
39 Almost half  of  the world’s total annual seaborne trade tonnage passed through 
the Strait of  Malacca and the nearby Straits of  Sunda and Lombok in 2010, See 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of  
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Middle East and Asia passes through the strait – a figure that 
has steadily increased as China and other regional powers have 
grown in population and wealth. In 2016, transits through 
Malacca were as high as 84,456 (over 16 million barrels/day) 
a large proportion of which were oil and gas shipments bound 
for China, Japan and South Korea (Figure 5.2).40 Rich in oil 
and gas deposits, the SCS is a site of intractable sovereignty 
disputes, overlapping maritime jurisdictional claims and 
conflicts over historical rights.41 Equally critical from a SLOCs 
security perspective are the Straits of Lombok and Sunda, other 
feeders into the South China Sea.
Fig. 5.2 – Crude oil and petroleum products 
transported through the Strait of Malacca 
(2011-2016, million barrels per day)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Maritime Transport, United Nations Publications, New York, 2011.
40 “Malacca Straits VLCC traffic doubles in a decade as shipping traffic hits all 
time high in 2017”, Sea Trade Maritime News, 18 February 2019.
41 For a detailed exposition of  security issues in South China Sea see, C. Rahman 
and M. Tsamenyi, “A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the 
South China Sea”, Ocean Development and International Law, vol. 41, no. 4, 2020, 
pp. 315-333.
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As the world’s largest trading nation and a country with the 
second most powerful navy, China is a critical player in the 
SCS. Beijing has aggressively asserted its territorial claims in 
the region, in blatant disregard ofthe norms and institutions 
of the rules‐based order. In recent months, China’s attempts 
to coerce and intimidate fellow claimants in Southeast Asia 
have grown stronger. The Chinese navy has been particularly 
aggressive in the waters off Vietnam and Malaysia. After the 
Chinese militia sunk a Vietnamese boat in December 2019, 
the Chinese Coast guard has aggressively marked its presence 
in waters close the Malaysian, Vietnamese, Philippine and 
Indonesian coasts.42 Beijing’s aggressive moves in the SCS have 
received pushback from the U.S. Navy, which has carried out 
a series of exercises with allies and partners in the contested 
waters, even deploying two aircraft carrier strike groups – the 
USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan – for joint operations in 
April 2020.43 U.S. naval warships have also carried out freedom 
of navigation patrols near the China-held Spratly and Paracel 
islands to challenge what Washington sees as the illegal claims 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the SCS.
Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries have scaled up efforts 
to counter China. In December 2019, Malaysia approached 
the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
claiming waters beyond the 200-kilometre limit of its Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) in the northern part of the SCS44 – a 
move prompted by China’s extended presence in and around 
the Luconia Shoals. Indonesia deployed warships in the waters 
off the Natuna Islands to fend off Chinese fishing boats and 
coastguard ships, and Vietnam has officially remonstrated with 
the UN, protesting the sinking of a Vietnamese fishing boat 
42 A. Ananthalakshmi and R. Latiff, “Chinese and Malaysian Ships in South 
China Sea Standoff ”, U.S.News, 17 April 2020.
43 “Nimitz Strike Group Participates in Second Dual-Carrier Operation in a 
Week ”, United States Naval Institute, 29 June 2020.
44 United Nations, “Partial Submission by Malaysia in the South China Sea to 
CLCS”, Oceans and Law of  the Sea, 12 December 2019. 
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by a Chinese vessel near the Spratly islands.45 Under Hanoi’s 
chairmanship the ten-member ASEAN issued a statement in 
June, reaffirming their collective stand that “the 1982 UNCLOS 
is the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign 
rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests” in the SCS.46 The 
moves and countermoves have created a sense of foreboding 
that many see as an ill-boding for security and stability in the 
SCS. 
Meanwhile, growing instances of piracy in the Western Pacific 
have troubled regional watchers (Table 5.1). The Regional 
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) reported a total of 41 
incidents from January through June of 2020 in Southeast Asia 
(as compared to 23 incidents in 2019).47 The latest incidents 
are more in the nature of armed robbery and spread across the 
South China Sea, from the coasts of Indonesia and Vietnam, to 
the Philippines.48 Particularly worrisome are the high numbers 
of attacks in the Singapore and the Malacca straits, critical for 
the movement of Asia’s trade through the SLOCs. Although 
law enforcement agencies have in recent years honed their skills 
in fighting pirates and armed robbers, the sophistication of the 
recent attacks has surprised many officials.49
45 “South China Sea: Vietnam approaches UN against China”, Times of  India, 14 
April 2020.
46 “ASEAN finally pushes back on China’s sea claims”, Asia Times, 30 June 2020.
47 A total of  51 incidents of  piracy and armed robbery against ships were 
reported in Asia during January-June 2020 compared to 28 incidents during 
January-June 2019. See “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia”, Half  
Yearly Report, January to June 2020, RECAAP Information Sharing Center.
48 “World-Wide incidents of  piracy and armed robbery against ships report from 
January to June 2020”, The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 19 July 2020
49 J.V. Hastings, “The Return of  Sophisticated Maritime Piracy to Southeast 
Asia”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 93, no. 1, March 2020.
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Tab 5.1 - Location of incidents (2017-2020)
Source: Regional Cooperation Agreement on Cambating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)
Securing the Sea Lanes
While sea lane security is the responsibility of regional maritime 
forces, those with capacity invariably take the lead. As the 
most capable military power, the United States has been at the 
forefront of the security mission in the Indo-Pacific region. The 
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a U.S.-led naval coalition of 
33 nations, has played a leading security role in the Gulf region, 
largely ensuring the safe passage of commercial shipping.50 The 
CMF has been assisted in its endeavour by the European Naval 
Force (EUNAVFOR) Somalia,51 and other regional maritime 
50 The CMF’s constituent Task Forces (CTF) 150 and 151 are responsible 
for Maritime Security Operations outside the Arabian Gulf, and for Counter 
Piracy respectively, See Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), https://
combinedmaritimeforces.com/
51 European Commission, External Action, “EU NAVFOR Mission update: 
Cooperation and Partnerships”, 5 April 2018
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forces from India, Japan and China, especially in the counter 
piracy mission. 
But the U.S. is rapidly decreasing its dependence on Middle 
Eastern oil. With the country turning into a net exporter of 
oil products recently, there is apprehension that Washington 
might reduce its security presence in the Persian Gulf.52 Some 
believe this is an unlikely scenario. Given the high dependence 
of U.S. allies – Japan, South Korea, and Australia – on Middle 
Eastern oil, they argue Washington is not likely to dramatically 
cut down its naval presence in the Gulf region. Indeed, China’s 
growing footprint in the Western Indian Ocean, as also the 
continuing importance of choke points for global trade, gives 
U.S. policymakers enough reasons to continue to deploy U.S. 
naval forces in the Persian Gulf.53
Yet, Indian Ocean powers like India are preparing for the 
contingency of reduced U.S. interests in the IOR. New Delhi is 
scaling up regional operations to protect regional sea lanes.54 The 
Indian navy, a key security provider in the IOR has increased 
cooperation with other prominent regional navies from France, 
Australia and Indonesia to hedge against the possibility of falling 
U.S. interests in the affairs of the IOR.55 Chinese assertive 
policies across the Indo-Pacific region have also revived the 
“Quad” – a multilateral group comprising India, the United 
States, Japan, and Australia. The four nations, which resumed 
dialogue after a decade-long hiatus in November 2017, have 
stepped up their efforts to counter Chinese dominance in the 
Indo-Pacific region.56
52 G. Bahgat, “The Emerging Energy Landscape” in K. Coates Ulrichsen (Eds.), 
The Changing Security Dynamics of  the Persian Gulf, London, Oxford Printing Press, 
2017, p. 70.
53 H. Brands, “Why America Can’t Quit The Middle East”, Hoover Institute, 21 
March 2019. 
54 A. Singh, “All out at Sea, India Engagement’s in the Indian Ocean”, The Hindu, 
16 May 2019.
55 D.R. Chaudhury (2020).
56 “Quad nations to boost coordination to counter China in Indo-Pacific”, The 
Business Standard, 6 October 2020. 
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Another significant security player in the IOR is the 
European Union, which has, through its Critical Maritime 
Routes Wider Indian Ocean (CRIMARIO) programme, sought 
to protect regional routes considered crucial to maritime trade 
and transport. The focus has so far been on capacity building 
(providing legal assistance and training), maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) and operational coordination among select 
East African and African archipelago states. Earlier this year, 
the EU took a step forward by announcing the CRIMARIO 
II initiative to support partner countries and organisations 
in securing SLOCs vital for international trade.57 Among 
other things, the interventions have emphasised coast guard 
interactions and maritime law enforcement where threats have 
appeared more recently and the gap in capacity is high. France, 
the UK and Germany have also taken a hard line against 
Chinese aggression in the Western Pacific, with the French and 
Royal navy even conducting maritime operations in the SCS.58
In the Western Pacific, two multilateral groupings have 
contributed significantly to sea lane security: the ReCAAP 
and the Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) Network.59 Earlier this 
year, member states – Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand – revised Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to 
strengthen information-sharing linkages and enhance mutual 
understanding and collaboration. To their credit, ASEAN navies 
and coastguards have also demonstrated a keen willingness 
for integrated operations, which suggests an increasing 
understanding of the benefits of maritime coordination and 
cooperation.
57 I. Gachie Vinson, “Maritime Security: The EU CRIMARIO II Initiative Is 
Starting”, CREMARIO.EU, 11 June 2020.
58 Tuan Ang Luc, “Are France and the UK Here to Stay in the South China Sea?”, 
The Diplomat, 14 September 2018.
59 “Singapore Hosts 14th Malacca Straits Patrol”, Naval Maritime and Defence, 
January 15, 2020.
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Shifting Patterns of Trade
Even so, regional trends in crime, economics and maritime 
geopolitics are shifting, creating new realities. The first is the 
possibility of a reduction in global demand in a post pandemic 
world. In 2019, world merchandise trade had begun to decline 
in volume terms, weighed down by political tensions and 
protectionist measures.60 Following the pandemic, there is 
fear that a further drop in demand could set off a reversal of 
globalisation. Already many regional governments, including 
many long-time advocates of global trade, are using the health 
crisis to erect barriers to commerce. 
Secondly, in the aftermath of Sars-CoV-2, there are increasing 
attempts at restructuring supply chains, which could introduce 
shifts in the pattern of maritime trade. Donald Trump in the 
U.S. wants to bring supply chains home from China, and has 
even publicly floated the need for a group of friendly nations 
in Asia that could help produce essential goods.61 While it may 
seem too radical a move, ”economic decoupling” with China has 
broadsupport outside of the U.S., including among many Asian 
states. Governments want businesses to look outside of China to 
find alternative sources for partsof their supply chain to diversify 
concentration risk and minimise disruption. Some, like India, 
are espousing a model of self-reliance that could wall off entire 
segments of their economy from exposure to Chinese businesses.62
To be sure, decoupling from China is neither easy nor 
practical. Despite their keenness to diversify sourcing and 
production, global companies remain unwilling to abandon 
manufacturing in China. Those countries that see themselves 
as alternative sites for production, industry watchers say, do not 
yet have the population base and demographics to replace China 
60 World Trade Organization, “World Trade Statistical Review 2020”, 2020.
61 H. Pamuk and A. Shalal, “Trump administration pushing to rip global supply 
chains from China”, Reuters, 10 June 2020.
62 “India set to erect a Great Wall against Chinese companies”, Economic Times, 
19 June 2020.
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as an optimal location.63 Even in the hypothetical case that 
regional states were able to shift value chains away from China, 
Beijing is not likely to respond with military force. Beijing is 
itself hugely dependent on Asian sea lanes for resources and 
energy, with a shipping industry that accounts for the largest 
share of the world’s shipping fleet (at around 15%). With its 
energy requirements likely to more than double over the next 
two decades, Chinese dependence on regional sea routes is only 
likely to grow. This suggests a reduced likelihood on the part 
of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to impede 
international traffic in Asia’s sea lanes. 
The reality for analysts and policymakers to consider is 
shifting geopolitics. From the Horn of Africa and the Persian 
Gulf to the Andaman Sea and the Western Pacific, rivalries 
are becoming sharper and more intense, causing stronger 
partnerships and alliances. Increasing pressure from the U.S. 
and its Southeast Asian allies could, for instance, prompt 
China to rethink its assertive posture in the SCS. If Sars-
CoV-2 accelerated the changes already underway resulting in 
an exodus of lower-value manufacturing jobs from China, it is 
even possible that Beijing could cooperate with regional states 
to ensure freedom of navigation. 
The fourth reality is climate change, and its impact on regional 
security capacities. Increasingly, it is environmental degradation, 
drought, overfishing, oil spills and extreme weather that present a 
bigger risk in the maritime domain than hard security challenges. 
In the Indo-Pacific region, with its many island states, climate 
change and related challenges have become an existential threat. 
This is stretching the security capacities of regional navies and 
coast guards. The willingness of Asian states to cooperate or 
compete with others in the maritime domain is then likely to 
depend on more than just political and geo-economic vectors. 
Any future framework for SLOCs security would need to 
63 “India can’t replace China at manufacturing, not without paying more”, The 
Print, 4 July 2020.
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consider environmental and capacity factors as well. If geopolitics 
is seen to be overtaking other crucial imperatives, such as the 
need for human security and development, the results could be 
vastly different.
Conclusions
It is evident the commercial and military uses of Asia’s sea lanes 
are inextricably intertwined, and cannot be viewed as distinct 
from each other. While the dynamics of maritime security in 
a post pandemic world are likely to be fluid, the impulse to 
cooperate could well be driven by the imperatives of economics 
and national well-being. With growing demand for resources 
and energy, and declining capacity among regional states to 
police the SLOCs, stakeholders may have little option but to 
pool resources and collectively secure the maritime commons. 
Growing contestation between world powers in the littorals 
will be a complicating factor, in particular the possibility of a U.S.-
China conflict in the SCS. Even without a military conflict, a trade 
war between the two countries could result in a re-orientation of 
Asian value chains. A shift in supply lines away from China could 
restructure maritime trade in ways that might be detrimental 
for the regional security order. The pandemic could also lead 
other regional stakeholders to act in erratic ways, especially if 
the shifting patterns of trade and economics are found to favour 
particular countries. Sars-CoV-2, however, is a developing story; 
its end state is unknown, as is its future impact on Asian trade 
and regional stability. What is clear is that regional powers have a 
tangible incentive to cooperate in a post pandemic world.
For the moment, the threats to maritime trade in Asia remain 
largely unchanged, even if the capacities to provide security 
appear to be shrinking. An intensification of non-traditional 
security challenges could result in a strong regional drive towards 
cooperation. Yet, geopolitics is likely to rein supreme. Assuming 
favourable geopolitical trends, a coordinated approach in the 
maritime commons is the best way to deal with existing threats 
in the Asian littorals.
6.  The Impact of Sars-CoV-2 on Terrorism 
      in Asia: Preliminary Considerations 
Giulia Sciorati
In the first few months of 2020, the Sars-CoV-2 crisis seemed to 
put everything on hold. Since the World Health Organization 
declared a pandemic in early March, international organisations 
and national governments have been facing an invisible threat 
that controlled attention and resources. Eight months later, as 
our management of the health crisis became more and more 
effective, so did our understanding of the extent of the impact 
of Sars-CoV-2. Indeed, aside from the economy and health, 
it has become clear that the pandemic kicked off a “domino 
effect” that influenced several forces and trends around the 
world. Terrorism is among them. As evocatively expressed 
by one political analyst in late September, the “pandemic has 
not flattened the terrorism curve”.1 Indeed, in certain parts of 
the world, preventive measures have fed into identity politics, 
damaging the social fabric of nations and heightening the risk 
of radicalisation among Muslim communities. This process was 
particularly striking in India, for instance, where members of 
the country’s Muslim minority were repeatedly identified as 
“super-spreaders” by national authorities.2
1 D. Kamat, “Pandemic Has Not Flattened the ‘Terrorism Curve’”, Asia Times, 
29 September 2020. 
2 J. Slater and N. Masih, “As the World Looks for Coronavirus Scapegoats, 
Muslims Are Blamed in India”, The Washington Post, 23 April 2020. 
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As the second continent in the world by number of terrorist 
attacks, Asia is weakened by structural frailties that make it 
more prone to terrorism and radicalisation. Above all, major 
conflicts like the Afghan war and the clashes between Muslim 
minorities and national governments in South and South-east 
Asia traditionally exacerbated the risk that terrorism would 
spread around the continent.
This chapter builds on this premise and offers some insights 
on countries and sub-regions in Asia that are deemed to be 
more likely to experience increasing numbers of terrorist 
attacks in the short run, as a consequence of the effects that 
Sars-CoV-2 had on everyday life. In the first section, this 
chapter presents a comprehensive overview of terrorism in 
Asia, analysing violent events around the continent after the 
2014 global peak in terrorism. The second section compares 
Asia against global terrorist trends, devoting particular 
attention to sub-regional and national anomalies. Lastly, 
the first part of the third section examines the pandemic-
inspired digitalisation drive and its effects on terrorism in 
Asia. The second part considers the likelihood that a nexus 
between natural disasters and terrorism might emerge on the 
continent because of the pandemic. This chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the main findings and the implications 
for national post-crisis recovery plans.
The Statistics of Terrorism in Asia
After global terrorism peaked in 2014, few places in the world 
continued to be subjected to terrorist attacks on a regular basis. 
In 2018, Asia accounted for about 38% of the total number of 
terrorist attacks in the world, second only to the Middle East 
and North Africa (Figure 6.1). Of the 15 countries around the 
world that recorded more than 150 terrorist attacks per year, 
5 were Asian countries: Afghanistan, India, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Pakistan. Together, they accounted for over 
35%  of the total number of terrorist attacks worldwide and 
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about 50% of the global number of terrorist fatalities.3
Between 2014 and 2018, Asia experienced over 25,000 
terrorist attacks, the majority of which were in South Asia 
(about 79%). 
Fig. 6.1 - Contributions to global terrorism 
per world area
Source: Author’s Elaboration of Data from the Global Terrorism Database 
(2019)
Even if Afghanistan – a country that has been at war for 19 
years – was excluded from count, South Asia would still be 
the continent’s most hit sub-region, registering around 11,000 
attacks in total. Together with Afghanistan, the other worst-
afflicted countries over the past 5 years were Pakistan and India, 
which experienced an average of 1,000 terrorist attacks per year. 
Bangladesh and Nepal followed suit, recording about 700 and 
400 attacks respectively. In contrast with the rest of the sub-
region, Nepal and Sri Lanka are the only countries showing 
a distinctive upward trend in the annual number of attacks 
between 2014 and 2018, with the latter recording around 
3 All data are from the Global Terrorism Database (2019).
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100 attacks in total. Lastly, the Maldives and Bhutan were 
the only two countries in South Asia not to show a particular 
susceptibility to terrorism. While Malé, in fact, experienced 
only 16 attacks (the majority of which occurred in 2014), 
Thimphu recorded only one. Even this single attack, though, 
has a stronger connection to India rather than Bhutan, as the 
main actor at play was the “National Democratic Front of 
Boroland”, an armed separatist group that sought to obtain 
the secession of the “Boroland Territorial Region” from India’s 
north-eastern state of Assam.4
In addition to South Asian states, the Philippines and 
Thailand were also among the countries that accounted for 
the largest share of global terrorism in 2018. Between 2014 
and 2018, Southeast Asia was the second sub-region in Asia 
by number of terrorist attacks, which totalled at about 5,000, 
equating to approximately to a quarter of the terrorist attacks 
that occurred in South Asia in the same period. Manila and 
Bangkok, for instance, experienced an average of about 600 
and 300 terrorist attacks per year. Conversely, Myanmar and 
Indonesia recorded a lower number of attacks in total (about 
300 and 150, respectively), but they showed growing trends, 
with the former spiking in 2017 with 116 attacks. Malaysia’s 
total number of attacks remained under 50, the most dangerous 
years being 2014 and 2016, when the Abu Sayyaf Group 
successfully conducted 15 attacks in the country.5 Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam’s totals remained under 10, with the former 
recording only a single, unsuccessful terrorist attempt in 2018, 
when several explosives were defused in Pailin province near 
4 No motive was ever given for the kidnapping of  Bhutanese citizens by the 
National Democratic Front of  Boroland. Authorities agreed to consider it a 
money-making attempt, as a ransom was asked to one of  the victims’ families, see 
BBS, “Kidnapped Men Released After Paying Ransom”, Bhutan Broadcasting 
Service, 7 September 2014. 
5 To expand on the impact of  the Abu Sayyaf  Group on terrorism in Malaysia, 
see L.  Steckman, “The Abu Sayyaf-ISIS Nexus: Rising Extremism and its 
Implications for Malaysia”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, vol. 8, no. 
5, 2016, pp. 16-21. 
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Thailand’s border. No group claimed responsibility for the 
failed attack, but geography alone suggests that the attack 
might have been more connected to Thai terrorism than 
Cambodia’s domestic security issues.6 No terrorist attacks 
have been recorded in Brunei, East Timor and Singapore since 
2014. Nonetheless, data collection on Brunei and Singapore – a 
totalitarian and an authoritarian regime, respectively – remains 
biased by incomplete media reporting.7 The same is true for 
Laos and Vietnam, which are also known as major “media black 
holes” in the sub-region.8
China and North Korea play a similar role in East Asia. Due 
to data unavailability on the North Korean regime, in fact, 
the latter was excluded from the count. East Asia, as well as 
Central Asia, has been generally spared from terrorist attacks, 
especially by comparison with the rest of the continent. During 
the five years under analysis, East Asia recorded fewer than 
100 terrorist attacks in total, about 80% of which occurred 
in China.9 Japan and South Korea, in contrast, experienced a 
total of 17 and 3 attacks respectively. While China and Japan 
have been on a decreasing trend since 2014, South Korea 
continued to experience few, random terrorist attacks, mostly 
connected to anti-American sentiment. Two out of the three 
violent episodes recorded in South Korea, in fact, have targeted 
American national symbols, such as the U.S. Ambassador and 
the embassy.10
6 K. Sarom, “Explosives Found in Pailin”, Phnom Pehn Post, 13 July 2018.
7 On authoritarian regimes and terrorism, see E. Pokalova, “Authoritarian 
regimes against terrorism: lessons from China”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 
6, no. 2, 2013.
8 The term “media black hole” applies to countries where privately-owned 
media are forbidden and journalists mostly relay government’s propaganda (RSF 
Reporters Without Borders, “Asia-Pacific”, 2020, https://rsf.org/en). To expand 
on media freedom in the Asia-Pacific region, see RSF (2020).
9 The terrorist attacks that occurred in Taiwan were included in the China 
category.
10 J. Kim, “U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Slashed in Face by Assailant”, 
Reuters, 4 March 2015; and S. Cho and S. Park, “Korean-Canadian caught for 
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When it comes to terrorism, figures for Central Asia are 
similar to East Asia’s. In the five years under analysis, in fact, 
the sub-region only experienced a total of 30 terrorist attacks. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were the two worst-hit countries, 
accounting for about 80% of the total number of attacks in the 
sub-region. They were also the only countries in Central Asia 
to record at least 1 attack per year. Indeed, data for Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan suggest isolated episodes of 
violence. The three attacks recorded in Kazakhstan, for instance, 
were part of a single, coordinated outbreak, which occurred on 
the same day in different parts of Aktobe, a city in the north-
west of the country.11 While most of the violent attacks in 
Central Asia boiled down to domestic grievances, China and 
the United States were also targeted: incendiary weapons were 
used to damage the U.S. embassy in Uzbekistan in 2015 and 
the Chinese embassy in Kyrgyzstan was bombed in 2016.12
Despite the 2014 global peak, terrorism continues to be an 
everyday reality in many Asian countries. South and South-east 
Asia remain the worst-hit sub-regions, accounting for about 
79% and 29% of the number of terrorist attacks around the 
continent respectively, while East and Central Asia combined 
account for just under 1%. Quantitative data are a useful 
starting-point to determine the extent of terrorism in Asia, but 
they are limited by incomplete reporting, as most media outlets 
continue to enjoy low levels of media freedom, especially in 
those areas that show a growing tendency towards terrorism.
botched Molotov cocktail attack on US embassy in Seoul”, National, The Korea 
Times, 12 February 2018. 
11 “Gunmen Launch Series of  Deadly Kazakhstan Attacks”, Al-Jazeera, 6 June 
2016.
12 To expand on terrorism and radicalisation in Central Asia, see J.R. Pottenger, 
“Islam and ideology in Central Asia”, in N. Lahoud and A.H. Johns (Eds.), Islam 
in World Politics, London, Routledge, 2012.
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A Partial Alignment with Global Trends
By examining terrorism as a global phenomenon, two main 
trends were detected. First, since the 2014 global peak, the 
annual number of terrorist attacks has been steadily declining. 
Indeed, the total number of attacks worldwide decreased by 
about 43% in five years, from 17,000 per year in 2014 to 
9,600 in 2018. Second, the reach of the Islamic State (IS) has 
been extending. Mozambique, the Netherlands and Sri Lanka, 
in fact, joined the total number of countries worldwide that 
experienced IS violence, taking the total count to 57. Despite 
these generally recognised trends, regional variety is still 
prominent.13
Consistently with the first global trend, Asia has been 
showing a general decline in the annual number of terrorist 
attacks. Having recorded 6,100 attacks in 2014, the continent 
sustained 4,200 in 2018, representing an average decrease of 
8% per year. Due to the rebound effect of the 2014 peak, 2015 
was the year that recorded the steepest annual decrease in global 
terrorism in the period under analysis, amounting at about 16%. 
East Asia saw the largest average fall (33%). At the national 
level, Pakistan was the only country in Asia where occasional 
spikes did not interrupt the decrease, from 2,151 attacks in 
2014 to 480 in 2018. Sri Lanka, however, is the region’s major 
exception, in view of the growing annual number of terrorist 
attacks perpetrated there (Figure 6.2). In 2019, Colombo 
experienced the world’s deadliest series of attacks, when 7 
bombs went off around the country, claiming the lives of over 
250 people.14 Terrorism has also been on the rise in Nepal and 
Myanmar in recent years, with spikes in 2017 of 247 and 116 
attacks respectively. Nonetheless, attacks in both countries 
13 E. Miller, Global Terrorism Overview: Terrorism in 2019, Background Report, 
College Park, National Consortium for the Study of  Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism, University of  Maryland, July 2020.
14 R. Abeynayake, “In Sri Lanka, Rising Islamic Militancy Was the Elephant in the 
Room”, South China Morning Post, 27 April 2019.
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decreased the following year. India also shows a minor increase 
in the annual number of attacks, passing from 860 in 2014 
to 888 in 2018. The country registers a spike in 2016, when 
terrorism peaked at over 1,000 annual attacks. Indonesia, by 
contrast, saw a more significant increase in the annual number 
of attacks, with a rise of about 19% over the whole period. 
In 2018, in particular, Indonesia’s annual number of terrorist 
attacks spiked, registering a total of 43 attacks. Jakarta recorded 
the lowest number of annual attacks in 2016, when the country 
only experienced 19 episodes.
Fig. 6.2 - Most consistent upward and downward trends 
in Asian terrorism
Source: Author’s elaboration of data from the Global Terrorism Database 
(2019)
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The second trend identifies an extension in the global reach of 
IS. Between 2014 and 2018, a total of eight Asian countries 
suffered from IS terrorism.15 While Pakistan was the sole 
country in the region to experience IS terrorist attacks in 2014, 
the number of countries where IS operates has been rapidly 
increasing: attacks, in fact, also occurred in Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh in 2015, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines 
in 2016, India and Kyrgyzstan in 2017 and Tajikistan in 2018. 
An estimated 550 IS attacks were recorded in Asia in the last 
five years. This total is certainly not exhaustive, as the number 
of attacks perpetrated by lone individuals may have had links 
to IS terrorism that remained undetected. Nonetheless, even by 
merely considering claimed or assigned attacks, data indicate 
deepening IS permeation across the continent. This process is 
even more striking as IS violence in Iraq has been decreasing.16 
IS attacks in Asia primarily occurred in Muslim-majority 
countries, with the exception of the Philippines and India. The 
latter, in particular, was still rocked by internal clashes involving 
the country’s Muslim minority.17 Since 2015, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan were the only three countries to 
experience at least one IS attacks per year, while the rest of Asia, 
especially India and the Philippines, recorded attacks only in the 
last two or three years. Afghanistan still accounts for the highest 
share of attacks in Asia (63.5%). Despite the growing number 
of Asian countries where IS is active, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, 
15 According to the Global Terrorism Database, attacks were perpetrated by the 
Khorasan Chapter of  the IS, the IS in Bangladesh and the East Asia Division of  
the IS. For a comprehensive overview of  the impact of  the IS in Asia, see A.S. 
Hashim, The Impact of  the Islamic State in Asia, Singapore, S. Rajaratnam School of  
International Studies (RSiS), Nanyang Technological University 2015. 
16 E. Miller (2020).
17 On the relations between the Muslim minority in India and the national 
government, see L. Maizland, India’s Muslims: An Increasingly Marginalized 
Population, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 20 August 2020; and E. 
Mangiarotti, “Kashmir: Covid-19 and the Politics of  Enforced Isolation”, in G. 
Sciorati (Ed.), Where the Pandemic Hits the Hardest: Fragility, Conflict and Covid-19 in 
Asia, ISPI Dossier, Milan, 30 May 2020.
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Malaysia and Tajikistan experienced single episodes, thus 
suggesting that IS’s reach in Asia remains largely limited to 
traditional strongholds like Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Despite sub-regional variety, Asia generally confirms the two 
major trends characterising global terrorism today: a decrease 
in the annual number of terrorist attacks and the extension of 
IS reach in the continent. Nonetheless, some countertrends can 
also be detected, when looking at Asia from a country-specific 
viewpoint. Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Nepal, for instance, all show 
an increase in the annual number of terrorist attacks. Moreover, 
although IS expanded in the Philippines, the group remains 
mostly active in neighbouring countries around South Asia.
How did Sars-CoV-2 Maximise Risks in Asia?
At the time of writing (November 2020), Sars-CoV-2 is still 
raging around the world, and Asia has reached a total of over 
11 million cases since the outbreak started. India is the country 
that has been worst hit at the regional level so far, reaching 
9 million cases, followed by Indonesia, Bangladesh and the 
Philippines, each reporting over 400,000 cases.18
Although the international community is still coming to 
terms with the impact of Sars-CoV-2 on our way of life, the 
notion that the pandemic accelerated some latent forces and 
trends has been proposed by many international observers.19 
The security realm is no exception. Over the past year, many 
dormant issues have in fact escalated in Asia: above all, the 
China-India border skirmishes and the Thai protests.20 Around 
the world, terrorism is falling into similar trends, as new attacks 
18 Data are from the World Health Organization.
19 Above all, W. Hague, “Coronavirus Has Accelerated Eight Mega-Trends That 
Will Transform Everything”, The Telegraph, 20 April 2020. 
20 See, for instance, G. Robinson, M. Macan-Markar and S. Turton, “Thai Protests 
Build as Pandemic Fuels Unrest Across Southeast Asia”, Nikkei Asia Review, 21 
October 2020. 
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in Europe have painfully shown.21 Asia, for its part, now risks 
heading in the same direction.
The Global Digitalisation Drive
As argued in a recent report by the United Nations Counter-
Terrorism Committee, Sars-CoV-2 has emphasised certain aspects 
of our life and downplayed others.22 Education and interpersonal 
relations, for instance, have mostly shifted into the digital realm, 
as national governments adopted preventive measures that have 
limited mobility and in-person meetings. In practical terms, 
these restrictions increased the number of unsupervised children 
and young adults spending prolonged time on the Internet, 
either attending school through online classes or turning to social 
media in search of surrogate frameworks of sociability. Such a 
phenomenon is particularly threatening, as previous studies 
on radicalisation have shown that the digital realm and, more 
specifically gaming platforms, are effective channels for extremist 
messages to be conveyed to the youngest and most responsive 
segments of the population.23 Before preventive measures were 
imposed, Asia was still the first continent in the world by number 
of Internet users, with 2.3 billion people in 2019, primarily located 
in China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, 
Vietnam and Thailand.24 Asia was also the largest global gaming 
market, generating revenues of around US$80 billion in 2020. 
In comparison, the North American and European markets 
combined produced only US$78 billion.25
21 N. Onishi, C. Méheut and L. Foroudi, “Attacks in France Point to a Threat 
Beyond Extremist Networks”, The New York Times, 6 November 2020. 
22 UNCTED, The Impact of  the COVID-19 Pandemic on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism 
and Countering Violent Extremism, United Nations Security Council Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 2020.
23 For a comprehensive review on the Internet-terrorism nexus, see M. Conway, 
“Determining the Role of  the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six 
Suggestions for Progressing Research”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 40, no. 
1, 2017, pp. 77-98. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157408.
24 Data from Internet World Stats.
25 Ibid.
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India is one of the two countries in Asia that runs the highest 
risk from the impact of the Sars-CoV-2 digitalisation drive on 
everyday life. This is partly due to the size of its population, as 
India has the world’s second highest number of Internet users, 
after China, amounting to about 560 million people.26 The 
majority of India’s population, moreover, is under 24 years old, 
thus including a large number of people who are potentially 
more receptive to extremist messages. In the last 5 years, India 
has recorded growing annual numbers of terrorist attacks, which 
peaked two years after the 2014 global peak, when New Delhi 
recorded 1,026 attacks. The general trend in the number of 
terrorist attacks in India in this period is broadly flat, however, 
with only a 3% increase, despite the fact that the country has 
experienced IS attacks every year since 2016.
As the fourth nation in the world by number of Internet 
users (about 171 million) and an age pyramid mimicking 
India’s, Indonesia also needs to be taken into consideration with 
regards to the Sars-CoV-2 global digital drive. Jakarta is in fact 
among the top 30 countries in the world that were worst hit by 
the pandemic, recording 463,000 cases and 15,000 deaths.27 
Terrorism in Indonesia has also been growing, with the annual 
number of attacks experienced by the country peaking in 
2018. Like India, Indonesia was also a theatre for IS terrorism, 
although the country experienced only a single attack in 2016, 
when a suicide bomber detonated near the Indonesian National 
Police headquarters in Surakarta, a city in Central Java.28 
Despite the fact that the permeation of IS remains limited, the 
Sars-CoV-2 digitalisation drive remains particularly threatening 
for a country like Indonesia, where Islam is professed by the 
majority of the population, the country’s population is young, 
the number of Internet users is vast and the annual number of 
terrorist attacks has been growing.
26 Ibid.
27 Data are from the World Health Organization..., cit.
28 F. Rizki and N. Nangoy, “IS-Linked Suicide Bomber Attacks Indonesia Police, 
Wounding One”, Reuters, 5 July 2016. 
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The Nexus between Natural Disasters and Terrorism
In addition to digitalisation, Sars-CoV-2 is connected to 
an element that has proven to be responsible for facilitating 
radicalisation in the past – that is, the construction of narratives 
linking natural disasters to shortcomings in national religious 
life.29 In this regard, the Maldives is a crucial example. Shortly 
after the 2004 tsunami, in fact, the Maldives – a country where 
Islam is imposed by law – experienced a surge in radicalisation, 
which may be reflected in the fact that Maldivians now 
account for a large portion of foreign fighters in Syria, Iraq and 
Pakistan.30 Indeed, the official narrative treated the disaster as 
a consequence of a general “lack of religiosity and un-Islamic 
behaviour” in the country.31 Another striking case in Asia is that 
of Pakistan, where a similar narrative emerged after the 2005 
Kashmir earthquake: many Islamic leaders, in fact, identified 
the disaster as divine retribution.32 
The pandemic now risks inspiring similar narratives in other 
parts of Asia. Indeed, the continent comprises about 40% of 
the global Muslim population and, in the last few years, Islam 
has become a divisive issue between Muslim communities and 
national governments around the continent. The Rohingya 
crisis in Myanmar and the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines 
are prime examples.33
29 C. Berrebi and J. Ostwald, Earthquakes, Hurricanes, and Terrorism: Do Natural 
Disasters Incite Terror?, Working Paper, RAND Corporation, 2011; and C. Berrebi 
and J. Ostwald, “Exploiting the Chaos: Terrorist Target Choice Following 
Natural Disasters”, Southern Economic Journal, vol. 79, no. 4, 2013, pp. 793-811.
30 Dharmawardhane, “Maldives”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, vol. 8, no. 
1, 2015, pp. 63-69.
31 L.T. Waha, “Covid-19: Harming Health and Social Cohesion in the Maldives?” 
in G. Sciorati (Ed.), Where the Pandemic Hits the Hardest: Fragility, Conflict and 
Covid-19 in Asia, Milan, ISPI, May 2020. 
32 A. Wilder, Perceptions of  the Pakistan Earthquake Response: Humanitarian Agenda 
2015 Pakistan Country Study, Medford, Feinstein International Center, Tufts 
University, 2008.
33 Among others, see F.B. Zakaria, “Religion, Mass Violence, and Illiberal Regimes: 
Recent Research on the Rohingya in Myanmar”, Journal of  Current Southeast 
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Moreover, maritime Asia is among the areas in the world 
that were most strained by the effects of climate change, 
deforestation, pollution and shrinking biodiversity.34 These 
issues made extreme weather phenomena like floods and 
typhoons more common and, as a consequence, civil society 
more receptive to these challenges. In Indonesia, for instance, 
shortly after lockdown measures were suspended, people went 
as far as protesting against the relaxation of the country’s green 
policies proposed by the government to stimulate economic 
recovery.35
Previous studies on the nexus between natural disasters and 
terrorism have shown that a positive correlation between the two 
phenomena is more prone to emerge when low- and medium-
income countries are involved.36 In the case of Sars-CoV-2, 
in addition to income levels, several other elements, such as 
the severity of the crisis, the percentage of the population that 
professes Islam, the level of the terrorist threat in the country and 
the reach of IS terrorism, facilitate the adoption of a narrative 
that links the health crisis to non-religious behaviour. When 
all these elements are taken into consideration, Indonesia and 
the Philippines emerge as the two countries in Asia that are 
now most exposed to the effects of the nexus between natural 
disasters and terrorism.
Both are in fact middle-income countries, according to data 
from the World Bank, with Indonesia gaining the status of 
upper-middle income country in July 2020.37 Although the 
Asian Affairs, vol. 38, no. 1, 2019, pp. 98-111. doi: 10.1177/1868103419845583; 
and N. Ochiai, “The Mindanao Conflict: Efforts for Building Peace through 
Development”, Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 23, no. 2, 2016, pp. 37-59. doi: 
10.1080/13439006.2016.1254364.
34 UNDP, “Climate Change in Asia and the Pacific. What’s at Stake?”, United 
Nations Development Programme, 28 November 2019.
35 F. Firdausand and R. Ratcliffe, “Indonesia Mass Strikes Loom Over Cuts to 
Environmental Safeguards and Workers’ Rights”, The Guardian, 5 October 2020.
36 C. Berrebi and J. Ostwald (2013).
37 “Indonesia Is Now an Upper-Middle Income Country, World Bank Says”, The 
Straits Times, 3 July 2020.
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Philippines was expected to follow in Indonesia’s footsteps, 
the pandemic jeopardised the country’s endeavour and Manila 
has so far remained among lower-middle income countries. 
While Indonesia hosts the world’s largest Muslim population 
(estimated at about 225 million people), the Philippines 
account for just over 6 million, representing only 6% of the 
country’s population.38 Nevertheless, given the country’s 
geography, Muslim minorities in the Philippines are located in 
specific areas, such as the island of Mindanao or the Sulu and 
the Palawan archipelagos. As maintained by Anushka D. Kapahi 
and Gabrielle Tañada (2018), the location of Muslim minorities 
and their identitarian bond contributed to developing a sense 
of separation from the rest of the country.39 This separation 
eventually manifested in the Mindanao conflict, during which 
Muslim minorities came together supporting secessionist 
claims. Eventually, the conflict led to the establishment of 
the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao 
(BARMM) in 2019, under which Muslim minorities were 
granted self-administration rights. The BARMM, however, 
now risks separating Muslim minorities even further from the 
rest of the population. Indeed, although the establishment 
of the autonomous region was considered a victory for the 
secessionist fringe, the BARMM has so far proven incapable 
of maintaining stability, as terrorist attacks occurred in the 
summer of 2020, accompanied by calls for full independence.40 
Since 2016, moreover, IS had also established its “East Asian 
Emirate” in the area, thus signalling a stronger presence of the 
group around the country.
38 “Factsheet on Islam in Mindanao”, Philippine Statistics Authority (Region XI 
- Davao Region), 28 September 2017.
39 A.D. Kapahi, and G. Tañada, “The Bangsamoro Identity Struggle and the 
Bangsamoro Basic Law as the Path to Peace”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 
vol. 10, no. 7, 2018, pp. 1-7.
40 B.S. Baraguir, Philippines: The Security Conundrum in Sulu, ISPI Commentary, 9 
September 2020. 
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Indonesia (and to a lesser extent Malaysia) is following a 
similar trajectory, although the country experienced only a 
single IS attack in the last five years. As well as suffering growing 
numbers of terrorist attacks, Indonesia and the Philippines 
are among the world’s 30 countries worst hit by the crisis, the 
second and fourth countries in Asia by number of cases and 
the second and third by number of deaths.41 These elements 
make Jakarta and Manila prime candidates for the adoption 
of narratives linking the pandemic to non-religious behaviour, 
thus increasing the susceptibility of civil society to violent 
extremist messages.
Nonetheless, as the pandemic is still spreading, definite 
conclusions on how Sars-CoV-2 is impacting terrorism in 
Asia cannot yet be drawn. Preliminary observations, though, 
indicate that some countries and sub-regions in the continent 
risk becoming more vulnerable than others to terrorism in the 
near future.
Conclusions
This chapter presented some preliminary considerations on 
the countries and sub-regions in Asia that are more prone to 
experience spikes in terrorism in the short-term because of the 
impact of Sars-CoV-2 on the continent.
Two elements were mainly taken into consideration: first, the 
fact that the pandemic sent the world into a digitalisation drive, 
inspired by the need to contain the diffusion of the virus, thus 
limiting mobility and personal relations. Second, the fact that 
among Asia’s Muslim communities the pandemic – a health 
crisis that is comparable to a natural disaster – risks inspiring 
narratives based on the notion that Sars-CoV-2 is a punishment 
for un-Islamic behaviour and lack of religiosity.
India and Indonesia are the two Asian countries that are 
potentially most sensitive to the effects of the first element, 
41 Data are from the World Health Organization..., cit.
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the global digitalisation drive, especially in light of their young 
populations and the vast number of Internet users. Indonesia, 
moreover, together with the Philippines, also is one of the 
countries in Asia where the nexus between natural disasters and 
terrorism is most likely to emerge. Indeed, Islam is particularly 
entrenched in both countries, IS has increased its presence 
and civil society is exceptionally sensitive to issues relating to 
nature. With regards to the impact of Sars-CoV-2 on terrorism, 
Indonesia thus emerges as one of the countries in Asia that 
has the most at stake in the short-run. Although South Asia 
continues to be the sub-region where most terrorist attacks 
occurred after the 2014 global peak and the area where IS has 
been able to extend its presence the most, South-east Asia is 
consolidating its second place.
The full extent of the pandemic’s impact on the international 
system remains to be seen. As the continent that first experienced 
the health crisis, Asia has been on the frontline of adopting 
effective response mechanisms, planning successful economic 
recovery plans and “competing” in the global vaccine race. In 
the last year, traditional and non-traditional security challenges 
have been put aside to focus on tackling the pandemic. De-
radicalisation and counter-terrorism objectives, however, 
should now be included in the post-crisis recovery strategies 
of national governments, especially by those countries in Asia, 
such as Sri Lanka, that have experienced steadily growing 
annual numbers of terrorist attacks since the 2014 global peak, 
and countries facing social currents that make processes of 
radicalisation under Sars-CoV-2-constraints more likely, such 
as India, Indonesia and the Philippines.
7.  The EU and Europe in the Indo-Pacific 
     Region – Finally Getting on Board?
Axel Berkofsky
This chapter is about something that has yet to happen: visible 
and sustainable EU and European involvement in the Indo-
Pacific region, including the presence of European naval forces 
in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and even in the disputed areas 
of the East and South China Seas. 
There can be virtually no doubt that the EU’s and Europe’s 
on-paper commitment to show the flag more effectively in the 
Indo-Pacific, as discussed below, is almost entirely motivated 
by China’s highly assertive (i.e. aggressive) policies and actions 
in support of its territorial claims in the disputed waters. 
Policymakers in Brussels and EU member states’ capitals 
confirm  that Europe is increasingly interested in helping to 
keep Asian maritime lanes of communication free and safe from 
the Chinese elephant in the room. China, for its part, seems to 
think it can sit all of this out. In March 2020, Chinese Foreign 
Minister, Wang Yi, dismissed the Indo-Pacific concept as an 
“attention-grabbing idea that will dissipate like ocean foam”. 
Unfortunately for him, it has not yet done so. On the contrary, 
analysts increasingly conclude that China has been put on 
notice and must expect a reaction to its territorial ambitions 
and claims from within and outside the Indo-Pacific. Thanks 
to Beijing’s aggressive interference in Hong Hong’s political 
and judicial affairs, its treatment of the Uighur minority in the 
province of Xinjiang in what Beijing refers to as “re-education 
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camps”1 and the continuing construction of military facilities 
(i.e. bases) on disputed islands in the South China Sea, over the 
last two years a new realism has set in in Europe. In fact, inside 
EU institutions in Brussels, China has been referred to as a 
“systemic rival” since early 2019 and one no longer hears many 
official voices promoting attempts to engage politically with 
the Chinese. On 16 September 2020, the UK, Germany and 
France jointly submitted a Note Verbale to the United Nations, 
reminding the international community (and more importantly 
China) of the 2016 verdict issued by the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. The court pronounced that 
China’s historic territorial claims in the South China Sea are 
obsolete as they do not comply with international law and violate 
the provisions stipulated in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).2 To be sure, Beijing has not and 
will not adjust, let alone reduce, its territorial claims in response 
to a European reminder that it is breaching international law. 
Unfortunately, this is simply not in the cards.  
A Matter of Definition
Certain geographical, geoeconomic and geopolitical 
considerations are in order if we are to appreciate the importance 
of the Indo-Pacific. The region comprises the Indian Ocean and 
the Pacific Ocean, hosts nearly 33% of the world’s population 
and accounts for 50% of world maritime trade 50% of the 
container traffic and 70% of the global trade in oil and gas 
travel through the Indian Ocean.3 The Straits of Malacca in 
1 Which in reality are detention camps, detaining up to one million Uighurs, 
brainwashing them into becoming ‘real’ Chinese as opposed to remaining 
‘separatists’ and/or terrorists).
2 See C.M. Ramos, “UK, France, Germany refute China’s expansive South China 
Sea claims”, Inquirer.Net, 18 September 2020.
3 For further details and data see also P. Saha and A. Mishra, The Indo-Pacific Oceans 
Initiative: Towards a Coherent Indo-Pacific Policy; Observer Research Foundation 
(ORF), Occasional Paper no. 292, December 2020. Also A. Cainey, The 
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the east and Hormuz in the west are some of the most strategic 
choke points in a region that hosts 64% of the world’s oil trade 
and movement The Indian Ocean is also home to 40% of the 
world’s offshore petroleum and mineral deposits. 
The term “Indo-Pacific”, Frederic Grare4 writes, implies the 
inclusion of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Unfortunately, 
boundaries are defined differently by different states according 
to their own interests. For France, by way of example, the Indo-
Pacific space extends from the shores of East Africa and Southern 
Africa to the coasts of North, Central, and South America. For 
France’s Ministry of the Armed Forces, Grare adds, the Indo-
Pacific is “a security continuum which extends from Djibouti 
to French Polynesia”. For the U.S., the Indo-Pacific region 
is smaller, stopping at India’s shores.5 Alan Gyngell from the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) agrees that 
the Indo-Pacific is a
framing device, not a geographical reality – its proponents 
shape it around their different interests. Each country has its 
own ‘Indo-Pacific’. Like the Asia-Pacific region or Asia itself, 
the Indo-Pacific is simply a way for governments to define an 
international environment suited to their policy objectives in 
particular circumstances.6
India’s version of the Indo-Pacific is an extension of its Look East 
policy for Southeast Asia and a defence of its sovereignty within its 
maritime surroundings.7 For Tokyo under former Japanese Prime 
Geopolitics of  Indo-Pacific Trade, RUSI Commentary, 25 November 2020; F. 
Heiduk and G. Wacker, From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific, SWP Research Paper 
2020/RP 09, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 2020.
4 Former French Ministry of  Defence official and currently Nonresident Fellow, 
South Asia Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
5 See F. Grare, France, the Other Indo-Pacific Power, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 21 October 2020.
6 See A. Gyngell, To Each their own Indo-Pacific, EastAsiaForum, 23 May 2018.
7 For details and analysis of  India’s Indo-Pacific strategy see e.g. R. Mukjerjee, 
“Looking West, Acting East”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2019, pp. 43-52; for an 
official Indian explanation of  the country’s Indo-Pacific Policies see H. Siddiqui, 
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Minister Shinzo Abe, its policies towards and in the Indo-Pacific 
Region were always primarily about China (like they continue to 
be under Japan’s current Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga).8 
Terminology and semantics vary in other ways too. When 
Tokyo talks about “free and open” in the context of “Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific” policy, it – like the U.S. – means not only 
problem-free access to maritime routes in the Indo-Pacific 
but also cooperation and coordination among democratic 
and liberal democracies, as practiced and promoted under 
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) initiated by the 
Japanese Prime Minister in 2007: in other words, cooperation 
and coordination in Indo-Pacific security between the U.S., 
Japan, India and Australia.
What Elephant?
The EU, Mohan writes, is the largest trading partner of many 
countries in the Indo-Pacific and the EU’s 27 member states 
ship over 35% of their exports to the region. 90% of these 
exports pass through the Indian and Pacific Oceans.9 Mohan 
also points out that European and Indo-Pacific countries share 
the same geopolitical concerns: finding themselves in the middle 
of U.S.-China rivalry and balancing or hedging an assertive or 
aggressive China. For countries like Japan, India or Australia 
the latter term is probably much more relevant. Tokyo, India 
and Canberra made up their minds some time ago: hedging 
and indeed countering China’s aggressive policies – alone or 
jointly – is very much on the menu and becoming entangled in 
U.S.-Sino rivalry is an acceptable price to pay.  
India’s Concept of  Indo-Pacific is Inclusive and Across Oceans, Ministry of  External 
Affairs, Government of  India, 8 November 2019.
8 For details of  Japan’s current and future Indo-Pacific policies see Free and Open 
Indo-Pacific, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  Japan, 7 August 2020.
9 G. Mohan, A European Approach to the Indo-Pacific?, Global Public Policy Institute, 
20 August 2020.
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In 2019 and 2020, China was the undisputed champion 
of disruptive action in Asian territorial waters. As in previous 
years, Beijing continued to build civilian and more importantly 
military facilities on disputed islands in the South China Sea. 
Satellite pictures published by the European Space Imagery 
back in March 2018 provided unambiguous evidence that 
China has built military bases on the disputed Spratly Islands.10 
Furthermore, Beijing continues to challenge the legitimacy of 
Japanese control over islands in the East China Sea (the Senkaku 
Islands which have been de facto part of Japanese territory since 
189511), and is also sailing too close for comfort for India into 
the Indian Ocean, building economic and military relations 
with countries India either has problems with (Pakistan) or 
considers part of its geopolitical and geoeconomic “background” 
(Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, The Maldives and others).  
Here Comes Europe, a Little Bit
It now seems that Europe and the EU want a piece of the action, 
albeit with the usual delays and timidity. In recent months the 
EU member states Germany and the Netherlands have issued 
their individual Indo-Pacific strategies.12 France for its part has 
10 See D. Bishton, “Spratly Islands Military Bases Revealed”, Spatial Source, 6 
March 2018. The images showed a deep water port, completed aerodomes, 
hangars, military barracks , communications infrastructure and a 2.7 km long 
runway on the Subi and Mischief  reefs – all you need for a fully equipped military 
base. See also J. Griffith, “China Beijing May Have Built Bases in the South 
China Sea, but that Doesn’t Mean it can Defend Them, Report Claims”, CNN, 
7 December 2020.
11 A group of  islands Japan annexed after its victory in the first Sino-Japanese 
War of  1894/1895. China claims until today that the islands (which are called 
Diaoyu Islands in China) have always belonged to China while Tokyo insists that 
they were “terra nullius” when Tokyo annexed them. The Senkaku Islands were 
formally returned to Japanese sovereignty in May 1972. Together with Okinawa, 
the Senkaku Islands were under U.S. administration since the adoption of  the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952.
12 The Dutch Indo-Pacific guidelines (issued in November 2020) will not be 
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had an official Indo-Pacific strategy since 2018 while the UK 
is reportedly planning to issue one soon. The EU’s External 
Action Service (EEAS) is due to publish its own Indo-Pacific 
strategy some time during 2021. 
So, from now on, will Europe be flying the flag in the 
Indian Ocean, the South China Sea and East China Sea, 
patrolling disputed Asian territorial waters, and helping like-
minded countries (Japan, India and Australia) to keep Chinese 
territorial expansionism and ambitions in check? Not yet, 
evidently, because the EU – unlike Japan, India and most 
recently Australia – has not yet given up on the idea, however 
unrealistic and unlikely it might be, of engaging with China 
politically. 
Brussels can have very few remaining illusions that the EU 
and China can jointly address and solve issues in international 
politics and security, if only because China is more often than 
not part of the problem rather than the solution. Beijing, 
of course, knows this, but evidently believes that trade and 
investment ties, which took centre-stage again at the very end 
of 2020, will convince Europe to bother (even) less with Asian 
politics and focus on the money. On 30 December, the EU and 
China signed their long-awaited bilateral trade and investment 
agreement (the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment or CAI, under negotiation since 201413). Whether, 
in the months and years ahead, this deal will have an impact 
on how ready Brussels and EU member states’ governments 
will be to order their naval forces to challenge China’s illegal 
territorial claims in the South China Sea remains to be seen. 
dealt with in this chapter, but for details see e.g. S. Strangio, “Following France 
and Germany, the Netherlands Pivots to the Indo-Pacific”, The Diplomat, 18 
November 2020. See also L. Louis, “The Outlines of  a European Policy on the 
Indo-Pacific”, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 26 November 2020.
13 For details see e.g. J. Brunsden, M. Khan, and M. Peel, EU Hails China Deal 
despite Risk of  Conflict with Biden White House, Report, Financial Times, 30 December 
2020. Also see J. Brunsden, M. Peel, and S. Fleming, “Human Rights Questions 
Remain over Brussels-Beijing Pact”, Financial Times, 31 December 2020.
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For now, at least, the bilateral trade agreement is all but 
unambiguous evidence that Brussels has decided to listen to 
the deal’s cheerleaders and lobbyists and go for the trade and 
money, taking at face value Chinese assurances that they will 
respect international labour rights. (Beijing’s refusal to abide by 
such standards had been the agreement’s last stumbling block 
until its signing in December). 
According to the chair of the EU Parliament’s delegation for 
relations with China, Reinhold Bütikofer, Brussels has allowed 
itself to be fooled into believing that Beijing will actually do 
something about labour rights in China too. He calls the 
agreement a “strategic mistake” and said it was “ridiculous 
for the EU side to try to sell as a success commitments that 
Beijing has made on labour rights in China”.14 He certainly 
has a point, not least as the agreement merely stipulates that 
Beijing will “make continued and sustained efforts” to ratify 
International Labour Organization (ILO) workers’ protection 
conventions. A commitment is no guarantee, and such a clause 
is essentially a free pass for China to drag its feet as long as it 
wants.15 Now that the deal is signed, however, the EU and those 
member states who are to profit most from it – Germany above 
all – are likely to take as low a profile as possible on territorial 
disputes involving China in the years ahead, hiding behind the 
hackneyed phrase that economic engagement will favour and 
promote political engagement. In reality, this strategy has never 
worked with China in the last ten years or so, as EU policymakers 
and officials are well aware. Berlin calls its approach “change 
through trade”. While this may sound visionary, it has no real 
meaning. Those who claim otherwise are typically unable to 
cite any empirical evidence that increased trade and economic 
14 From the German Green Party cited in the aforementioned Financial Times 
article. Indeed, there is sample evidence that China ‘employs’ Uighur Muslims 
imprisoned in detention camps in the Chinese province of  Xinjiang as forced 
labourers.
15 See T. Mitchell and K. Mason, “Xi’s Trade Deal with the EU Rings Alarm Bells 
in US”, Financial Times, 2 January 2021.
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engagement with China has ever encouraged, let alone obliged, 
China to address EU’s theoretical concerns about human rights, 
the oppression of minorities, freedom of speech and expression 
(or lack thereof ) etc. 
The fact that the agreement was signed when Germany held 
the EU presidency might be a coincidence but is probably not. 
More than 50% of EU exports to China are from Germany 
and German multinational companies with a large presence in 
China have been pushing for the trade pact to be adopted for 
some time.16 One can be excused for suspecting that Berlin had 
a very open ear to business’ request to adopt the agreement in 
the final hours of its EU Presidency. 
France Went First
Let us rewind to 2018, the year Paris published its Indo-Pacific 
strategy, emphasising France’s right and indeed obligation to 
defend its sovereignty in the region, extending over the islands of 
Mayotte and La Réunion, the Scattered Islands and the French 
Southern and Antarctic Territories in the southern part of the 
Indian Ocean. France also has territories in New Caledonia, 
Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia and Clipperton Island. 
In short, France considers itself a “resident power” and/or an 
“island state in the Indo-Pacific”, though this idea is arguably 
a left-over of French colonialism. Roughly 1.6 million French 
citizens (or citizens with French passports) live in the Indo-
Pacific region and about 8,000 French soldiers are permanently 
based there. However, France’s relations with its overseas 
territories are anything but problem-free and some could well 
seek to free themselves from their former colonial masters in the 
future. French sovereignty is already being contested in New 
Caledonia and in French Polynesia, and both Mauritius and 
16 German carmaker Volkswagen e.g. generates close to 50% of  its revenue in 
China and German petrochemical giant BASF has in 2019 initiated a US$10 
billion investment project in China.
The EU and Europe in the Indo-Pacific Region 127
Madagascar contest French sovereignty over Tromelin Island 
and the Scattered Islands respectively (both part of France’s 
Southern and Antarctic Lands). The French Indo-Pacific 
strategy will therefore only be successful, Frederic Grare claims, 
“if France’s overseas territories redefine their relations with the 
metropolis to become vectors of political, diplomatic, military, 
economic, and cultural influence”. Given France’s colonial past 
in the region and elsewhere, that is unlikely to happen. The 
country’s overseas territories, Grare seems to suggest, need to 
align their policies with those of France, facilitate and promote 
them. Such an approach smells of French colonialism and 
will probably not meet with much enthusiasm in the overseas 
territories, to put it mildly. 
France’s Ministry of Defence points out that scientific and 
technological progress has led to new risks and sources of 
conflict in the region. Access to deep underwater resources, the 
expansion of military power projection capabilities, anti-access 
and area denial capabilities (meaning China’s capabilities) as 
well as technologically more advanced cyberspace and satellite 
capabilities are all challenges for the region, Paris warns.17 In 
order to meet them, the ministry is planning to expand France’s 
strategic partnerships with countries like Australia, India, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Indonesia and Vietnam. Among others, 
over the last two-three years, Paris has stepped up multilateral 
cooperation in the region through the ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) which, in addition to 
the ten ASEAN member countries, brings Japan, the U.S. and 
even China to the table to discuss regional security, though in a 
very informal manner, and usually leading to the issue of a very 
generic statement. (Of course, the argument can be made that it 
is better to talk to rather than talk about each other). 
The French troops referred to above are stationed in the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Djibouti. Six Rafale fighter jets 
17 For details see also “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific”, Ministère des 
Armes France, May 2019.
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are also based in the UAE and complement four Mirage-2000 
fighters deployed in Djibouti. In the southern Indian Ocean, 
French troops are stationed on La Réunion and the Mayotte 
islands and are supported by 2 surveillance frigates with 1 
helicopter each, 1 supply and support vessel, 2 patrol vessels 
and 2 tactical transport aircraft. In the Pacific Ocean, French 
forces are stationed in New Caledonia and French Polynesia and 
operate 2 surveillance frigates with 1 helicopter each, 3 patrol 
vessels, 2 multi-mission ships, 5 maritime surveillance aircraft, 
4 tactical transport aircraft and 5 helicopters. Paris also has 
18 resident and non-resident defence attachés stationed in 33 
countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Finally, France is engaged 
with regional centres dedicated to the surveillance of maritime 
spaces and lines of communication in the Indo-Pacific. Paris 
has deployed three naval officers to the Information Fusion 
Center in Singapore (IFC), the Regional Centre for the Fusion 
of Maritime Information (CRFIM) in Madagascar and the 
Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region located 
(IFC-IOR) in New Delhi. 
Finally, throughout the year 2018 French President 
Emmanuel Macron gave a series of speeches on France’s role 
in the Indo-Pacific Region.18 In those speeches, he spoke of the 
challenge posed by China’s military rise, Sino-U.S. rivalry and 
tensions and, probably most importantly, what he defined as 
an “axis of cooperation between Canberra, Delhi and Paris”. 
In September 2019 then Macron positioned France as a 
“balancing power” in the Indo-Pacific, a positioning Beijing at 
the time was less than (very) happy about, to put it this way.19 
While this sounds good and forward-looking, in reality it does 
not mean that France is or will ever be such a power. It is in 
18 See e.g. Emmanuel Macron, “Discours à Garden Island”, Base Navale de 
Sydney; Élysée, 3 May  2018. 
19 For details see on China’s reaction see e.g. N. Swanström, J. Panda, and M.N. 
Dugal, Balancing China in the Indo-Pacific: France Joins Hands with India and Australia, 
Issue Brief  no.2, Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP), 
November 2020.
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no way clear how France will “balance” between Washington 
and Beijing nor what such “balancing” would entail or lead to. 
There is certainly no evidence of France having performed such 
a “balancing” act in the recent past.
The German Indo-Pacific Guidelines: 
Talking the Talk without Walking the Walk 
Back in November 2019, Berlin announced the deployment, 
in 2020, of a frigate to the Indian Ocean and potentially to 
the South China Sea.20 Due to the global pandemic, however, 
that did not happen and the frigate Hamburg is now due to 
be deployed sometime in 2021. Berlin also revealed that the 
vessel could also be deployed to the South China Sea but 
has cautioned that it would not sail within 12 nautical miles 
(nm) of Chinese-claimed territories in the South China Sea. 
According to UNCLOS, all states have the right to establish 
what is defined as “territorial sea” extending up to 12 nautical 
miles from the coast.21 Within this zone, coastal states exercise 
sovereignty over the air space above the sea, the seabed and 
the subsoil. By confirming that it would not sail within 12 
nautical miles of Chinese-claimed islands in the South China 
Sea, Germany has de facto recognised Beijing’s illegal territorial 
claims there, making the entire mission pointless through an 
excess of caution not to anger Beijing. In practice, Germany 
will limit itself to what is referred to as “innocent passage” in 
international territorial waters. UNCLOS defines that “passage 
is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take 
place in conformity with this Convention and with other 
20 See B. Müller, “Marine Plant die Entsendung einer Fregatte in den Indo-
Pazifik”, Pivot Area, 26 November 2019.
21 The territorial sea extends to a limit of  12 nautical miles from the baseline of  
a coastal state.
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rules of international law”.22 In dismissal of UNCLOS and 
international law, China, however, does not recognize and 
grant other countries the right to “innocent passage” through 
territorial waters in the South China Sea claimed by itself. 
Furthermore, and here it becomes more complicated and more 
controversial, by calling a passage “innocent”, the passage 
implicitly acknowledges that the waters are part of what a state 
(here China) (since 2016 “illegal”) claims is part of Chinese 
territory. In other words, while the intention is to make a point 
that the passage is taking place in international waters, China 
could see itself confirmed that the islands it claims are part of 
Chinese national territory and de facto acknowledged as such 
by those who exercise their right to “free passage” when sailing 
through those waters. 
In the past, the U.S. navy has conducted so-called “Freedom 
of Navigation Operations” (FONOPs) in the South China 
Sea, challenging Chinese territorial claims that have been 
officially illegal since 2016. U.S. navy vessels have sailed inside 
the aforementioned 12-nautical-mile zones around Chinese-
claimed islands, making Beijing less than happy. The German 
navy, on the other hand, has excluded conducting any such 
FONOPs in the South China Sea, stating instead that its 
frigate would navigate on a zig-zag course around the Chinese-
defined 12 nautical miles zones. The U.S. navy has asked naval 
vessels of other countries to join U.S. FONOPs exercises, 
but so far without success.  To be sure, this might change in 
future, possibly within the framework of the Quad. U.S., 
Japanese, Indian and Australian naval vessels conducting joint 
manoeuvres in disputed waters in the South China Sea might, 
to put it bluntly, remind Beijing that international law cannot 
be dismissed as irrelevant without consequences. 
22 See United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS) of  10 
December 1982; https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
convention_overview_convention.htm. For further details see e.g. S.O. Williams, 
“Maritime Security: The Concept of  Innocent Passage”, The Maritime Executive, 
17 December 2014.
The EU and Europe in the Indo-Pacific Region 131
On the subject of the German contribution to freedom of 
navigation in the Indo-Pacific, it should not go unmentioned 
that, due to a lack of resources and ships that can be deployed 
to the Indo-Pacific, the German frigate Hamburg (if and when 
it will be deployed in 2021) will not be joined by any other 
German navy vessels. It will remain a symbolic contribution. 
It could, of course, become more than this if the German navy 
decides to cooperate with other navies in the Indo-Pacific. This, 
however, is a big “if ”.  
In August 2020, when Germany issued its Indo-Pacific 
policy guidelines, they were hardly a big bang contribution to 
maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.23 They refer to increased 
security engagement in the region through port calls, joint 
exercises and the protection of global maritime trade routes. 
They also call for the “diversification of partnerships in the 
region beyond China” without, however, providing any details 
in that regard. Furthermore, they refer numerous times to an 
ASEAN-centric security architecture, to which Germany is 
planning to make additional contributions. Unfortunately, the 
record shows that ASEAN’s relevance to conflicts or potential 
conflicts in the region, especially territorial ones, is extremely 
limited if not non-existent. The German guidelines also remain 
vague as to what exactly Germany’s security contributions to 
the allegedly ASEAN-centric security architecture might or will 
be. Either way, any talk of ASEAN-centric security architecture 
must be seen against the background of how ASEAN has even 
failed to react to Chinese economic blackmailing of one of 
its own member states in the recent past. ASEAN’s reaction 
to China suspending banana exports from the Philippines in 
June 2016 is a typical example. Beijing temporarily stopped 
importing bananas due to falsely asserted “health reasons” 
after a Philippine warship confronted Chinese fishermen in 
waters around the Scarborough Shoal. The shoal is cluster of 
23 See “German-Europe-Asia. Shaping the 21st Century Together”, Federal 
German Foreign Office, Berlin, August 2020.
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small islets and coral reefs and is located roughly 140 miles off 
the northern coast of the Philippines – within a 200-nautical 
mile “exclusive economic zone” belonging to the Philippines 
according to UNCLOS.24 China halted banana imports from 
the Philippines for six weeks but ASEAN neither reacted nor 
backed up the member state whose territorial integrity had 
been clearly violated. Germany in the meantime seems to have 
concluded that the Code of Conduct agreed between China 
and ASEAN (adopted in 2002) can effectively resolve tensions 
and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.25 In reality, 
nothing could be further from the truth, if only because, as 
far as Beijing is concerned, there are no territorial disputes to 
be resolved. Roughly 95% of the South China Sea, Beijing has 
decided unilaterally, is part of Chinese sovereign territory as 
defined by the so-called Nine-Dash Line which dates back to 
1949 (and the foundation of the PRC). Consequently, from 
a Chinese perspective, there is nothing be negotiated between 
China and ASEAN. Since Beijing has long concluded that there 
are effectively no disputes to resolve, it has decided all by itself 
ASEAN countries’ territorial claims as obsolete. 
The German guidelines emphasise multilateralism and talk 
about NATO expanding ties with countries like Japan and South 
Korea, though how exactly this should be done is not explained. 
The same applies to many of the policy initiatives listed in the 
guidelines’ 70 pages. They envision partnerships with India and 
ASEAN numerous times (India gets mentioned 57 and ASEAN 
66 times) but focus on non-traditional security issues and 
collaboration (as opposed hard/military security cooperation). 
24 See A. Higgins, “In Philippines, Banana Growers Feel Effect of  South China 
Sea Conflict”, The Washington Post, 6 October 2012; next to the Philippines, the 
shoal is also claimed by Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan. Beijing for its parts insists 
that – based on Chinese maps dating back to the XIII century – the shoal (like 
pretty much the rest of  the South China Sea) is part of  – Chinese territory.
25 For a very critical assessment of  the German guidelines see also A. Fulda, 
Germany’s New Policy Paper for the Indo-Pacific: Some Change in Tone, Little in Substance, 
RUSI Commentary, 11 September 2020.
The EU and Europe in the Indo-Pacific Region 133
Climate change, environmental security and public health are 
listed in this context. To sum up, the guidelines are so high 
on rhetoric and low on substance that Germany’s priorities, at 
least under business-friendly Chancellor Angela Merkel, could 
hardly be clearer. Coby Goldberg of the Washington-based 
Center for a New American Security Asia-Pacific Security 
Program provides evidence in that respect.26 On the occasion of 
the virtual EU-China Leaders’ Meeting on 14 September 2020, 
Angela Merkel (on behalf of the EU Presidency) talked for 5 
minutes about issues related to the then ongoing negotiations 
for the EU-China trade agreement but spent only 10 seconds 
on China’s policies towards Hong Kong and minority rights (or 
lack thereof ). 
Conclusions: Not on the Same Page?
In a recent policy brief, Mathieu Duchâtel and Garima Mohan 
argue that France and Germany are pursuing Indo-Pacific 
strategies with contrasting focuses. While the French approach 
to the Indo-Pacific is, they argue, compatible with that of the 
U.S. (albeit the one adopted by President Donald Trump), the 
German approach is not (or not fully so).27 Comparing the 
French Indo-Pacific policy strategy paper with the one issued by 
the U.S. State Department in November 2019, they conclude 
that the French and U.S. approaches are well aligned because 
they both prioritise a coercion-free and open Indo-Pacific and 
adherence to international law, including freedom of navigation 
in international territorial waters. The German strategy, they 
argue, reflects Berlin’s refusal to align itself with the U.S. 
approach (again, the one adopted by Trump – we shall find out 
in 2021 whether the Biden approach differs). In this context, 
26 C. Goldberg, “Germany’s Indo-Pacific Vision: A New Reckoning With China 
or More Strategic Drift?”, The Diplomat, 15 September 2020.
27 M. Duchâtel and G. Mohan, Franco-German Divergences in the Indo-Pacific: The Risk 
of  Strategic Dilution, Institut Montaigne, 30 October 2020.
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Duchâtel and Mohan cite Berlin’s repeated refusal to choose 
sides between Washington and China as (alleged) evidence 
for their conclusion. However, in recent years, especially since 
Trump launched his de facto trade war with China, not only 
German policymakers but those of other interested countries 
too have shown determination not to become entangled in 
U.S.-Sino conflicts over trade and security. 
While the German guidelines fail to provide details on 
other possible bilateral or multilateral partnerships, the French 
explicitly propose expanding bilateral, trilateral and multilateral 
ties with Australia, India and Japan, as the authors point out. Of 
course, talking about expanding French bilateral or multilateral 
security ties in the Indo-Pacific is not tantamount to doing 
so, and it should never be forgotten that these guidelines are 
written by policymakers and bureaucrats. There are obviously 
no operational, let alone legal, obligations to follow up or 
implement what is written in them.  
The German Indo-Pacific guidelines, Duchâtel and Mohan 
point out, are clear in their concern about China unilaterally 
altering the territorial status quo and accuse the country 
of “calling into question existing rules of the international 
order”. In this context, they cite various disputes with 
Chinese involvement, such as the border dispute with India 
in the Himalayas. To counter Chinese policies and territorial 
expansionism, the German guidelines go on to call for closer 
cooperation between like-minded countries and democracies in 
the region. The authors wonder how this fits in with calling for 
a more “inclusive” Indo-Pacific and the possibility of working 
with China on selected areas such as climate change. This, 
however, is neither unusual nor exceptional: it is very much 
in line with the overall EU approach towards China, which is 
to express concerns (albeit to no avail and without convincing 
Beijing to modify any of its policies) about a steadily increasing 
number of Chinese regional policies while at the same time 
not abandoning the hope of cooperating with China in more 
“uncontroversial” areas like climate change. 
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Unfortunately for the EU, and all other countries dealing 
or negotiating with Beijing, from a Chinese perspective, the 
number of controversial and “sensitive” issues is growing 
constantly. In fact, almost everything on China’s domestic and 
foreign policy agenda has become “sensitive” and Beijing warns 
those who want to make money with and in China to refrain 
from commenting, let alone criticising. The EU, at least so it 
seems, is playing ball with this: the aforementioned EU-China 
trade agreement is a reminder that Brussels and EU member 
states are prepared, as they have always been, to put geopolitical 
and geostrategic interests and ambitions on the back burner in 
return for problem-free access to the Chinese market and the 
country’s 400 million middle-class consumers. Business over 
principle EU-style. What else can I say?
Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations for the EU
This Report offers clear insights into the extent to which the 
Sars-CoV-2 pandemic may affect Asian security in the short 
term. It identifies trends current at the time of writing, when 
the global pandemic has not yet been defeated, that will 
be crucial to understanding the continent’s post-pandemic 
security landscape. All contributors to this report in essence 
agree in placing systemic and geopolitical competition between 
China and the United States at the heart of these trends. Sars-
CoV-2, which originated in China (though Beijing has yet to 
fully acknowledge this) has not increased bilateral cooperation 
under the auspices of and within the framework of the World 
Health Organization (WHO), at least not under Donald 
Trump’s presidency. This is to a large extent because the WHO 
has more than once been accused (and not only by the U.S.) 
of having responded too slowly to the global pandemic, and of 
taking Chinese assurances that the country was able to contain 
the virus at face value. Records do indeed show that for months 
the WHO failed to critically verify or monitor Chinese data 
and crisis management. While for now it seems that Asia has 
been more successful and efficient in containing the virus, 
democratic and authoritarian states have used different methods 
and instruments to do so. The differences between the ways in 
which the virus has been contained in Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan on the one hand and in China on the other are stark. 
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China’s lockdowns in Wuhan and around the country enabled 
Beijing to declare a premature victory over the pandemic. In 
contrast, the U.S. under Trump could not have handled the 
crisis in a more disastrous fashion, though that did not prevent 
the president from playing a blame game and calling Sars-
CoV-2 the “Chinese virus”. Throughout this period, China has 
continued to build military bases on disputed islands in the 
South China Sea. In fact, Beijing has undoubtedly considered 
the ongoing global pandemic as an opportunity to speed up 
the construction of facilities on islands that, from a Chinese 
perspective, belong to China and China only. Washington 
under Trump has largely stood by while Beijing has been quick 
and efficient in filling the regional (and global) leadership 
vacuum left by a disastrous U.S. regime.
This Report also shows that Sars-CoV-2 has exacerbated 
the reliance of Asia’s most fragile countries on China. Several 
countries in South and South-east Asia have become used to 
relying on China for their developmental needs since the Belt 
and Road Initiative was implemented. During the acute phase 
of the health crisis, these countries have also grown accustomed 
to Chinese aid and many have now assumed debts with Beijing 
to ensure a supply of vaccines in the future. As the post-Sars-
CoV-2 economic crisis looms over the region, these nations 
may be drawn even more towards Chinese investments and 
developmental programmes in an effort to relaunch their 
economies. This overreliance introduces a serious risk that 
the region’s balance of power might shift in the short term, 
leading to greater support and a more central role for China 
even within the framework of regional organisations like 
the “Association for South-East Asian Nations” (ASEAN). 
The recently adopted “Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership” is a case in point. The security ramifications of 
such an occurrence would be extensive, particularly in the 
South China Sea, where finding common ground between 
China’s claims and those of other contestants has become 
more and more difficult: lines of maritime communication 
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may be radically modified to accommodate contrasting 
interests among regional powers.
In addition to the destabilising effect of China-U.S. competition 
and the risks associated with Beijing’s growing regional influence 
and economic clout, other security issues, like the continuing 
isolation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
and a new wave of Islamic terrorism in the region, will remain 
security challenges in post-Sars-CoV-2 Asia. In light of the above 
and based on the authors’ contributions to this work, we can put 
forward the following recommendations for European Union 
policy on post-pandemic regional security in Asia.
a) Work towards a comprehensive EU policy for the Indo-Pacific 
region instead of  relying on bilateral agreements
EU interest in the Indo-Pacific region has been confirmed 
by the negotiation and establishment of several bilateral free 
trade agreements with regional actors from Japan to Vietnam. 
At the same time, an increasing number of EU countries have 
been developing their own national Indo-Pacific strategies, 
signalling growing interest in the region at the national level 
too. However, the fragmented approach taken so far by EU 
institutions operating almost exclusively on a bilateral basis, 
aimed at engaging with countries in the region individually, 
has little chance of countering China’s influence and impact. 
Therefore, if the EU is serious about becoming a real security 
actor in the region, it should seek not only to publish an EU 
Indo-Pacific strategy as early as possible in 2021 but should 
also work out and explain how such an EU strategy can be 
reconciled with and complemented by existing French, German 
and Dutch Indo-Pacific guidelines. Given the limited resources 
available, duplication must be avoided at all costs. Furthermore, 
an EU Indo-Pacific policy must have a clear and limited focus 
and must establish where its priorities lie and how policy and 
strategy proposals can be implemented on the ground. All too 
often, EU policy and strategy papers list far too many issues 
and areas that Brussels would like to address and tackle, usually 
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with very few resources and tools. This approach has never 
worked in the past and will not work in the future. Therefore, 
“less is more”. Brussels needs to identify its priorities in the 
Indo-Pacific: EU policy guidelines must not be allowed to read 
like a “shopping list” of unresolved security issues in the region.
b) Identify the differences between the U.S. and the EU approaches 
to security in Asia
As mentioned above, all contributors to this report have identified 
U.S.-China competition and rivalry as the most pressing short-
term issue for Asian security. As noted by a variety of observers, 
the counterbalance to Chinese power presented by the U.S.-EU 
alliance has been weakened by structural differences between the 
approaches of the two partners. While the EU has mainly been 
working bilaterally, the U.S. has attempted to build alliance-like 
frameworks, the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” being the 
latest example. The EU needs to address the contradictions that 
characterise these two approaches and find common ground if 
it is to foster a complementary regional policy. Furthermore, 
there would be nothing wrong with exploring the possibility 
of the EU moving towards the Quad either informally or 
even institutionally. The British are already considering the 
establishment of operational cooperation with the Quad and 
there is little doubt that the EU and the four Quad countries 
can refer to each other as “like-minded”. This is imperative in 
light of the fact that – to put it bluntly – the gloves are off in the 
Indo-Pacific and China is challenging the status quo in territorial 
waters. While conflict is not inevitable, it is nonetheless time to 
deter threats to peace and stability in the region. Finally, Brussels 
and Washington must pick up the pieces of EU-U.S. cooperation 
in Asia that Donald Trump has smashed over the last four years, 
and collaborate again without the ill-fated threat of tariffs on 
European exports. The EU’s adoption of a trade and investment 
agreement with China at the very end of last year might not 
therefore have been the most effective move. The fact that Beijing 
refers to the EU’s readiness to sign such an agreement as “evidence 
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of strategic autonomy” does not improve the prospects for rapid 
improvement in EU-U.S. cooperation in Asia in general, and 
with regard to China in particular. 
c) Build more EU-led dialogues in which policy discussions can be 
conducted outside China’s sphere of  influence
The Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) is 
a prime example of an EU-led multi-stakeholder initiative 
aimed at maintaining an independent framework within which 
policy debates can be conducted free from China’s influence 
over multilateral institutions. Global institutions have become 
a strategic tool in China’s rise, as the country’s government 
envisions them as frameworks for the development of common 
rules tailored to China’s national standards, especially in the 
technology sector. In order to contrast this trend, the EU 
needs to foster GPAI-like initiatives in the security domain 
too, especially involving those Asian partners most exposed to 
China’s growing power in the wake of Sars-CoV-2.
d) Strengthen the EU humanitarian assistance network to support 
the DPRK in countering the health, food and economic crises
One of the main potential impacts of the Sars-CoV-2 pandemic 
on Asian security concerns North Korea. The health emergency 
and restrictions to international mobility have further restricted 
access to the DPRK. The country therefore risks becoming even 
more isolated from the international community (if that is at 
all possible) and focusing exclusively on nuclear militarisation. 
Since the mid-1990s, the EU has been providing aid to selected 
communities in the DPRK, especially with regard to food 
security. The EU should strengthen the network through which 
European teams traditionally offer humanitarian assistance to 
North Korea in order to help the country respond to the dual 
effects of economic sanctions and the pandemic-driven health 
and economic crises. By doing so, the EU may succeed in 
limiting DPRK’s isolation.
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e) Support national digital literacy programmes in South 
and South-east Asia to counter Islamic radicalisation
Sars-CoV-2 has forced Asia and the world into a digitalisation 
drive. In the case of South and South-east Asia, this process 
has occurred in countries experiencing rising levels of Islamic 
terrorism and political violence. Given the connection between 
digitalisation, the online diffusion of violent extremism and 
youth radicalisation, digital literacy programmes need to be 
included in national recovery strategies. The EU’s Development 
Cooperation Instrument, which already finances the Regional 
Multiannual Indicative Programme for Asia and the Erasmus+ 
programme, could be employed to expand EU-Asia cooperation 
in higher education and to devise programmes specifically 
aimed at offering young people viable tools for navigating a 
Sars-CoV-2-inspired digital world.
To conclude, the main impact of Sars-CoV-2 on security in Asia 
has been to re-focus the spotlight on the connection between 
traditional and non-traditional security in the region. While 
this issue has long characterised Asia, the pandemic has brought 
it to the fore. Indeed, traditional security is bound to become 
ever more closely tied to other vectors of human security in the 
short run, leading to a shift in the concepts and paradigms that 
have distinguished the continent until now.
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